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Abstract
UNGODLY FREEDOM: HOW PHILOSOPHERS RISE AND EMPIRES FALL IN
THE WORK OF LEO STRAUSS
by
Eli Karetny

Advisor: Professor Corey Robin

This dissertation argues that to fully understand the work of Leo Strauss, scholars
must look beyond the Platonic and Machiavellian elements in Strauss and explore how
Nietzsche’s ideas about nihilism, the will to power, the eternal return, and the
ubermensch influence Strauss’s critique of modernity, his understanding of the
relationship between philosophy and politics, and his redefinition of the philosopher as a
prophetic lawgiver. This study examines the Nietzschean origins of Strauss’s hierarchical
theory of freedom, which vests reimagined philosophers with the authority to create truth
and meaning. I argue that Strauss’s concept of philosophy and corresponding pedagogy
cultivates new intellectual elites who aim at the transformation of democratic regimes
based on Strauss’s vision of permanent cyclical movement propelled by an aristocratic
ideal of excellence and the possibility of an emergent monarch. Strauss’s defense of
noble imperialism and his critique of modern universalism are rooted in an apocalyptic
theory in which the destruction of existing orders clears the way for the emergence of
future founders.
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Introduction
After 9/11 and the Bush administration’s declaration of a war on terror, journalists
and scholars began to debate the teaching and legacy of the philosopher Leo Strauss. 1
While Strauss’s work had long been a subject of controversy in the academy, the
ascendancy in the Bush administration of neoconservative policy intellectuals, many
claiming Strauss as a teacher, created a reputation for the philosopher as the inspiration of
a new American empire. This reputation was created through both journalistic accounts
and academic treatments. While several of these new treatments of Strauss properly focus
on the Nietzschean elements of his thinking, which could plausibly be linked to robust
programs of warfare and domination, this dissertation argues that that Nietzschean
element of Strauss’s teaching has been radically misconstrued.
This dissertation argues that Strauss’s political philosophy has nothing to say
about the promotion of freedom and democracy through imperial expansion, but does
advocate noble expressions of freedom and imperialism, which combine aristocratic and
authoritarian principles with an apocalyptic vision. The argument here is that the
Nietzschean elements in Strauss’s teaching shape his understanding of the philosopher’s
intellectual and political purpose and that a reimagined conception of freedom as the
creation of truth and meaning is central to that purpose. Though Nietzschean ideas are at
1

see James Atlas, “Leo-Cons: A Classicist’s Legacy: New Empire Builders,” New York Times, May 4,
2003, sec. 4, Week in Review, 1; Alain Frachon and Daniel Vernet, “The Strategist and the Philosopher,”
Le Monde, April 19, 2003 (trans. Mark K. Jensen); Steven Lenzner and William Kristol, “What Was Leo
Strauss Up To?” Public Interest, Fall 2003, 10; Jim Lobe, “Neo-Cons Dance a Straussian Waltz,” Asia
Times Online, May 9, 2003; Richard Lacoyo, “You’ve Read about Who’s Influential, but Who Has the
Power?” Time, June 17, 1996, 56; Brent Staples, “Undemocratic Vistas: The Sinister Vogue of Leo
Strauss,” New York Times, November 28, 1994; Seymour Hersh, “Selective Intelligence,” New Yorker,
May 12, 2003, 6; Jeet Heer, “The Philosopher,” Boston Globe, May 11, 2003, H1; William Pfaff, “The
Long Reach of Leo Strauss,” International Herald Tribune, May 15, 2003; Richard Bernstein, “A Very
Unlikely Villian (or Hero),” New York Times, January 29, 1995, E4; Charles Larmore, “The Secrets of
Philosophy,” New Republic, July 3, 1989, p. 32; Paul Gottfried, “Straussians vs. Paleo-Conservatives,”
Lew Rockwell, May 17, 2002.
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the core of Strauss’s political philosophy, Nietzsche’s influence is often concealed and
downplayed as certain Platonic and Machiavellian themes are elevated. A recurring
Platonic theme that Strauss draws attention to is the concept of noble lies, but in Strauss’s
Nietzscheanized interpretation, the emphasis is on the philosopher’s need to suppress
dangerous truths and create life-giving truths. The Machiavellian aspects of Strauss’s
teaching tie the philosopher’s creative thinking to an uber-heroic justification for political
deception that blurs the difference between political and theological concepts.
I argue that Strauss’s thinking is both utopian and apocalyptic in the way that it
aims to create a new class of thinkers who can transform reality through philosophy and
politics. Strauss’s teaching is based on a vision of cyclical political movement in which
constitutional regimes become corrupt and give way to “post-constitutional Caesars” who
prepare the way for a “pre-constitutional situation” that creates space for new
philosophers to become founders and lawgivers. This dissertation explores how Strauss’s
ideas about freedom and imperialism point to a rebellion against modern democratic
regimes, which Strauss sees converging toward a World State 2 that represents the Final
Tyranny, 3 which ends the prospects of future founders. Freedom and imperialism come
together in Strauss’s work not to propel the movement toward a universal empire, but as a
noble countermovement animated by Strauss’s monarchical ideal in which philosophers
are treated as god-like kings because they are the highest source of truth, meaning and
wisdom. But for Strauss’s wise men to emerge as founders and lawgivers, modern
civilization as we know it must come to an end.

2

Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 149.
Leo Strauss, On Tyranny: An Interpretation of Xenophon’s Hiero, Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth
eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 208.
3

2

The Political Context
The debates about Strauss’s influence on neoconservatism brought the relevance
of Strauss’s work to a wider audience as journalists and scholars raised concerns that
policymakers influenced by Strauss’s teaching were pursuing an agenda that differed
from what was publicly proclaimed. Critics across the political spectrum pointed to
various aspects of Strauss’s thought to alert the public of the potential disaster that could
result from US policies. Three crucial themes came out of those writings about Strauss’s
work: his focus on civilization-defining wars, his defense of elitism and hierarchy, and
his promotion of “noble lies” to justify political deception.
First, critics suggested that when neoconservative policy intellectuals framed the
war on terror as a civilizational conflict they were guided by Strauss’s teaching. James
Atlas saw in the Iraq War the expansion of the American Empire motivated by “nothing
less than a defense of Western Civilization - as interpreted by the late classicist and
philosopher Leo Strauss.” 4 Others noted that Strauss’s defense of Western civilization
was based on a worldview that was atypical for proponents of Western liberal democracy.
Seymour Hersh pointed to Strauss’s “tendency to view the world as a place where
isolated liberal democracies live in constant danger from hostile elements abroad, and
face threats that must be confronted vigorously and with strong leadership.” 5 Hersh saw
in Strauss’s scholarly defense of freedom and democracy a way of thinking that leads to
militarism and authoritarianism. William Pfaff described Strauss’s theory as a “bleak and
anti-utopian philosophy that goes against practically everything Americans want to

4

James Atlas, “Leo-Cons: A Classicist’s Legacy: New Empire Builders,” New York Times, May 4, 2003,
sec. 4, Week in Review, 1.
5
Seymour Hersh, “Selective Intelligence,” New Yorker, May 12, 2003, 6.
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believe,” a theory that “contradicts the conventional wisdom of modern democratic
society.” 6 What these characterizations miss are the utopian aspects of Strauss’s work
and the way his defense of freedom and imperialism were expressions of rebellion
against the modern democratic principles that grew out of Western civilization.
The second common theme present in the debates about Strauss’s influence on
neoconservative intellectuals is his reputation for elitism, which promotes a hierarchical
worldview. Jeet Heer framed Strauss’s elitism as something more troubling than a simple
defense of wealth and privilege. Heer pointed out that when Strauss says “only
philosophers can handle the truth,” he is invoking a deeper justification for hierarchy,
which runs counter to the enlightenment principle that truth and freedom lead to human
happiness. 7 According to this reading, Strauss’s elitism is tied to his teaching that
philosophers are uniquely wise in knowing how to protect ordinary people from
dangerous truths. Insufficient scholarly attention has been given to the idea that for
Strauss, the philosophers’ unique wisdom grants them the authority to create alternative
truths.
The third theme present in the commentaries on Strauss’s teaching highlight the
way Strauss invokes Plato’s concept of noble lies as a philosophical justification for
political deception. Even Strauss’s students acknowledged that the Machiavellian aspects
of Strauss’s teaching justify political deception in pursuit of unstated, idealistic aims. 8
Critics treated Strauss’s treatment of Plato’s noble lies as little more than a philosophical

6

William Pfaff, “The Long Reach of Leo Strauss,” International Herald Tribune, May 15, 2003,
http://www.iht.com/articles/96307.html.
7
Jeet Heer, “The Philosopher,” Boston Globe, May 11, 2003, H1.
8 Catherine Zuckert and Michael Zuckert, The Truth About Leo Strauss: Political Philosophy and American
Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 7.
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veil for Machiavellian duplicity. 9 Whereas Plato used myths and untruths for pedagogical
purposes to promote social harmony, Strauss’s version focused on esoteric
communication between elites in pursuit of a hidden agenda. 10
Even as scholars sought to correct the critics by drawing attention to the
misunderstood elements of his teaching, they paid too much attention to how his students
used political lies to justify policy goals and too little on his own justification for the use
of philosophy to create truth. Anne Norton even argued that journalists were wrongly
blaming Strauss for a political program promoted by errant pupils who misunderstood
Strauss’s higher philosophical aims. 11 She saw in neoconservative policies an expression
of imperial adventurism justified by Straussian intellectuals who, like Alcibiades, were
inspired by their teacher’s words to set sail for Sicily. Mark Lilla attempted to set the
record straight by explaining that Strauss’s work on Plato was a cautionary tale that
warns intellectuals not to succumb to the tyrannical temptation and not to embark on
heroic adventures that may bring ruin to the empire. 12 Lilla is right that Strauss’s Platonic
teaching about noble lies goes beyond a Machiavellian justification for political
deception. And Strauss does explicitly oppose tyranny, just as he does indeed warn
against pursuing empire as an end in itself. But my argument is that we must look beyond
Strauss’s readings of Plato and Machiavelli to see how the Nietzschean elements in

9

See Seymour Hersh, “Selective Intelligence,” New Yorker, May 12, 2003, 6; Richard Bernstein, “A Very
Unlikely Villian (or Hero),” New York Times, January 29, 1995.
10
See Shadia Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 27,
Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 77,
Nicholas Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue: Unveiling Leo Strauss and the Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy
(New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 118.
11
Anne Norton, Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2004), p. 200.
12
Mark Lilla, The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics (New York: New York Review of Books, 2001),
pp. 130-136.
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Strauss led him to imagine something greater than tyranny, something more glorious than
empire.
The Scholarly Literature
The scholarly task of interpreting Strauss’s work is made difficult by the way he
read and wrote about political theory and the way crucial influences are concealed in his
interpretation of other thinkers. The interpretive techniques Strauss described in his
discussion of esoteric writing should be applied to his own work because, as his students
acknowledge, he incorporates methods of hidden communication that can only be
understood by first recognizing that he employed the same “rules of writing” that he
attributed to other political philosophers. 13
Academics influenced by Strauss and his interpretive techniques offer clues as to
why Strauss’s work has long been misinterpreted by scholars. Strauss scholars provide
good reasons for believing that the techniques of concealment and “writing between the
lines” which Strauss attributed to other political philosophers are employed in his own
writings. Harvey Mansfield, a prominent student of Strauss’s, acknowledges that Strauss
used various methods of concealment and misdirection in his scholarship. 14 Mansfield’s
discussion of Strauss’s work on Machiavelli draws the reader’s attention to some of the
ways Strauss concealed his true teaching and the fact that there is a hidden teaching to
uncover. Strauss’s readings of Plato and Machiavelli are especially relevant in this regard
because they demonstrates how central themes in Strauss’s political philosophy were
presented in a manner that concealed his actual teaching.

13

Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 30.
Harvey Mansfield, “Strauss’s Machiavelli,” Political Theory, Vol. 3, No. 4, November 1975, pp. 372384.
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The reactions by Strauss’s students to scholars who critique Strauss’s methods
help explain the reasons behind Strauss’s esoteric style of reading and writing, which has
long frustrated scholarly efforts to understand his work. Soon after Strauss’s death,
J.G.A. Pocock tried to engage Harvey Mansfield in a scholarly debate about Strauss’s
interpretation of Machiavelli. The result is an important published exchange in which
Pocock describes various writing techniques used by Strauss, which obscure his meaning
and make academic discussion of his work exceedingly difficult. 15 For outsiders, his
style of reading and writing act as a barrier to entry meant to keep away unwanted
observers. For his students, these techniques have served as a kind of philosophical
training. Strauss’s pedagogy of close textual reading comes along with his use of
concealment, confusion, paradox, inconsistency, and irreconcilable tensions, which force
readers into constant engagement with mysterious gaps, curious contradictions, and
purposeful silences alongside intriguing allusions and complex puzzles. Those who
withstand what Pocock refers to as Strauss’s efforts to “condition and brutalize the
subliminal consciousness” are inspired to fill the gaps, solve the contradictions, and see
in pregnant silences the space where new truths can be born and put into the mouths of
others. Pocock explains how Strauss’s method is to impute intention to an author
wherever there is silence, anomaly, inconsistency, or contradiction; “wherever the
example seemed not to prove what it was intended to prove,” Strauss claimed that the
author “was alerting us to his intention of saying something other than what appears on
the face of the text.” 16 The method ultimately makes the interpretation non-falsifiable,

15

J.G.A. Pocock, “Prophet and Inquisitor, Or, A Church Built Upon Bayonets Cannot Stand: A Comment
on Mansfield’s ‘Strauss’s Machiavelli,’” Political Theory, Vol. 3, No. 4, November 1975, pp. 385-401.
16
Ibid.
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prevents open academic discussion, and creates a mechanism for Strauss’s followers to
promote their own truths and recruit other to advance those truths.
Due to the obstacles Pocock points out, scholars have misinterpreted the
significance of Strauss’s reading of Machiavelli. Scholars influenced by Strauss’s
teaching have, over the years, tended to focus on his critique of Machiavelli as the
founder of a modernity that leads to nihilism. 17 This reading of Strauss neglects entirely
the Nietzschean elements of his teaching, but even those scholars who see Nietzsche’s
influence in Strauss’s reading of Machiavelli focus on the use of political deception in
pursuit of an imperial agenda or in the service of a Schmittian conception of permanent
warfare. 18 There is good reason why scholars look to Strauss’s work on Machiavelli to
understand Strauss’s glorification of founders and lawgivers, but along with the
Nietzschean emphasis on philosophers as creators, the religious dimension of Strauss’s
Machiavelli has also been concealed.
Even as Strauss criticizes Machiavelli’s overt atheism and faults him for initiating
a mode of modern thought that puts nature and philosophy at the service of all mankind,
at a deeper level Strauss glorifies Machiavelli as a prophetic lawgiver and the creator of a
new world. Paradoxically, an atheistic Machiavelli showed Strauss how philosophers can
be politically mobilized by religious modes of thought and expression. Mansfield
presents the political wisdom Strauss learned from Machiavelli as a secret, sacred
doctrine that can only be properly expressed in religious terms: “Strauss’s secret teaching

17

See Robert J. McShea, “Leo Strauss on Machiavelli,” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4,
December 1963, pp. 782-797; Kim A. Sorenson, Discourses on Strauss, (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2006).
18
Shadia Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Nicholas
Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue: Unveiling Leo Strauss and the Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy (New York:
Routledge, 2008).
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is classical natural right, but he chose to ally this with, or express it in, the tradition of
religious belief.” 19 Strauss criticized Machiavelli qua modern political thinker who
subverted existing religious beliefs, but Strauss honored Machiavelli the philosopher who
restored a pre-modern religious spiritedness and inspired the actions of future founders.
Peter Minowitz argues that Strauss’s most far-reaching claim about Machiavelli has not
gotten the scholarly attention it warrants. Minowitz says that “Strauss’s Machiavelli,
between the lines, not only recommended techniques of political control that incorporate
lessons he’d gleaned from Christianity’s unprecedented global influence; he also
recruited a future brigade of philosophers who would employ such techniques on behalf
of an entirely worldly agenda. The explanations that Harvey Mansfield and Leo Paul S.
De Alvarez have provided of such “spiritual warfare,” I maintain, have yet to be
sufficiently developed and assessed.” 20 Though Strauss claims this combination of
philosophy, politics, and religion are embedded in Machiavelli’s writings, Mansfield
admits that “Strauss has put a teaching in Machiavelli’s mouth in order to prepare a
return to his own classical teaching.” 21 Strauss’s reading of Plato has long been
recognized as central to that teaching.
Miles Burnyeat’s critique of Strauss’s work on Plato was a seminal event in
Strauss studies because of the way Burnyeat refuted Strauss’s interpretation and claimed
that it contained a political agenda meant to inspire future followers. 22 Burnyeat’s
critique triggered a wave of published responses from Strauss’s students, all of which
19

Harvey Mansfield, “Strauss’s Machiavelli,” Political Theory, Vol. 3, No. 4, November 1975, pp. 372384.
20
Peter Minowitz, “The Enduring Problem of Leo Strauss?” Claremont Review of Books Special Edition,
Fall 2014.
21
Mansfield, p.381.
22
Miles Burnyeat, “The Sphinx Without a Secret,” New York Review of Books, May 30, 1985, pp. 30-36.
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1985/05/30/sphinx-without-a-secret/.
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focused less on the faults Burnyeat exposed in Strauss’s reading of Plato and more on
Burnyeat’s claim that Strauss taught his students to surrender their critical faculties and
devote themselves to realizing Strauss’s own goals. Due to Strauss’s gifts as an inspiring
teacher, Burnyeat wrote, an academic cult formed around him that “gives his ideas a
potency that they lack on the printed page.” 23 Strauss’s students demonstrate in their
responses to Burnyeat how the religious themes Mansfield and Minowitz said were
present in Strauss’s Machiavelli were also present in Strauss’s own pedagogy to such an
extent that his teaching is transmitted to his students as religious wisdom.
Whereas Mansfield’s response to Pocock’s critique of Strauss’s Machiavelli
demonstrates a form of interpretation that promotes a political agenda rather than open
scholarly debate, the responses by Strauss’s students to Burnyeat’s critique of Strauss’s
Plato demonstrate how Strauss’s teaching contains a religious dimension. Harry Jaffa’s
response stands out, and not only because he is recognized as the founder of the West
coast school of Straussianism that promotes a unique mythology of American
nationalism. 24 Jaffa’s response focuses on Burnyeat’s charge that Strauss was an
inspiring teacher, and rather than denying the claim, he embraces it and elevates Strauss
in the manner that Strauss elevated Machiavelli, which is to say, he treats him as a
prophetic lawgiver by comparing him to Moses. Jaffa focuses on Strauss’s concept of
natural right and explains how it is the source of a higher wisdom “for the American
people as much as were the tablets of law brought down by Moses from Sinai for the

23

Ibid.
See Anne Norton, Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2004).

24
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children of Israel.” 25 Jaffa’s response shows how Strauss transformed political
philosophy into a religious experience:
It is difficult to convey to anyone who has not shared such an experience the excitement I
felt - now nearly forty years ago - when I realized that I had been emancipated from the
dungeon of historicism, from that dark place of the soul in which the great questions, the
only questions that make life ultimately worth living, are treated as “essentially
meaningless.” That excitement has however never left me, and I can have only pity for
those - like Professor Burnyeat - who seem likely never to know it. 26

This is philosophic freedom as a kind of religious emancipation, a never-ending source of
excitement and energy that makes life meaningful and worth living. Jaffa captures how
the Platonic Strauss taught his students to think about freedom. For Strauss, “Platonizing”
entails philosophical truth-creation that reflects Nietzsche’s influence on Strauss and
redefines the task of philosophy by turning thinkers into lawgivers, meaning-makers, and
founders. Like Mansfield says about Strauss’s Machiavelli, Jaffa was taught by Strauss
that Plato contained a “classical natural right” teaching, but both the Machiavellian and
Platonic sides of Strauss interpret that teaching as the lawgiving authority of supra-human
thinkers who create the foundations for all meaningful truth and order.
Scholars have misunderstood how the Nietzschean dimensions of Strauss’s work
influence the Platonic and Machiavellian elements that scholars have long viewed as the
constitutive features of his political philosophy. The discovery of personal letters from
Strauss to friends and colleagues have forced scholars to further explore Nietzsche’s
influence on Strauss’s work. One of the most significant discoveries in those letters is
Strauss’s admission to Karl Lowith that “Nietzsche so dominated and charmed me

25
Allan Bloom, Joseph Cropsey, Robert Gordis, Harry V. Jaffa, Clifford Orwin, Thomas L. Pangle et al.,
“The Studies of Leo Strauss: An Exchange,” New York Review of Books, October 10, 1985. In response
to Miles Burnyeat, “Sphinx Without a Secret,” New York Review of Books, May 30, 1985, pp. 30-36.
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1985/10/10/the-studies-of-leo-strauss-an-exchange/.
26
Ibid.
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between my 22nd and 30th years that I literally believed everything I understood of
him." 27 Some scholars like Steven Smith argue that Strauss ultimately broke free of
Nietzsche’s spell and turned to Plato “for the reconstruction of prescientific
consciousness” as part of an effort to redirect the path thinkers like Heidegger took from
Nietzsche and to redefine the role of philosophers. 28 In this reading, the Platonic elements
in Strauss point to the religious and mythical sources of wisdom, which are then
incorporated into Strauss’s reading of other political philosophers like Machiavelli, who
Smith sees as the basis of Strauss’s understanding of “the primacy of political things.” 29
Other scholars accept that Strauss’s turn to Plato and Machiavelli involve an
effort to redirect the post-Nietzschean path of philosophy, but they see Nietzsche’s
influence persisting throughout Strauss’s writings. Nicholas Xenos emphasizes that the
apparently Machiavellian sources for Strauss’s understanding of the relationship between
politics and philosophy actually originate from Strauss’s encounter with Carl Schmitt. 30
Others see Strauss’s critique of Schmitt’s concept of the political as both an admission of
Schmitt’s influence and a signal that Nietzsche remained Strauss’s true guiding star. Alan
Gilbert sees Strauss’s critique of modernity as “a Nietzschean denunciation of the
epochs-long revolt of the poor, the triumph of ‘slave morality’ and equality.” 31
Moreover, Gilbert sees Strauss’s defense of freedom in opposition to modern tyranny as
not only Nietzschean but also apocalyptic because it “envisions nuclear destruction as a

27

Leo Strauss letter to Karl Lowith, June 23, 1965 in The Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss, ed.
Steven B. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 148.
28
Steven B. Smith “‘Destruktion’ or Recovery?: Leo Strauss’s Critique of Heidegger,” The Review of
Metaphysics, Vol.51, No.2 (Dec. 1997), pp. 345-377.
29
Ibid.
30
Nicholas Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue: Unveiling Leo Strauss and the Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy
(New York: Routledge, 2008).
31
Alan Gilbert, “ Strauss’s Vision of a Great Anti-modern Tyrant and its Bizarre American Consequences,”
June 2, 2009. http://www.democraticindividuality.com/2009/06/strausss-vision-of-great-anti-modern.html.
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return to a human ‘spring’ as if everything would grow anew and then cycle through
again to the ‘last men.’” 32 This reading is reflected in the scholars who see an
“apocalyptic utopianism” animating Strauss and those influenced by his teaching who are
guided by a “hope that a purgative fire will clear the ground for a new world order.” 33
Shadia Drury has long promoted the interpretation that Strauss’s diagnosis of and
response to the “crisis of modernity” is a Nietzschean confrontation with nihilism in a
godless world. 34 Drury explores how Nietzsche’s ideas about absent gods shape
Straussian pedagogy and how Strauss embeds Nietzsche’s themes of suffering, heroism,
and meaning-creation into his recruitment efforts: “Nietzsche thought that only when
suffering is witnessed by gods did it become meaningful and heroic. Soaring high,
Strauss discovered that there are no gods to witness human suffering; and finding the job
vacant, he recruited his acolytes.” 35 But Drury overemphasizes the aspect of tyrannical
rule by elites in her reading of Strauss. Despite his view that a philosopher should see
himself as the “ruler of rulers,” 36 Strauss’s aim is to inspire future philosophers to be
creators of new regimes rather than the hidden power guiding existing rulers.
Unique among Strauss’s defenders, Laurence Lampert embraces the Nietzschean
influence on Strauss but argues that the crucial difference between Nietzsche and Strauss
is that Strauss insisted on publicly concealing the death of God. Beyond that important

32

Ibid.
Corey Robin, “In the Shadow of Tyranny,” New Statesman, June 13, 2005.
https://www.newstatesman.com/node/162260.
34
Shadia Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
35
Shadia Drury, “Leo Strauss and the Grand Inquisitor” Free Inquiry Magazine, Volume 24, Number 4,
November 2004. http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article7395.htm.
36
Leo Strauss, On Tyranny: An Interpretation of Xenophon’s Hiero, Victor Gourevitch and Michael S.
Roth eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 86.
33
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difference, for Lampert, Strauss’s political philosophy, exemplified by his readings of
Plato and Machiavelli, is decisively influenced by Nietzsche. Lampert shows how Strauss
used Plato’s views about eros to reformulate Nietzsche’s concept of the will-to-power:
the good-in-itself, according to Lampert’s take on how Strauss read Plato, is “a
satisfaction of striving that can only be the initiation of new striving and not satiation.” 37
Lampert sees Strauss making Nietzsche’s ceaseless striving compatible with the
affirmation of a permanently unchanging world. According to Lampert, Strauss gives
new expression to Nietzsche’s paradoxical embrace of two seemingly contradictory
doctrines, the will-to-power and the eternal return of the same. Lampert accepts Strauss’s
explanation that according to Nietzsche, the fact of the will-to-power is the basis for “the
new highest value, affirmation of the eternal return of the world as it is, the real world.” 38
Strauss scholars who confront Nietzsche’s influence on Strauss tend to see in his political
philosophy an anti-nihilistic effort to discover truth and meaning in a post-Nietzschean
world. 39 But Lampert makes the interesting claim that Strauss, like Nietzsche, actually
sees philosophers as creators of truth, even though Strauss publicly claimed that
philosophers discover rather than create truth because, unlike Nietzsche, Strauss was too
timid to openly legislate values. 40 Lampter is right to argue that, unlike Zarathrustra,
Strauss refuses to publicly proclaim the death of God. But Lampert is wrong to argue that
Strauss’s political philosophy aims at an aristocratic form of liberalism.
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Although Lampert’s analysis of Nietzsche’s influence on Strauss shows how an
anti-liberal theory can be made compatible with an aristocratic defense of liberal
democracy, other Straussian scholars dismiss claims that Strauss’s critique of modernity
emanated from a Nietzschean core. Peter Berkowitz argues that while “Strauss defended
liberal institutions,” he was deeply concerned about the consequences of modern thought
and politics and thus “favored reforming liberalism from within.” 41 Though Berkowitz
denies that this vision of internal reform comes from a Straussian understanding of the
philosopher which is inspired by Nietzsche’s ubermensch, he frames Strauss’s defense of
liberal democracy in terms of resisting democracy’s own worst tendencies by cultivating
a kind of freedom that fosters the development of humanity’s best, philosophers whose
wisdom make them appear “almost superhuman.” 42
But Berkowitz’s all-too-vocal protest sounds too much like a silent admission that
liberal critics like Stephen Holmes are right to read antiliberalism into Strauss’s defense
of democracy against fascism. “Strauss’s argument,” Holmes explains, “is stupefyingly
paradoxical. Indeed, it is so foreign to our ordinary way of thinking that it is at first
difficult to absorb. From a Platonic perspective, it turns out, fascism was excessively
democratic and egalitarian. Like Christianity and liberalism, it wholly neglected ‘the best
human type.’” 43 Berkowitz rejects what he sees as Holmes’s “effort to characterize
Strauss as a disciple of Nietzsche and Heidegger,” an effort that “paints an ugly portrait
of Strauss as a thinker endowed with an almost superhuman contempt for ordinary human

41

Peter Berkowitz, “Liberal Zealotry,” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 103, No. 5 (Mar., 1994), pp. 13631382.
42
Ibid.
43
Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 77.

15

beings.” 44 The key point is not that Strauss’s contempt for ordinary people is
superhuman, but that his concern above all else is to produce philosophers who see
themselves as superhuman, as founders and lawgivers who Strauss misleadingly refers to
as perfect princes. Strauss acknowledges that he is “almost solely concerned with the goal
or end of education at its best or highest – of the education of the perfect prince.” 45 But
Strauss’s perfected princes are not rulers or even wise teachers and advisors directing the
ruler’s hand. Berkowitz defends Strauss from the charge that he is an antiliberal,
antidemocratic Nietzschean and portrays Strauss’s focus on the best human type as a
“provocative defense of democracy” rather than a Nietzschean effort to destroy it. 46 My
view is that Strauss’s teaching does aim to destroy democracy because destruction of
existing regimes clears the way for the creation of new regimes.
Because the Platonic, Machiavellian, and Nietzschean elements of Strauss’s work
are interwoven with philosophical concepts containing a religious dimension, his
teaching defies contemporary political categories. And yet scholarly responses to
Strauss’s work are often grouped according to the perceived or professed political
orientations of the scholars. There are leftists and conservatives who similarly argue that
Strauss’s anti-utopian political philosophy results in managerial tyranny of intellectual
elites. 47 There are leftists, liberals, and libertarians who see Strauss’s work containing
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utopian elements that inspire rebellion against managerial-administrative rule of elites. 48
There are religious conservatives and paleoconservatives who see Strauss as a subversive
atheist, and liberals and leftists who see in his teaching a traditionalist defense of
religious orthodoxy. 49 Though Strauss’s work triggers strong political responses, the
scholarly efforts to explain his teaching do not fall neatly into political categories, but the
scholarship can be characterized according to the Platonic, Machiavellian, and
Nietzschean themes in his work that they emphasize.
Critics on the left and the right who argue that Strauss’s Platonic ideal veils a
Machiavellian political agenda that will lead to “managerial tyranny” 50 demonstrate how
Plato and Machiavelli offer useful frames, but their argument neglects Strauss’s
Nietzschean critique of legal-bureaucratic rule and his disparagement of modern elites.
Strauss’s entire discussion of the “tyrannical teaching” can be understood as an attempt to
inspire rebellion against administrative rule by elites and the cultivation of new elites
inspired by something greater than managerial rule. Strauss’s elitism is animated by a
vision of founders and creators, not managers.
Other scholars see in Strauss a Machiavellian attempt to subvert America’s
Christian values. Self-described conservative traditionalists like Claes Ryn see in
Strauss’s teaching a conspiratorial element which focuses on replacing the traditional
48
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ruling class with new philosophical elites, and thereby affecting internal regime change. 51
Because Ryn sees Strauss’s new elites as stand ins for disagreeable minorities with
outsized political influence, his critique misses the extent to which Strauss’s philosophers
are Nietzschean value creators and not simply Machiavellian manipulators. Ryn’s
insistence that Straussian intellectuals cannot be trusted bears the odor of anti-semitism.
Ryn’s charge is that Straussians are a deceitful, insular minority who pursue a hidden
agenda by manipulating those in power. “To avoid the resentment of the surrounding
society,” Ryn claims, “and be able to insert themselves into the counsels of the powerful,
the philosophers must use deceit. Once in a position of influence, they can advance their
own objectives by whispering in the ear of the rulers.” 52 Ryn frames those objectives as a
betrayal of America’s true moral-religious values. Strauss’s defenders dismiss such
arguments by aligning them with the work of Lyndon LaRouche. 53 But to borrow
Strauss’s notion of reductio ad Hitlerum, by which he means that a “view is not refuted
by the fact that it happens to have been shared by Hitler,” 54 a critique is not refuted
because it happens to contain antisemitic elements. But it can be refuted based on its
neglect of the Nietzschean elements in Strauss’s teaching.
Where Christian traditionalists see one kind of betrayal, libertarians see another.
Libertarians see Strauss’s work as an attempt to subvert America’s liberal-economic
values by pursuing a transformative nationalist-imperialist agenda. C.Bradley Thompson
and Yaron Brook claim that neoconservatism is guided by Strauss’s view that a
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militarized America willing to sacrifice for the principles it cherishes could save
modernity from an existential meaninglessness. 55 They claim that Strauss believes
nationalism offers the best way to respond to modern nihilism because it points back to
an era when myths gave people something noble to believe in: “nationalism for Strauss is
a suitable halfway house on the road back to the ancient polis.” 56 In this view, nationalist
myths pave the way for a return to a previous age, when ruling elites reflected the highest
human possibilities. Thompson and Brook claim Straussian elites condition ordinary
Americans “to believe in the ‘idea’ of the public interest or the ‘idea’ of America so that
whoever controls the ‘idea’ controls the regime.” 57 But my argument is that control is not
the endgame. The Thompson-Brook critique captures how the Platonic and
Machiavellian sides of Strauss point to deeper Nietzschean concerns, but those concerns
are really about creating and recreating regimes that provide truth and meaning. Alan
Gilbert sees in Strauss’s defense of imperialism the expression of a kind of greatness that
allows aristocratic intellectuals to seek noble adventure as a way to overcome existential
despair. 58 That reading parallels the libertarian critique which sees national greatness not
just as an idea designed to enhance the power of idea-makers, and imperialism not just as
a means to enhance the power of the state: together, ideas and state policy are “the
ultimate antidote to nihilism.” 59 But the noble adventure to overcome nihilism does not
aim at rule itself, it aims at creation.
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When Strauss’s students explain that they were taught “how to look at modernity
through pre-modern eyes” they point to the utopian aspect of Strauss’s vision, which
guides their thinking about the possibility of restoring noble conceptions of greatness. 60
Charles Kessler draws attention to how Strauss thought of the prospects for such a
restoration within democratic regimes by distinguishing between an ancient concept of
utopianism that he embraced and the modern utopianism he rejected. The ancient version
imagines democracy differently than the modern version. In Strauss’s ancient view,
democracy is “resourceful and adaptable and contagious,” but “democracy’s health
depend[s] on certain pre-democratic virtues of self-restraint, self-sacrifice, and
statesmanship.” 61 According to Kessler, Strauss taught his students that over time a
democratic “system would discourage and undermine the very virtues that had made
possible its founding.” 62 And therein lies both the Nietzschean core and the utopian
vision in Strauss’s teaching as it applies to democracies. Whereas democracy is
dehumanizing because it undermines the heroic spirit that animates creators and founders,
democratic systems are also resourceful and adaptable because they are based on the
principle of freedom, which can foster the development of the creators and founders who
make meaning, truth and order possible and propel the movement toward aristocratic
excellence. Social and political upheavals in the years after Strauss’s death confirmed to
policy elites influenced by his teaching something embedded in that teaching: “systemic
renewal was possible, after all.” 63
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The Argument
A guiding premise of this dissertation is that Strauss’s nominal defense of
democracy is based on an apocalyptic vision that combines a Nietzschean notion of
creator-freedom, a Machiavellian glorification of founder-princes, and a Platonic concept
of human transcendence through contemplation and teaching. Despite containing the
“severest indictment of democracy that ever was written,” 64 Strauss finds in Plato a way
to transform democratic regimes by cultivating a new intellectual aristocracy capable of
achieving the highest human possibilities: “since the principle of democracy is freedom,
all human types can develop freely in a democracy, and hence in particular the best
human type.” 65 Strauss’s political philosophy envisions a ruling class taught to believe
that their intellectual superiority gives them the natural right to transform democratic
regimes by promoting aristocratic excellence. But when he openly proclaims that his
pedagogical endeavor is to “found an aristocracy within democratic mass society” 66 his
boldness conceals a greater boldness. What sounds like the “natural aristocracy” of the
American framers is actually a different kind of elitism altogether. The best human
beings, says Strauss, are those who understand that in a godless world it is they who must
create meaning, truth, and order. And when existing regimes fail to provide meaningful
truth and order, then those regimes must be remade. Systemic renewal is possible.
This dissertation looks beyond the different paths Strauss’s students pursue and
argues that his teaching inspires a common conviction about the superhuman role
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political thinkers, writers, and advisers can play in a late modern, godless world. Mark
Lilla explains that West Coast Straussians learned from Strauss how to see America as
the culmination of a Western philosophical tradition that originated with Plato and that
through his teaching, Straussians see the possibility that American democracy can be a
source of civilizational redemption. 67 My argument is that all Straussians are inspired by
utopian visions infused with religious sentiments. For nihilism to be overcome, according
to Strauss, intellectual elites should see themselves as the source of ennobling myths, as
the creators of truth who must claim for themselves the power and authority of gods.
I argue that this teaching, utopian in one way and anti-utopian in another, leads
not to democratic expansion through imperialism, but to a self-destructive nationalism
that undermines democratic values by combining authoritarian and aristocratic principles
with an apocalyptic vision. Strauss’s political philosophy presents the possibility of
systemic renewal through a cyclical process that sees death and destruction as the path to
redemption. Applying Strauss’s teaching about freedom and imperialism to modern,
democratic regimes involves transforming democracy into a mechanism for the
destruction and recreation of modern Western civilization, which Strauss sees evolving
into a World State 68 that represents the Final Tyranny. 69 The dissertation explores how
Strauss’s efforts to combat this modern tyranny led him to employ a premodern
“tyrannical teaching” in his own pedagogy, and how his explicitly anti-nihilistic political
philosophy led him to promote a “nihilistic rebellion” against universal moral principles
and universal political institutions. By exploring the Nietzschean aspects of Strauss’s
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ideas about freedom, tyranny, and nihilism, this dissertation helps explain Strauss’s
“nihilistic revolution” to prevent what Habermas refers to as “the completion of the
modern project.” 70 The dissertation began as an investigation into how Strauss’s ideas
about freedom influenced an American imperial agenda, but the results of that
investigation make clear that Strauss’s teaching about freedom looks beyond America
and beyond empire.
This is not a story about how the fall of towers leads to the expansion of an
empire. This is a story about how fallen towers can signal the collapse of existing
regimes, and can set in motion conditions that allow for new creation based on ancient
ideals. “Athens” and “Jerusalem” represent the two poles of ancient wisdom that guide
Strauss. “Athens” represents ancient wisdom as expressed by philosophers who exhibit a
higher kind of freedom, which justifies seeing them as higher beings. “Jerusalem”
represents the source of sacred texts that inspire a chosen few to keep alive the belief in
higher powers. In response to the way modern nihilism threatens the higher freedom of
priestly kings and would-be wise men, Strauss turns to “Athens” to teach future
philosophers to see themselves as the chosen few, and he turns to “Jerusalem” to teach
those chosen few to restore mankind’s highest potential by setting in motion the
conditions for future creation: “the purgation of the earth through Flood,” Strauss
explains with reference to the biblical story of Babel, is “a restoration of mankind to its
original state; it is a kind of second creation.” 71 This is a story about how Athens and
Jerusalem come together in Strauss’s mind to prepare the ground for future creators.
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Chapter Outline
Each chapter of this dissertation presents different aspects of Strauss’s teaching
about the possibility of systemic renewal within a modern political regime. The first
chapter explores how the Nietzschean origins of Strauss’s theory of freedom animate his
vision of philosophers as lawgivers. The second chapter looks at how politics and
philosophy come together in that vision, and the third analyzes how his redefined
conception of philosophy sees education as the development of politically engaged
intellectual elites who see themselves as prophetic wise men. The final chapter looks at
how Strauss’s ideas about aristocratic excellence and noble imperialism point to an
apocalyptic vision of regime transformation, which guides his would be prophets.
All the chapters analyze from different angles how Strauss’s political philosophy
grows out of an elitism that not only opposes modern egalitarianism but also rejects the
Enlightenment notion that truth is the path to freedom, justice, and happiness. A
connecting thread running through the chapters is Strauss’s distinct elitism, which the
Zuckerts explain in terms of Strauss’s attitude toward truth: “[w]hat distinguishes
Strauss’s elite is not wealth, status, political, military, or economic power, but recognition
of “the truth.” This truth is hard to face: there is no God, and there is no divine or natural
support for justice.” 72 Strauss follows Nietzsche in thinking that the truth leads to an
existential abyss from which only philosophically creative minds offer a way out. But
Strauss does not follow Nietzsche in shouting this alleged truth from rooftops. His
attempt to correct the path from Nietzsche is to insist that philosopher-creators be
politically responsible and engaged. Whereas some see Strauss’s elitism and open call to

72

Catherine Zuckert and Michael Zuckert, The Truth About Leo Strauss: Political Philosophy and
American Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 7.

24

“found a new aristocracy within democratic mass society” 73 aimed at tyranny by
intellectuals, I argue that Strauss’s hierarchical and authoritarian worldview points in
another direction. Strauss envisions future philosophers and gentlemen who achieve the
greatest glory not as regime rulers but as regime creators. The dissertation begins with
Strauss’s unwillingness to openly proclaim God’s death and ends with a vision of a
monarch-in-motion, a theory rooted in a cyclical and apocalyptic concept of regime
transformation that treats philosophers as godlike beings with the power and authority to
create meaningful truth and order.
Chapter One offers a framework for understanding Strauss’s theory of freedom,
which includes a concept of “noble freedom” that draws inspiration from Nietzsche’s
vision of philosopher-creators. I will argue that Strauss transforms the distinction
between negative and positive freedoms into a hierarchy of different kinds of freedom
corresponding to a rank order of human beings according to their “nature.” “License”
represents the lowest kind of freedom, which applies to people with no control over their
animalistic urges. For Strauss, license leads to anarchy and degrades human potential; he
rejects it completely. Strauss uses “Liberty” to refer to the kind of freedom that applies to
people who accept the need to restrain and moderate human desires and behavior. Liberty
is meant for people who obey moral authorities and aspire to be dutiful citizens pursuing
common goals that transcend self-interest. This concept of liberty is the basis for civilized
political order, according to Strauss, and he defends it but with important qualifications.
“Noble freedom” is the highest kind of freedom, and the kind Strauss is most concerned
with conceptualizing and promoting. Noble freedom applies only to philosophers who
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have the intellectual courage to confront and the intellectual creativity to overcome the
“fundamental human experience of meaninglessness.” 74 I will argue that Strauss’s theory
that noble freedom is necessary to overcome nihilism is rooted in the Nietzschean notion
that truth-creation is the highest form of the will to power, and it is the basis for Strauss’s
redefinition of the philosophical enterprise.
Chapter two explores the relationship between philosophy and politics in
Strauss’s work. I will argue that Strauss’s teaching is based on a redefinition of
philosophy that fuses aspects of philosophy and politics in a manner that magnifies the
tensions between what he presents as two distinct ways of life. This chapter will build on
the work of those scholars who see in Strauss’s thought the influence of Schmitt’s
concept of the political, 75 while also incorporating the argument that Strauss’s political
philosophy is self-consciously opposed to Schmitt’s political theology. 76 My view is that
Nietzsche’s rethinking of philosophy was more important in shaping Strauss’s outlook
that Schmitt’s rethinking of the political, a modified version of which is concealed in
Strauss’s political philosophy. I will make the case that Strauss’s political philosophy
embraces what Mansfield calls “spiritual warfare” against enemy philosophies like
“historicism” and “relativism,” that Strauss’s philosophers are taught to uphold civic and
religious traditions for the protection of both the public and philosophy, and that Strauss
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promotes a concept of natural right in which philosophers have the power and authority
to create meaningful human worlds.
Chapter three develops Strauss’s notion of philosophical education and shows
how Strauss imagines a new class of aristocratic intellectuals whose devotion to
philosophy is inspired by his oracular “call to greatness.” 77 Chapter three explores why
Strauss thinks that the pursuit of wisdom leads philosophers into schools he calls sects
and why the truths they are forced to keep secret endanger the public, invite persecution,
and compel them to engage in political activity like sophistry and sectarianism even as
they argue that philosophical wisdom requires transcending politics. I will argue that
ultimately Strauss sees philosophical education as the cultivation of intellectual elites
who see themselves saving mankind from modern nihilism by becoming “more than
perfect philosophers,” by becoming prophetic lawgivers. 78 The possibility of superhuman
perfection ostensibly modeled on the questing philosophers of old is actually guided by
Strauss’s reimagined and Nietzscheanized Socratic model such that future philosophers
can succeed where past philosophers failed in actualizing philosophy’s wisdom in this
world, not in a perfected political regime but in perfected wise men whose transcendence
is made possible through regime creation.
Chapter Four looks at the utopian and apocalyptic elements in Strauss’s teaching
as they emerge from his defense of noble imperialism and his critique of modern
universalism, which he sees as a form of tyranny. The notion of temptation will be
explored in the context of Strauss’s concern with regime transformation as a rebellion
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against modern tyranny. The chapter argues that Strauss’s teaching is a temptation to
move from constitutionalism to “post-constitutional Caesarism,” but not because he sees
benevolent absolutism or wise tyranny as the best regime. For Strauss, the tyrannical
temptation is about creating the conditions for a “pre-constitutional situation” and
keeping alive the movement that inspires future founders to create ever-new regimes.
The final chapter argues that Strauss’s ideas about ancient utopianism, regime
transformation, and noble imperialism seek to preserve the cyclical movement that keeps
alive a monarchy-in-motion. The aim of Strauss’s political philosophy is not to establish
a permanent framework for a stable, final, or best social order. The aim is to inspire
never-ending movement toward the missing king. In this movement, new philosophers
rise and old empires fall.
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Chapter 1: Freedom, Out of Nihilism
Though Nietzsche’s shadow hovers over debates surrounding the influence of Leo
Strauss on American political thought, missing entirely from those debates is a
consideration of how Strauss’s ideas about freedom relate to Nietzsche’s thought. 1 I am
not the first to argue that Strauss’s “philosopher” is an expression of Nietzsche’s
“superman,” I support this claim, however, with a novel perspective on how Strauss
translated Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power into a concept of freedom, which he
imported to an American tradition. Thus was he able to reconcile Nietzsche’s theory of
the will to power and the eternal return with the reality of American political culture.
In developing his ideas about freedom, Strauss transforms the distinction between
negative and positive freedom into a hierarchy of different kinds of freedom
corresponding to a rank order of human beings according to their “nature.” The lowest
kind of freedom Strauss refers to as “License,” which applies to those human beings with
no control over their base animalistic urges. This freedom that means doing whatever one
wants leads to anarchy, and Strauss rejects it completely. A higher kind of freedom that
corresponds to those people who accept the need to restrain and moderate human desires
and behavior Strauss refers to as “Liberty.” This freedom that applies to people who obey
the law and aspire to be dutiful citizens pursuing common goals is the basis of modern
civilized order for Strauss, and he defends it but with important qualifications. “Noble
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freedom” is the highest kind of freedom, and the kind Strauss is most concerned with
conceptualizing and promoting. Noble freedom applies only to those of a certain
“nature,” those with the intellectual courage to confront, and the intellectual creativity to
overcome, nihilism, the “fundamental human experience of meaninglessness.” 2 Noble
freedom is how, in Strauss’s reading of Nietzsche, “[m]an reaches his peak through and
in the philosopher of the future,” who justifies not only man but also the rest of existence
by consciously creating values on the basis of the will to power as the fundamental
phenomena. 3 Strauss’s theory that noble freedom is necessary to overcome nihilism is
rooted in the Nietzschean notion that value-creation is the highest form of the will to
power. For Strauss, noble freedom entails a release of creative energies leading to action
that puts an end to the historical “rule of non-sense and chance” and consists in
“prescribing to nature what or how it ought to be.” 4 The highest kind of freedom is the
source of natural law in Strauss’s work, and he channels this power toward his own
notion of “natural right.”
But for Strauss the creative action of free thinking is threatened by lesser forms of
thought leading to a situation where humanity is in danger of not having the kind of
thinkers who can justify existence and make human life meaningful. Modernity, he
declares repeatedly, is in crisis because philosophy has been transformed by scientific
and historical approaches to understanding and explaining objective reality. These ways
of thinking, referred to throughout his writings as positivism and historicism, lead to
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relativism and nihilism because they are incapable of creating values: such forms of
thought reveal rather than put an end to the non-sense and chance that has hitherto ruled
humanity. Accelerating the descent into nihilism are those philosophies that speak in the
name of what Strauss treats as lower forms of freedom. Theories of freedom committed
to satisfying all human hopes and desires are “dehumanizing” and guarantee the coming
of Nietzsche’s “last man.” Theories that seek to abolish suffering and inequality are even
more problematic because, in Strauss’s reading of Nietzsche, “suffering and inequality
are the prerequisites of human greatness.” 5 Noble freedom as a defense of human
excellence is the basis of a new social hierarchy guided by “natural right” and ruled by
thinkers who believe and teach that chosen philosophers have the godlike power to save
humanity.
This chapter will begin by highlighting Nietzsche’s formative influence on
Strauss and then proceed to a detailed analysis of how Strauss translated Nietzsche’s
“will to power” into a concept of “noble freedom,” which is the highest expression of the
distinct kinds of freedom Strauss discusses. The final section will explore the possible
intention and consequences of Strauss’s linking freedom to “natural right,” which will set
the stage for the next chapter’s discussion of the relationship in Strauss’s work between
philosophy and politics.
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Nietzschean Foundations
It’s no secret that the issue of Nietzsche’s influence on Leo Strauss divides
scholars. 6 The starting point for the quarrel is Strauss’s admission that “Nietzsche so
dominated and charmed me between my 22nd and 30th years that I literally believed
everything I understood of him." 7 As Gregory Smith correctly points out, unlike
Nietzsche who called attention to his autobiography in works like Ecce Homo, Strauss
went out of his way to hide himself in his commentaries. This makes those rare instances
when Strauss does draw the reader’s attention to his personal life especially revealing.
From Strauss’s admission that Nietzsche exercised a profound influence on him,
we can glean a few observations. First, the fact that Nietzsche’s ideas both “dominated
and charmed” the young Strauss reveals that, for Strauss, ideas have the power to control
human minds through “charm” and methods Strauss elsewhere discusses such as
seduction. It is also important to note that Nietzsche’s “domination” is exercised over
intelligent, knowledgeable, philosophical minds: at 22 Strauss had already completed his
doctoral thesis in philosophy under Ernst Cassirer and by the end of this period of
Nietzsche-domination he had written his first book, an interpretation of Spinoza’s critique
of religion. Finally, for Strauss, the belief necessary to overcome nihilism flows from
certain approaches to thinking, but not from others.
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Thinking is recast as transhistorical engagement with great minds through
contemplation, interpretation and teaching that gives rise to a ruling elite in possession of
the highest human wisdom. Robert Howse explains this as a response to the loss, under
the conditions of post-Nietzschean modernity, of all authoritative horizons, a loss which
creates an opportunity for “a new kind of philosophizing that constructs engagements
between thinkers from different times in the past who speak to us anew about the
fundamental questions through being made to speak to each other across the centuries.” 8
Howse emphasizes that this new approach to philosophy emerges out of the confrontation
with the abyss, but “instead of fear and trembling before the abyss, a new kind of
intellectual community” arises prepared to manage the most serious human problems
resulting from the loss of authoritative truths. 9 Strauss’s new intellectual elite pursues
philosophy as a way of life in the context of what some Strauss scholars call the “primacy
of politics,” which protects them from falling victim to their own prideful passions by
giving in to the tyrannical temptation, the fundamental error made by great thinkers like
Heidegger who take seriously Nietzsche’s challenge. 10 What guards Strauss’s
philosophers in the all-important, defining moment is their awareness that “thinking as a
way of life comes to sight not (as with Heidegger) in the still of the woods at night or
while standing alone before the abyss, but in a given social world constituted by law, by
politics, and by the “sacred” or its secular equivalents.” 11 Strauss’s much discussed
autobiographical preface to the English edition of his Spinoza book makes great efforts to
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distinguish his understanding of philosophy from Heidegger’s “new thinking,” but those
efforts only partially conceal the shared vision of transcending scientific and historical
approaches to philosophical rationality and the higher purpose of restoring the human
experience of sacredness. Strauss’s turn to pre-scientific consciousness and pre-modern
rationality is a consequence of this lifelong commitment, which began with his belief in
Nietzsche’s project as revealed by Nietzsche’s invented prophet Zarathrustra.
Strauss is very precise and deliberate with his word choice. This is true for his use
of numbers, too. When he writes "between my 22nd and 30th year" he is directly saying
something about what transpired during this period, but he is also signaling that
something happened at the end of this time, in his 30th year. This is when he acted upon
his “literal belief” and went his own way. Nietzsche begins Thus Spake Zarathrustra
with these words: "When Zarathrustra was thirty years old, he left his home..." Between
the ages of 22 and 30 Strauss simply believed Nietzsche’s teachings. That does not mean
that at 30 he stopped believing or that, as Steven Smith argues, Nietzsche’s spell on
Strauss was broken. 12 At 30, the year when Strauss left his native Germany and set out on
a journey that took him through various Western states before settling in the U.S., he, like
Zarathrustra, left his home and set out in search of a new chosen people for a new
teaching, keeping in mind Zarathrustra’s prophecy that only after his believers have
departed and made their own way can the promised future come.
So in what manner did Strauss make his own way? Strauss took up Zarathrustra’s
call to battle against “Giant Chance” and overcome history’s “lack-of-sense.” 13
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Strauss’s notion that noble freedom is necessary to overcome the nihilism that leads to
“dehumanization” and threatens “human excellence” is a reflection of how Nietzsche’s
“philosophers of the future” see themselves as warrior-knights engaged in great
civilizational struggles that determine human fate and give existence meaning. Only
philosophers can experience the noble freedom that justifies human existence and opens
the door to their own “perfection.” 14 Where Strauss steps out of Nietzsche’s shadow, and
goes his own way, is his blending and blurring of philosophical traditions which serve to
inspire thinkers to action based on the prospect of becoming lawgiving founders and
prophets who are “more than perfect philosophers.” 15 Their will to power gives the law
to mankind and to nature; their freedom ranks highest because only they can create a
meaningful world out of existential nothingness. 16
Translating the Will to Power into Freedom
In his early writings before he had developed the doctrine of the will to power,
Nietzsche explored the need for a new kind of philosopher who would create values for a
modern world lacking meaning and purpose. This philosopher-creator would use
“knowledge in the service of the best life” by willing, not the truth, but illusion. 17
Elements of Nietzsche’s myth-making, law-giving, life-shaping thinker made their way
into Strauss’s ideas about the identity and function of philosophers. In his seminar on
Beyond Good and Evil, Strauss focused on Nietzsche’s concern with transforming
“deadly truths” into “life-giving truths” by embracing myth as an expression of a creative
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will that can nourish higher forms of human life. 18 Even while explicitly distancing his
own views on power from those of Nietzsche, Strauss’s concern with philosophy and
free-thinking can only be fully understood in light of what would become in Nietzsche’s
later work the doctrine of the will to power.
In developing his concept of the will to power, Nietzsche highlights the problems
that he claims flow from a modern approach to philosophy that sees itself animated
primarily by a search for truth unconnected to higher questions of meaning. One key
problem for Nietzsche and for Strauss is that philosophy has become identical to science
and therefore cannot speak to human values: philosophy, in Strauss’s words, has been
reduced to explaining only the “how” and has been rendered impotent in determining the
“why” of existence. 19 Strauss follows Nietzsche in thinking that the coming “philosophy
of the future” will redefine the relationship between philosophy and religion. 20 Strauss
understands Nietzsche’s position as moving away from the opposition between
knowledge and faith and toward a philosophy that sees the will to power as the source of
both knowledge and faith. 21 But where Nietzsche sees the will to power as the creative
source and primary fact of existence, Strauss treats a certain kind of freedom as the
foundational phenomena. 22
Strauss’s lectures on Nietzsche reaffirm those themes presented in his published
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Nietzsche writings. Focusing on “the philosophy of the future,” Strauss overtly draws
attention to Beyond Good and Evil in the title of a seminar he taught and an essay he
published on Nietzsche near the end of his life in which he consistently points to Thus
Spake Zarathrustra as an interpretive guide, and silently points away from The Will to
Power. The first two are completed accounts describing the need for a new kind of
philosophy able to overcome the modern crisis of nihilism; the last represents incomplete
notes detailing the core theme of that new philosophy. Because The Will to Power was
unfinished and corrupted by Nietzsche’s sister, Strauss has legitimate reasons to focus
elsewhere. But the fact that he systematically incorporated the doctrine of the will to
power without acknowledging it suggests that he had other reasons for redirecting the
attention of his readers and students.
Strauss seems to accept Nietzsche’s rejection of the modern view that organic
beings are primarily driven by the instinct for self-preservation but he refuses to stand
with Nietzsche in declaring that “a living being wants above all to release its strength, life
itself is the will to power.” 23 Strauss says that for Nietzsche, philosophers represent the
highest expression of the will to power, its “most spiritual form,” 24 but when speaking in
his own name Strauss says nothing of the will to power and emphasizes instead that
philosophy is the highest expression of human freedom or the "highest activity of man." 25
To see how Strauss gets to philosophy representing the pinnacle of a hierarchy of
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freedoms, we must first explore how Nietzsche saw himself correcting philosophy’s
errors which lead to nihilism, a problem Nietzsche identifies with mankind’s loss of aim,
unity, and truth. 26 He describes this profound absence as a loss of belief in rank, nobility,
and hierarchy: pre-modern cosmology once nourished and supported complex belief
systems that upheld social hierarchy and cultivated excellence. Without such
mythologies, hierarchy is no longer believed natural and human greatness is threatened.
The will to power was Nietzsche’s reaction to this horror.
The “most grievous, protracted and dangerous” error, Nietzsche says, is that
philosophy has understood its own purpose as the search for truth without recognizing
that what animates that search is the will to power. 27 Philosophy is not the only form, of
course, of the will to power, but it is its highest expression, and therefore the highest
expression of life because for Nietzsche “life simply is the will to power,” which means
that life “in its essence means appropriating, injuring, overpowering those who are
foreign and weaker; oppression, harshness, forcing one’s own forms on others,
incorporation, and at the very least, at the very mildest, exploitation.”28 A riddle: How is
life a form of exploitation, but the highest life, philosophy, an expression of freedom?
Strauss’s ideas about freedom are assembled from this Nietzschean puzzle.
For Nietzsche, all beings seek to discharge inner forces, and all human beings
long for freedom. 29 The yearning for freedom is tied to the unleashing of inner drives
and to the overcoming of obstacles restricting those drives. The relationship between the
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will to power and human freedom is never systematically developed in Nietzsche’s
writings but he posits a relationship between the metaphysical claim that all life is
propelled by the will to power and the view that all human life desires freedom. “The
greater the dominating power of a will,” he explains, “the more freedom may the passions
be allowed.” 30 But this dynamic is more complex than simply identifying freedom as the
space where the passions seek fulfillment, a consequence of the will’s struggle for power.
The notion that the will to power is best understood through a metaphor of
struggle suggests that, for Nietzsche, freedom is not just a release of the will’s energies or
the satisfaction of its desires. True, “the ‘great man’ is great owing to the free play and
scope of his desires” Nietzsche explains, but also “to the yet greater power that knows
how to press these magnificent monsters into service.” 31 The discharge of energy to
satisfy human desires is only approvingly called freedom when the will masters its own
passion-monsters by pressing them into noble service. Freedom requires a struggle
against constraining forces. Absent constraint there can be no freedom. “A society that
preserves a regard and delicatesse for freedom must feel itself to be an exception and
must confront a power from which it distinguishes itself, toward which it is hostile, and
on which it looks down.” 32 Absent lower elements from which distinction is achieved
there can be no higher freedom. Nietzsche continues here by linking aristocratic greatness
to a higher kind of freedom, a linkage that Strauss will develop further. “The
presupposition inherent in an aristocratic society,” Nietzsche says, “for preserving a high
degree of freedom among its members is the extreme tension that arises from the
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presence of an antagonistic drive in all its members: the will to dominate.” 33 Strauss will
give this drive to domination a peculiar political twist by presenting its highest expression
as the philosopher’s desire to rule the rulers. But the starting point for any higher
expression of freedom is the nihilism that only philosophers can overcome.
The modern world is plagued by nihilism because modern philosophy mistakenly
sees truth as its primary principle rather than power, but two related problems have
emerged which Nietzsche hopes to reverse: modern morality strives for universal
happiness, security, comfort, equal rights and the end of suffering, 34 and modern freedom
is associated with what Nietzsche refers to as “laisser-aller,” or the absence of coercion. 35
Nietzsche’s attack on modern freedom finds parallels in Strauss’s critique of Isaiah
Berlin’s negative freedom, which will be discussed later in the chapter. A superior
morality that “desires to train men for the heights, not for comfort and mediocrity, a
morality with the intention of training a ruling caste - the future masters of the earth must, if it is to be taught, appear in association with the prevailing moral laws, in the
guise of their terms and forms.” 36 This is why the idea of freedom is so important and
why Nietzsche emphasizes the need for “a different kind of “free spirit” from those
before us.” 37 Rethinking freedom is the key to reversing the values of modern morality
and overcoming modern nihilism.
Nietzsche’s rethinking begins by transforming the relationship between freedom
and coercion. Without coercion no moral code can properly develop: “Every moral code,
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in opposition to laisser-aller, is an example of tyranny against ‘nature’, and against
‘reason’ too: but that cannot be an objection to it.” 38 If freedom is to be the basis of a
moral code, it must not be thought of in simple opposition to tyranny because the
development of moral codes, which Nietzsche sees as an expression of the highest
freedom, requires coercion.
The essential, invaluable thing about every moral code is that it is one long coercion: in order to
understand Stoicism or Port-Royal or Puritanism, just think of the coercion that every language
has employed up till now in achieving its strength and freedom - the coercion of metre, the tyranny
of rhyme and rhythm. How much trouble the poets and orators of every people (not to exclude
certain contemporary prose writers, in whose ear an unshakeable conscience resides) have put
themselves to - ‘for the sake of folly’, as utilitarian fools say, thus fancying themselves clever; ‘in
subservience to tyrannical laws’, as anarchists say, thus imagining themselves ‘free’, even
freethinking. 39

Neither the utilitarians nor the anarchists understand Nietzsche’s concept of freedom,
which he recognizes is premised on a strange fact: “everything on earth that exists or has
existed by way of freedom, subtlety, daring, dance, and perfect sureness, whether it be in
ideas, or in governance, or in oratory and rhetoric, in the arts as well as in manners, has
developed only by virtue of the ‘tyranny of such despotic laws.’” 40
Nietzsche’s concept of “natural” freedom in opposition to the “excessive freedom
of laisser-aller” emphasizes the creative inspiration of the artist whose “free ordering,
arranging, deciding, shaping” occurs in obedience to “the thousandfold laws whose very
exactness and rigour make a mockery of all conceptual formulations.” 41 Reveling in the
mockery and partaking in “Olympian laughter,” Nietzsche never sets out to
systematically describe the relationship between the will to power and natural freedom.
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Strauss’s response to Nietzsche’s open laughter involves a commitment to seriousness,
which will be discussed in Chapter 2 through his engagement with Carl Schmitt, which
considering Schmitt’s decision to join the Nazis, led Strauss to take Schmitt’s notion of
seriousness even more seriously. The political consequences of Nietzsche’s ideas were
not, for Strauss, something would be Olympians should laugh about. Strauss’s efforts to
make these ideas politically responsible involved furthering Nietzsche’s own efforts at
drawing together philosophical freedom and inspired creativity. Strauss’s “founder,”
discussed at length in Chapter 3, is the political realization of Nietzsche’s philosophercreator. For Nietzsche, the imaginative will of the creator obeys higher laws which give
rise to the ordering of human existence through law-giving:
Law-giving moralities are the principal means of fashioning man according to the pleasure of a
creative and profound will, provided that such an artist’s will of the first rank has the power in its
hands and can make its creative will prevail through long periods of time, in the form of laws,
religions, and customs. Such men of great creativity, the really great men according to my
understanding, will be sought in vain today. 42

Everything on earth that makes life worth living, Nietzsche declares openly, is the result
of a “protracted period of unidirectional obedience.” 43 I understand Nietzsche to be
rejecting one kind of freedom without turning against freedom as such. Explicit in his
rejection of “excessive freedom” is the celebration of another kind of freedom, which is
tied to creativity as expressed by “free ordering, arranging, deciding, shaping.” Moreover,
his all-consuming task of preparing the way for the philosophers of the future demands
the leadership of “free minds” or “free spirits.” As we shall see, appearing to “make his
own way” from Nietzsche, Strauss downplays Nietzsche’s commitment to freedom and
emphasizes his views on power and compulsion, then esoterically articulates his own
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theory of freedom silently borrowing from Nietzsche precisely those ideas he explicitly
distances himself from. Strauss’s lawgiving morality aims to fashion an intellectual
community of wise men who embody freedom in Nietzsche’s higher sense.
Implicit in Nietzsche’s account of the role coercion plays in the development of
moral codes is a rank order of different kinds of freedom each with its own orientation to
power. “Laisser-aller” is at the bottom, followed by “the means to discipline and
cultivate” the spirit, and at the top is “ordering, arranging, deciding, shaping.” Ignorant
and timid, those desiring laisser-aller want only to be left alone, protected from the lifeexploitations of stronger wills, wanting above all else to preserve their own weak
existence. Nobler souls experience a higher freedom by courageously submitting to
educative forces beyond their comprehension or control; obedience to higher powers
strengthens the spirit and teaches discipline and cultivates self-mastery. The supreme
expression of freedom in Nietzsche’s writings, is the rhythmic dance of creative wills
who impose their own meaningful order on other beings and on existence itself.
The precondition for Nietzsche’s higher creative freedom is having a strong will
that can overcome the impediments and contending forces obstructing the achievement of
one’s goals. Don Dombowski argues that Nietzsche’s notion of freedom requires external
impediments and the struggle against them, which Dombowski sees as a form of
“positive freedom.” 44 But more needs to be said, lest the impression be left that
Nietzschean freedom is purely inner-directed, solely about self-transformation and selfmastery. Wills must struggle against something, and must move toward something, to
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become free in Nietzsche’s sense. Wills battle against an external world, which is also
acting upon the will. For Nietzsche, only strong wills are capable of gaining control in
that battle of forces, only strong wills can order, arrange, and shape the external world.
For Nietzsche, strength and freedom blur into one another. The key is not just whether
wills can be classified as free or unfree, the issue is also whether wills are strong or weak.
At times Nietzsche seems to fold into his doctrine of the will to power different
conceptions of freedom. He describes the desire for freedom and independence as
disguised forms of the will to power and contrasts the hermit’s “spiritual freedom” with
the lowest form of freedom, the drive to self-preservation. 45 But he also says that the will
to power appears as the will to freedom for weak wills. 46 At times Nietzsche drives a
wedge between freedom and power in order to denigrate the desires of “weak wills” and
elevate the impulses of “noble souls.” Suggesting that hunger for freedom is distinct
from and inferior to the drive for power, he says that “One desires freedom so long as one
does not possess power.” 47 “The remainder of mankind,” Nietzsche says
condescendingly, “all that is not warlike by instinct, wants peace, wants concord, wants
‘freedom,’ wants ‘equal rights’: these are only different names and stages of the same
thing.” 48
Even as he denigrates one kind of freedom, he describes the philosopher’s will to
power as the supreme expression of freedom. When Nietzsche prizes the “freedom of
creative natures” 49 he is referring to the artist-philosopher who forms human beings and
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creates meaningful order out of existential chaos by giving the law to nature. 50 This
creative-freedom is tied to the “freedom of the spirit,” an instinct for unbelief on the part
of strong wills that guards them from convictions that blind them. 51 But freedom from
conviction, what he calls “intellectual probity,” is both necessary and problematic for
Nietzsche. Such spiritual-intellectual independence is necessary for “creative natures”
and “great men” but “independence in the absence of greatness causes mischief and
ought not be allowed.” 52 He is not simply saying that some should be free and some
should not. He is saying that the all-important freedom of creative meaning-making and
law-giving can only be experienced by “noble souls” and thus understanding freedom in
terms of equal rights infringes on the power of creators and makes nihilism impossible to
overcome. Implicit in his call to unleash the creator-philosophers is a hierarchy of human
beings: ordinary people are subordinate to their leaders, who are themselves subordinate
to the “highest men” who exist above and beyond the masses but also “beyond the rulers”
for “in the rulers they have their instruments.” 53 When Nietzsche proclaims that new gods
are still possible and admits that within him is active a religious god-forming instinct he
has in mind a future where philosophers rule the rulers with their invisible creations.
Nietzsche’s noble souls are free spirits with a “god-forming instinct” that sets
them above both the people and their rulers, who become the instruments of the “highest
men.” 54 Intellectual-spiritual-moral self-assertion is, for Nietzsche and for Strauss, a sign
of the future philosopher’s superiority. “There is an instinct for rank that more than
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anything else is itself the sign of high rank.” 55 The noble soul “knows that it is above.” 56
These free spirits “give themselves laws” and thereby “create themselves.” 57 Free spirits
have the power of self-determination and freedom of will, they are experimenters who
achieve self-mastery through self-discipline. 58 But they also discipline the external world.
Lower types, commoners and their leaders, must be disciplined from without by these
highest mens. Nietzsche’s free minds belong to those Strauss will refer to as noble souls,
who exercise their power-privilege-duty, according to Strauss’s “natural right,” to freely
order, arrange, and shape human existence.
Dombowski’s reading of Nietzsche’s free spirits as regime-changers who
“prepare the ground for a new regime” 59 parallels my reading of how Strauss’s
philosophers exhibit a higher freedom. These free thinkers represent a new breed of
skeptic whose intellectual-spiritual strength empower them to do great things. 60 The next
chapter will discuss Strauss’s “zetetic philosophy” which he overtly presents as an
alternative mode of thinking designed to protect the mind’s higher freedom, but which he
covertly uses to recruit the philosophically-inclined to “do great things,” which for
Strauss requires becoming properly “political.” But in this, Strauss does not stray far
from Nietzsche, whose free spirits are commanders and legislators who “feel the tug
towards freedom as the strongest drive” of the spirit. 61 For Strauss, as for Nietzsche, the
free and wise man is equated with the strong man whose “higher responsibility”
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compared to those with weak wills is to discharge their power dutifully, responsonsibly
via “great deeds.” This unleashing of the strong will’s power is discussed in terms of
freedom-as-creativity and expressed in the future philosopher’s act of lawgiving. 62
Nietzsche’s “higher responsibility” is understood by Strauss as “philosophy’s
cosmic responsibility” for the “salvation of mankind.” 63 Both Nietzsche and Strauss at
times blur the distinctions between the concepts freedom, duty, privilege, right, and
power: they imagine the noble souls will channel this concocted force toward establishing
a new table of values or moral code. Failure leads to nihilism because if the philosophers
do not create a value system worthy of belief, then mankind will have nothing of value to
believe in. Whereas Nietzsche overtly fuses the concepts freedom, right, privilege, duty,
power, Strauss accepts these complex inter-relations but downplays power and privilege,
elevates duty and responsibility, gives the different kinds of freedom an explicit political
flavor, and transposes these ideas on a reimagined concept of natural right. At the center
of this power-freedom dialectic is their mutual concern with overcoming nihilism through
a new kind of philosophy.
Nietzsche declares that the free spirits are in a permanent struggle against
nihilism, which is overcome only in moments of creation. 64 Describing how the
Olympian laughter of philosophers in the face of human suffering demonstrates
superhuman strength, 65 Nietzsche portrays his free spirits as god-like beings who rule
invisibly over a tragic human existence. Laughter turns the human tragedy into a comedy,
62
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but only for the Olympians. Strauss chooses to discuss human existence in terms of
neither tragedy nor comedy, but through the prism of political “seriousness.” The new
gods, for Strauss, are not characterized by their laughter, but by their exercise of
“Olympian freedom” in confronting the real world “crisis of our time.” 66 But Strauss
traces political crises back to philosophical problems, and like Nietzsche he believed
philosophy itself had to be transformed in order to overcome “fundamental nihilism.” 67
For Strauss this entails transforming “deadly truths” into “life-giving truths,” and the
greatest of these deadly truths is that “God is dead.” Strauss accepts Nietzsche’s view that
nihilism is the consequence of “sacrificing God for sake of nothing.” 68 Strauss too
believes that the death of God leaves an absence and until that absence is filled, nihilism
will plague humanity. Strauss too believes that future philosophers can save mankind, but
only by reorienting their thinking about truth-creation as the highest form of the will to
power and seeing it as an expression of the highest kind of freedom.
Strauss’s Hierarchy of Freedom
Strauss’s process of translating the will to power into a theory of freedom is
evident in the way he shifts Nietzsche’s focus on the relationship between will to power
and nihilism to a focus on the relationship between freedom and nihilism. Strauss
interprets Nietzsche as arguing that the will to power is the “fundamental human
phenomena,” 69 but when Strauss discusses Nietzsche’s thought in the context of
presenting his own ideas about natural right he emphasizes that freedom is the
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fundamental human experience. 70 Nietzsche’s influence on Strauss’s thinking about
freedom is often hidden behind a veil of critique, such that Strauss self-consciously
distances himself from Nietzsche as he co-opts many of Nietzsche’s core themes and
translates them into a new idiom. Thus Nietzsche’s influence is clearer when Strauss is
not discussing Nietzsche.
The importance to Strauss of truth-creation as an expression of the will to power
is submerged in his analysis of human nature, and his conclusion that human beings need
worthy goals to struggle toward for life to have meaning and purpose. Believing that
human nature is fixed and permanent allows Strauss to make arguments about things that
human beings always need, the most important of which is a meaningful goal. He says
that human “life is activity which is directed towards some goal.” 71 Strauss believes that
humans are not only purposive beings, they are also struggling beings. 72 If humans are
not struggling and striving with purpose, then human vitality is lost and nihilism sets in.
"Indifference to any goal" and "aimlessness" prevent humans from doing what our being
is meant to do: by not having a goal or aim we are no longer alive in any meaningful
human sense because the movement toward something we deem worthy makes our lives
worthy. But this means that while having worthy goals is necessary, achieving those
goals is problematic because the movement ends. If to have our goals satisfied is to lose
the animating purpose that makes a human being worthy of life, then to establish as the
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goal of human history a kind of freedom that leads to the satisfaction of the needs and
desires of all people is to aim at the ultimate dehumanization of mankind. Universal
freedom leads to the end of human life. What some see as human progress Strauss sees,
like Nietzsche, as the victory of nihilism. But where Nietzsche presents the will to power
as the way to understand how truth-creation can overcome nihilism, Strauss offers a
theory of freedom.
Strauss argues that freedom is the ultimate human aspiration, but he understands
freedom in a hierarchical way. 73 And even though in his early book on Hobbes he rejects
the state of nature as a conceptual mechanism because it serves to reinforce the view that
a social contract is what legitimizes ruling power, 74 his work after settling in the U.S.
treats the state of nature as the “ideal vehicle for freedom.” 75 But Strauss’s reason for
accepting the linkage between nature and freedom is that nature represents hierarchy. In
Strauss’s work the state of nature is transformed into a conceptual mechanism to justify,
not a social contract based on universal freedom, but the notion that “freedom allows for
the development of the best human type.” 76 Greatness can emerge in a regime devoted in
principle to human freedom, but an intervention is required in how freedom is
understood. Strauss’s theory of freedom allows him to critique some forms of freedom
and to claim at the same time that other kinds represent or make possible the highest
human goal: freedom opens up an “abyss of nothingness” and brings about nihilism,
while at the same time holds out the possibility of moving beyond nihilism and restoring
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the human experience of sacredness.
How can freedom represent both the highest human goal and a problem to be
transcended? Strauss’s answer is a hierarchy of different kinds of freedoms, the two he
names in ascending order are “license” and “liberty,” while the highest kind of freedom
goes unnamed but will be referred to here as “noble freedom” because of the role played
by the nobility theme in Strauss’s adaptation of Nietzsche’s thinking. Strauss’s hierarchy
of freedoms can only be fully understood in light of Nietzsche’s view that truth-creation
is highest form of the will to power and the way Strauss sees freedom in relation to
different kinds of inner forces experienced by different kinds of people. Strauss
reassembles Nietzsche’s scattered fragments and coopts, covers, and critiques
Nietzsche’s way of thinking about freedom, restraint, power and creation.
Strauss’s discussion of “license” shares much with Nietzsche’s critique of “laissez
aller,” but instead of referring to it as “excessive freedom” Strauss calls it “ruinous
permissiveness” and claims, like Nietzsche, that it leads to anarchy, dehumanization and
nihilism.77 Strauss presents the problem through a moral prism: “Freedom as a goal is
ambiguous, because it is freedom for evil as well as for good.” 78 But the ambiguity he
acknowledges is essential for his theory of freedom because the problem of nihilism
demands a recognition of the different kinds of freedom, and the different purposes
served by ideas of good and evil. Because license can lead to evil, it requires education,
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restraint, and obedience for it to be directed toward the good. License justifies a
worldview in which all human desires seek to be satisfied, but for Strauss human desires
are understood in terms of base urges which need to be controlled. Freedom is
“accompanied by a sense that the full and unrestrained exercise of that freedom is not
right. Man's freedom is accompanied by sacred awe, by a kind of divination that not
everything is permitted.” 79 Freedom as license leads to an awareness that restraint is
necessary. And restraint he claims, “must in many cases be forcible restraint in order to
be effective...Man is so built that he cannot achieve the perfection of his humanity except
by keeping down his lower impulses.” 80
Only a select few are able to master their bases impulses on their own, all others
demand external powers to guide them toward the good. Strauss argues that “man’s
natural evil” demands the establishment of dominion by those few capable of knowing
what is right by nature. 81 For Strauss, base human impulses must be controlled according
to moral truths known by those few who can exercise self-control and achieve selfmastery. Others need to be restrained by the few who can restrain themselves: “what is
true of self-restraint, self-coercion, and power over one’s self applies in principle to the
restraint and coercion of others and to power over others.” 82 This way of thinking
demonstrates a tendency on Strauss’s part to relate inner freedom to how much control or
power one has over the external world, including over others. Ultimately it becomes a
political expression of Nietzsche’s “free ordering, shaping, arranging, deciding” in which
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Strauss concludes that “even despotic rule is not per se against nature.” 83
In thinking through the distinction between freedom and tyranny, Strauss insists
that legitimate restraints are those experienced as sacred. Sacred or transcendent sources
“permitted earlier men to make a tenable distinction between liberty and license. License
consists in doing what one lists; liberty consists in doing in the right manner the good
only; and our knowledge of the good must come from a higher principle, from above.” 84
To move beyond the ruinous permissiveness of freedom as license, people must look up
with awe and reverence to those with knowledge of what is good and right. The key is
that the restraints which come along with liberty are understood and experienced as
sacred, but whereas sacredness was once identified with transcendence it is in Strauss’s
work connected to higher human sources of wisdom and power.
Strauss’s understanding of “liberty” is based on the premise that some individuals
possess gifts that allows them to access higher wisdom, which is the source of the
knowledge of good and evil. This knowledge legitimizes the laws that people living
under liberty must obey. Liberty represents a kind of freedom that exists in tension with
obedience to higher powers and the compulsion of necessary moral laws. 85 When Strauss,
following Nietzsche, says that compulsion is necessary, he is not defending coercive
order as such in contradistinction to anarchy. He is defending the human experience of
sacredness against dehumanization, which is the consequence of the loss of sacred
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authority and the resulting permissiveness that comes from the inability to distinguish
worthy goals from base desires. Liberty understood as an ideal oriented to good action
requires a knowledge from above, that is, from higher, authoritative sources. This liberty
is not an inborn universal human right; it is an ideal in which ordinary people look above
to their superiors for the knowledge that transforms them from naturally evil men into
good, obedient citizens with worthy goals that makes their lives meaningful and fully
human. Strauss’s liberty not only involves keeping down lower impulses, but also setting
worthy goals and ensuring permanent movement toward those goals. This process of
creating purpose and meaning by deciding which goals are noble and which are base
requires a special kind of knowledge and a special kind of individual. When he says that
"real men" despise bodily pleasures and aspire to great things, he is pointing to a kind of
aristocratic excellence he feels is threatened by wrongheaded approaches to freedom. 86
For Strauss, liberalism is based on a misguided conception of freedom, which
treats the individuals as sacred and yet is unable to justify any notion of sacredness.
Dismissing the theoretical basis of Isaiah Berlin’s defense of negative liberty, Strauss
emphasizes liberalism’s inability to justify the sacredness of the “frontiers of freedom
that nobody should be permitted to cross.” 87 Strauss is not challenging the location of
those frontiers, but their status as “sacred.” He talks about the most effective restraints on
human urges as having the status of sacredness, but the idea of preventing any external
force, any authority, from interfering in the private sphere created by the liberal
tradition’s concept of freedom cannot be called sacred. When he says that the “sanctity of
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the individual as individual, unredeemed and unjustified” is what freedom came to mean
for the many, he is acknowledging that higher conceptions of freedom may be
achievable, but not by “man as mere man”:
Every freedom which is freedom for something, every freedom which is justified by
reference to something higher than the individual or than man as mere man, necessarily
restricts freedom or, which is the same thing, establishes a tenable distinction between
freedom and license. It makes freedom conditional on the purpose for which it is
claimed. 88

Echoing Heidegger’s Nietzschean critique of negative liberty, Strauss argues that the
highest kind of freedom is the lawgiving kind. 89 Steven Smith concedes that, like
Heidegger, who claimed that “to give oneself the law is the highest freedom,” Strauss too
believed that freedom that is only negative cannot be regarded as genuine. 90 But where
Heidegger’s opposition to negative freedom “meant lack of concern, arbitrariness of
intentions, lack of restraint in what was done and left undone” and led him to reject
liberalism openly and completely, Strauss’s critique of negative freedom did not prevent
him from appreciating the potential of Berlin’s liberal theory of freedom. 91 Strauss
recognized that it “would be shortsighted to deny that Berlin’s formula is very helpful for
a political purpose - for the purpose of an anticommunist manifesto designed to rally all
anticommunists.” 92 Even as he rejected the philosophical justification behind Berlin’s
concept of freedom, Strauss appreciated its political purpose. It was not Berlin’s
philosophical argumentation that Strauss found persuasive; it was Berlin’s role as a
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philosopher using freedom to direct the political purpose of the West in a civilizational
struggle. Strauss rejected how Berlin thought about negative and positive freedom, but
Strauss seemed to identify an unnamed freedom in Berlin’s effort to define how Western
civilization should think about their own freedom and to persuade Western leaders to
defend their ideal of freedom as superior to and endangered by other kinds of freedom.
Whereas Strauss’s understanding of liberty, involves the process of fashioning
good citizens out of naturally evil men, noble freedom transcends good and evil and is the
source of the highest truths. Noble freedom is a kind of lawgiving power that decides,
shapes, informs and directs how lower forms of liberty are thought of and experienced.
Strauss presents “genuine freedom” in contradistinction to both license and liberty, and
treats this kind of unnamed freedom as the “highest human aspiration” because its
expression provides truth and purpose. Strauss’s description of this noble kind freedom
is only available to the law-giving few who aspire to the highest human excellence:
“While some men are corrupted by wielding power, others are improved by it.” 93 The
highest kind of excellence comes from exercising the highest kind of power.
Noble freedom is expressed as creative, lawgiving power. The ideas that guide
and determine human life are the "free human creations" that Nietzsche associates with
his free spirited philosopher-artist and Strauss with his philosopher-founder. 94 Noble
freedom aligns with Nietzsche’s “free ordering, arranging, deciding, shaping;” it is in
Strauss’s view what allows human beings to live purposefully because it is the source of
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the highest power, which determines human values and give mankind meaning and
purpose. Noble freedom emerges out of Nietzsche’s “god-forming instinct” and is, for
Strauss, the source of the law that proscribes to nature how it ought to be; it is the power
that creates “the whole.” 95 Life and thought are the result of an act of creation: “all
human life and human thought ultimately rests on horizon-forming creations which are
not susceptible of rational legitimization.” 96 Without a God to attribute this creative
power to, there is only “a mysterious absence that human logos cannot penetrate.” 97 This
absence is the reason why Strauss moves away from Nietzsche’s tendency to identify
intellectual freedom with probity: Strauss sees this ending in the abyss of nothingness. 98
Intellectual probity is “freedom from morality,” which reveals the fundamental mystery
of existence that human minds cannot make sense of without “horizon-forming
creations.” 99 Strauss goes beyond intellectual probity by teaching that the highest kind of
freedom is not a freedom from morality but a freedom for the creation of morality.
Despite his polemics against them, Strauss credits the intellectual freedom of the
historicists-turned-nihilists for reopening questions and problems long taken for granted.
Problems that Enlightenment intellectuals thought were solved could again be seen as
problems in need of new solutions because the historicists, who followed Nietzsche down
a path Strauss could not openly take, recognized the need to go beyond the “fundamental
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mystery of existence.” 100 When Strauss declares “I am not a historicist but I give them
credit for reopening these problems,” he is emphasizing how his alternative path from
Nietzsche is a superior approach to overcoming the abyss of nihilism. This approach
entails going beyond intellectual probity and embracing a noble freedom animated by the
god-forming instinct.
Noble freedom provides both the way to overcome the abyss of nihilism and the
way to human perfection in the form of the future philosopher or “wise man.” In
Strauss’s work, the wise man takes the place of the dead God who was once "the most
perfect being" but under the conditions of modernity the only perfection “mankind can
know is human perfection in the form of the wise man." 101 And freedom understood in
Strauss’s higher, noble sense, is the path to this perfection: “The wise man alone is
free.” 102 Strauss then adds to the essential humanness of the wise man who is the “highest
human type” a superhuman element that transforms the wise man into a god-like ruler. 103
Superhuman perfection is achieved through a particular kind of political engagement,
which will be explored in the next chapter. The key here is that Strauss understand noble
freedom as the way to achieve perfection through the exertion of creative power over
others. "Ruling over willing subjects is divine," Strauss offers in a footnote about
gentlemanly perfection. 104 The wise man knows that to achieve this divine rule the wise
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man must become “the ruler of rulers,” 105 which is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s view that
the highest men use rulers as their instruments. 106
Strauss conflates his notion of noble freedom with an understanding of natural
right that justifies the right of superior beings to rule over others. He admits that “some
men are by nature superior to others and therefore, according to natural right, the rulers of
others.” 107 What is less immediately apparent is that Strauss’s defense of aristocratic
excellence demands not only a recognition of the natural right of superior individuals to
rule over their inferiors, but that egalitarian conceptions of freedom threaten the highest
human excellence and therefore inequality must be willed. Moreover, theories of freedom
tied to satiating all human desires, theories that seek to end human suffering, also threaten
excellence and therefore cruelty must be willed. In both his written exploration of
Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil and in the final lecture of his seminar on Nietzsche’s
book, he explains his revulsion at the coming of the “realm of freedom,” an ideal in
which all human suffering and inequality are abolished and all human beings see
themselves as supermen. 108 Because suffering and inequality are the prerequisites for
greatness, the pursuit of excellence demands that suffering and inequality by willed. 109
This does not mean that Strauss is an enemy of all kinds of freedom. He is opposed to the
coming of the realm of freedom precisely because he cherishes the prospect of noble
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freedom for his philosophers.
Much of Strauss’s discussion of freedom centers on Nietzsche’s legacy. In the
opening chapters of Natural Right and History, Strauss establishes the contours of his
battle against the “radical historicists” who, like Heidegger, took the wrong path from
Nietzsche. Strauss seeks to guard against the threat he claims they represent. “To avert
the danger to human life,” two options are available, either “insist on the strictly esoteric
character of the theoretical analysis of life - that is, restore the Platonic notion of the
noble delusion” or “deny the possibility of theory proper and so conceive of thought as
essentially subservient to, or dependent on, life or fate.” 110 Strauss sees Nietzsche’s
misguided successors taking the second option. Strauss of course took the first and
embraced esotericism and his own version of Plato’s noble lies in which “Platonizing”
entailed using philosophy to create meaningful truth and order.
In taking a different path from Nietzsche, Strauss criticizes other Nietzscheans for
blurring the difference between intellectuals and true philosophers, but Strauss, like the
Nietzscheans he rejects, accepts the view that our choice of worldviews “has no support
but itself; it is not supported by any objective or theoretical certainty, it is separated from
nothingness, the complete absence of meaning, by nothing but our choice of it.” 111
Straussian esotericism means not openly acknowledging this, but seeking to overcome
the nothingness through meaning-creation. 112 Assembling Strauss’s various views on
freedom into a hierarchical theory with meaning-creation as the pinnacle creates a key
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that decodes the riddle he lays out early in his account of natural right. He presents a
choice: “We are free in the sense that we are free either to choose in anguish the world
view and the standards imposed on us by fate or else to lose ourselves in illusory security
or in despair.” 113 But these are not either/or options. Strauss creates options for the
universal human “we” to choose from and at the same time chooses for his own selective
“we” all three options. From within the abyss of nihilism, here referred to as despair,
Strauss’s philosophers create security through illusory myths by reintepreting particular
traditions, the worldview imposed by fate. This is Strauss’s philosophical “loving
reinterpretation of tradition,” a rethinking of the past that prepares the way for a new kind
of future. 114 Philosophers overcome nihilism and save humanity by attaching themselves
to the traditions surrounding them and employing their creative powers by reinterpreting
the shared past of a particular group in a loving manner so as to invite the peoples’
willing obedience, an expression of divine rule. More will be said in later chapters about
Strauss’s rethinking of the relationship between philosophy, politics, and religion. But as
it relates to his theory of freedom, we should note here that politics divides people
according to those who accept tradition in a religious manner demonstrating obedient
love from those whose commitment to philosophy offers them the freedom from religious
belief and the freedom for creating that belief for others. This transforms philosophers
into godlike beings ruling invisibly over a human world they create but do not inhabit.
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Conclusion
Nietzsche has Zarathrustra tell his followers to be gift-givers, to let their
knowledge become the meaning of the earth. 115 As creators and fighters these men of
ideas rebel against the “giant Chance,” which has ruled over human history thus far. This
revolt against history’s intrinsic meaninglessness results in the creation of new meanings
for mankind and does so without appeals to transcendent, otherworldly concepts.
Zarathrustra then tells his followers to go their own way with this teaching. But his
prophecy is not without guidance. He promises that out of these “seceding ones” a new
chosen people will arise, and from them a Superman who will replace the God of old.
Those influenced by Leo Strauss see his teachings as a kind of gift. In his book on
Zarathrustra, Stanley Rosen mentions Strauss only once, when Rosen explains what
Strauss taught his students about “the Gift-giving Virtue” that concludes the first part of
Nietzsche’s Zarathrustra. Rosen details how, for Strauss, this section parodied the
Christian Trinity with the Father being Zarathrustra the gift-giver, the Son being the gift
of the future, and the Holy Ghost being the solitude of one’s own spirit. 116 When Rosen
explains Zarathrustra’s gift, he is describing what Strauss taught about overcoming
nihilism through the will to power reinterpreted through the prism of freedom: “The will
to power manifests itself within individual creativity as the ability to shape the nihil of a
free death into a table of values for the next epoch of human history.” 117 Strauss’s theory
of freedom operates on several levels at once: it opens up the abyss of nihilism and
demands courage in the face of meaningless existence, but it also taps into the creativity
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of the philosophers’ will to power, which promises a new moral code for mankind.
Steven Smith gives voice to Strauss’s theory of freedom by acknowledging that freedom
leads to nihilism, but that through a nihilistic negation, a higher freedom can be
restored. 118 Daniel Tanguay speaks of this in terms of the dialectical movement from
Natural Law back to Natural Right, which he interprets, following Strauss, as a form of
creative freedom to determine the laws that determine human values. 119 Catherine and
Michael Zuckert stress the centrality of the wise man, 120 but say little about the
relationship between freedom and wisdom because in Strauss’s view wisdom is
predicated on special insight into matters traditionally governed by theology: "human
knowledge of the nature of God is the forgotten basis of free thought." 121 This special
knowledge Strauss calls wisdom. His students discuss it by reference to freedom: by
“forgetting” the knowledge of God, they reveal a void that their higher freedom can fill.
In what way did Strauss’s noble freedom seek to address the problem of nihilism
by retranslating Nietzsche’s will to power? “I have in mind his interpretation of human
creativity as a special form of the universal will to power,” Strauss admits. But little is
offered by way of explanation, especially in the currently published version of his
critique of modern freedom, which ends with: “Existentialism is the attempt to free
Nietzsche’s alleged overcoming of relativism from the consequences of his relapse into
metaphysics or of his recourse to nature.” 122 The existentialism he refers to here and
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elsewhere is the result of the misguided Nietzscheans whose path from Nietzsche Strauss
tries to redirect. The no longer published version of that same essay omits the final two
pages, a key section describing how freedom reveals both the problem of nihilism and the
way to overcome it. His seminar on Beyond Good and Evil confirms that the two pages
removed from later publications of the essay contain views that, while he taught them to
his students until the end, were deliberately hidden from public view. The omitted section
begins by announcing that existentialism starts as the reaction of serious men to their own
recognition that all human choices are groundless, a view he attributed in Natural Right
and History to misguided Nietzscheans. Strauss then declares that “the fundamental
phenomenon, the only phenomenon that is not hypothetical, is the abyss of freedom: the
fact that man is compelled to choose groundlessly; the fundamental experience, i.e., an
experience more fundamental than every science, is the experience of the objective
groundlessness of all principles of thought and action, the experience of nothingness.” 123
This is the key to understanding Strauss’s work. “Man and ultimately everything,” he
proclaims, “must be understood in the light of this fundamental experience.” 124 Mankind
and mankind alone is directly constituted by this fundamental nothingness. How? The
abyss of freedom is synonymous with the experience of nothingness, but for some unique
individuals this freedom-as-awareness of nothingness morphs into freedom-as-lawgiving
and truth-creation, which offers a way out of nihilism. The only way out, Strauss makes
very clear, is to “turn one’s back on the lessons of history and voluntarily choose life-
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giving delusion instead of deadly truth.” 125 The solution is to “fabricate a myth” that
supports “worthy” or “noble” human values. But this is impossible for men whose
intellectual freedom leads them only to destroy belief systems, to be open and vehement
atheists, for example, which is why Strauss struggled with Nietzsche’s insistence on
intellectual probity, as if it were a self-destructive force opposing the wills spiritual
yearnings. 126 Strauss sees an “atheistic religiosity” driving Nietzsche, and Strauss tries to
reorient that religiosity through political philosophy. Stopping at intellectual probity is
inadequate, which is why he says atheism is the penultimate stage. 127 Freedom entails
both facing the abyss of nothingness, and then “ordering, arranging, deciding, shaping”
the way out. But that is only for philosophers whose life and work Strauss redefines. The
rest of mankind is saved by being kept in the dark and having a properly good show
puppeted for them on the cave wall. How Strauss’s philosophers become godlike
puppet-masters is the subject of the remaining chapters.
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Chapter 2: The Political in Philosophy
A central theme in Strauss’s writings is the relationship between philosophy and
politics. Strauss’s exploration of this multilayered relationship ultimately fuses aspects of
philosophy and politics even as his teaching overtly magnifies the tensions between what
he presents as two distinct ways of life. His understanding of philosophy is animated by a
doctrine of the primacy of politics that emphasizes permanent combat against perceived
threats to his notion of excellence, the necessity of upholding civic and religious
traditions for the protection of both the public and philosophers, and the freedom of
philosophers to create and recreate truth and order.
For Strauss, philosophers impose order on nature’s meaningless chaos by
founding or transforming “regimes,” by which he means the totality of customs, laws,
institutions and culture determining how people live. 1 His use of the term varies in scope
such that it can refer to a political system (ie the Athenian regime) or a philosophical
mode of thought (ie regimes of truth) or a civilization (ie Western civilization). 2 By
creating and transforming regimes, philosophers transform human beings in the process:
ordinary people can become dutiful citizens, politically-ambitious individuals can be
made into virtuous leaders, and philosophers themselves can become founders and
lawgivers. His analysis of the permanent tensions between philosophy and politics is an
expression of his belief that human life requires meaningful truths that only philosophers
can provide, and that modern approaches to philosophy threaten the philosophers’ ability
to do so. In claiming that philosophy must become properly political to defend itself
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against various threats, Strauss redefines philosophy by redirecting it away from an inner
quest to discover truth to an outward movement to produce truth and create new regimes,
and he does this while ostensibly defending the traditional quest for truth and the
preservation of existing regimes.
Strauss argues that for a renewed philosophy to fulfill the “cosmic responsibility”
of justifying human existence, it must confront multiple dangers. 3 On the philosophical
plane the dangers have to do with the inability of certain kinds of knowledge to determine
the most important human values, on the political plane the challenge is how to deal with
dehumanizing ideologies and corrupt regimes. One level accounts for his battles against
modern scientific and historical approaches to knowledge, specifically his polemic
against “positivism” and “historicism,” which are said to hinder the quest for truth. The
other level accounts for his overt attacks on modern liberalism in his early writings
followed by support for “ancient liberalism” in his later work, his lifelong battle against
egalitarianism and the principle of universal enlightenment, and his persistent judgment
that modernity itself threatens the philosopher’s quest. The two planes overlap and
intersect in complex ways, and, even when separable, it is never clear whether philosophy
or politics is truly of greatest concern because ultimately they are inextricable for Strauss.
Both are made to point toward a kind of almost-divine lawgiving emanating from a
supreme power - the mind of the philosopher.
By defending “classical” against “modern” philosophy, Strauss is not only
challenging the methods and sources of scientific and historical approaches to
knowledge, he is also arguing for a kind of philosophy that can understand “the whole”
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by self-consciously becoming political, in both its manner of public presentation and its
awareness of and response to the threats to philosophy posed by modernity. While
insisting that his version of classical philosophy is non-dogmatic and non-ideological, it
reflects a distinct anti-scientific and anti-historical approach to philosophy that contains
an anti-democratic political teaching, which redirects democracy away from
universalism, equality, openness and peace toward exceptionalism, aristocracy,
exclusivity and combativeness. Getting to that teaching requires untangling the
relationship in Strauss’s work between philosophy and politics, which begins with his
admission that “the philosopher is always a political philosopher.” 4 What he means by
this only becomes clear after exploring how his engagement with Carl Schmitt set the
stage for his rethinking of philosophy. Ultimately Strauss developed an approach to
philosophy that contains four interrelated aspects: the quest for truth, the awareness that
fundamental problems are insoluble, the ascent from opinions to genuine knowledge, and
the transformative process and strategic purpose of philosophical education. Though the
Nietzschean elements color each aspect of his redefinition of philosophy, the concealed
influence of Carl Schmitt persists throughout his writings.
Lasting Honors to the Political
Early in his career Strauss developed a distinct critique of Carl Schmitt’s concept
of “the political,” which served as the basis for his later rethinking of the relationship
between politics and philosophy. Strauss’s critique of Schmitt reframes Schmitt’s notion
that the friend/enemy conflict is the core of the political. Strauss interprets Schmitt’s
definition of the political as an affirmation of man’s dangerousness expressed as the
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willingness to fight. 5 But fight for what? Without a higher purpose to guide this
willingness to engage in combat, Strauss explains, Schmitt’s notion of the political
amounts to fighting for its own sake. Strauss insists that Schmitt’s affirmation of the
political cannot be appropriately expressed without a moral basis lest it be understood as
a mere negation of liberalism’s depoliticalization, which is why Strauss argues that
Schmitt was unable to achieve a perspective beyond the horizon of liberalism. 6
Strauss sought a perspective beyond Schmitt’s critique of liberalism, and after
settling in the U.S. he framed that search in terms of transcending modernity rather than
liberalism. Nicholas Xenos captures the moment where Strauss’s position departs from
Schmitt’s. Both Strauss and Schmitt acknowledge that “the political is entailed in the
disagreements over “what is right,” but because [Schmitt] understands morals only in the
“humanitarian-pacifist sense,” he couches his polemic against liberalism as a polemic
against morals.” 7 Xenos explains that, in Strauss’s view, this position leads Schmitt into a
contradiction because his opposition to depoliticization is essentially moral, but it also
shows how “endorsing the political in these terms leads to an affirmation of fighting
(with friends and against enemies) without regard to “what is being fought for.”” 8 For
Strauss, this is a fundamentally liberal position, “albeit in inverted form: it is an
expression of toleration toward all “serious” convictions that entail the real possibility of
war.” 9 According to Strauss, a “more appropriate” affirmation of the political would have
a moral basis in pre-political knowledge, which would resolve Schmitt’s contradictions
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and strengthen the effort to transcend liberalism and modernity.
Strauss critiques Schmitt for claiming that “there is a primary tendency in human
nature to form exclusive groups,” while at the same time presenting the political
opposition between one’s own group and the enemy group as flowing from pre-existing
group identity, which would mean that “the political is something subsequent or
supplementary.” 10 Schmitt does not give an account of why the other group is different
and why the other should be seen as an enemy. For Strauss, it is insufficient to turn to
theological tradition and simply accept that a higher power has revealed it to be so.
Strauss wants to know the higher power’s reasons, and wants any proclaimed higher
power to be able to give reasons, because through a rational justification of what
determines friends and enemies, wisdom is demonstrated as the highest power with
supreme authority over all political forces. For Schmitt and Strauss both, there must be
something higher than and prior to political order. Whereas Schmitt sees that something
in theological terms, Strauss sees it in philosophy, which can better provide a rational
justification for supra- and pre- political powers.
Philosophy is, for Strauss, the constitutive force that provides identity and
purpose, which must be understood first in moral terms by establishing right and wrong
and then in political terms by establishing law and order. According to Strauss,
philosophy is more at home with the political Right, which better understands human
nature and why the political requires a moral basis. By turning to the idea of nature,
philosophy can provide the foundation that Schmitt’s concept of the political requires:
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The ultimate foundation of the Right is the principle of the natural evil of man; because
man is by nature evil, he therefor needs dominion. But dominion can be established, that
is, men can be unified, only in a unity against – against other men. Every association of
men is necessarily a separation from other men. The tendency to separate (and therewith
the grouping of humanity into friends and enemies) is given with human nature; it is in
this sense destiny, period. But the political thus understood is not the constitutive
principle of the state, of “order,” but only the condition of the state. 11

Strauss looks behind or beyond the state and finds that Schmitt’s political formations
(friend/enemy groups) are the result of predetermined moral formulations. Schmitt’s
account of the grouping of humanity into friends and enemies is unsatisfactory for
Strauss because it does not explain the primary tendency. For Strauss, the primary
political tendency is the need to establish dominion over naturally evil, that is, morally
base, human beings who must be taught “what is right.” Moral knowledge precedes the
political unity that is established against others. In Strauss’s telling, enemies are
determined only after one’s own group is formed out of a moral framework that provides
identity and purpose. Friends and enemies are created by lawgivers with special
knowledge of human needs who recognize that ordinary people cannot rule themselves,
that dominion must be imposed due to mankind’s natural condition. The special
knowledge that is the basis of morality and thus the basis of political rule comes either
from theological notions of a divine creator or philosophical expressions of “what is
right.” Strauss of course opts for philosophy, which is not to say that the religious themes
evident in Schmitt’s work are not contained in Strauss’s.
Whereas Schmitt’s concept of the political centers on a willingness to fight in
groups whose apriori existence provides identity and purpose, Strauss’s concept of
philosophy is concerned with contemplating fundamental questions which bring higher
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moral truth to and therefore direct the political. For Strauss, philosophy protects the
political sphere from losing its spirited belief in moral values and governmental laws,
which strengthen and reinforce each other. But it is not only this power to sustain
political life that leads Strauss to see philosophy higher than politics. Philosophy is the
source for “everything which comes into being through human action.” 12 Philosophy is
the source of the highest wisdom and power because it opens up the possibility of
experiencing transcendence through creation. Without philosophy, the political tends
toward destructiveness unaccompanied by creation.
Strauss’s engagement with Schmitt led him to rethink the relationship between
politics and philosophy. Strauss sought a “more appropriate” affirmation the political
than the affirmation of man’s dangerousness, which is how he understood Schmitt’s
concept of the political. Strauss presented a better articulation of the political by
emphasizing creative powers, namely “the power that forms states.” 13 Strauss rejects
Schmitt’s affirmation of the political as destructive because it focuses on a human
deficiency, the need for dominion, rather than a human excellence, the creation of truth
and order. Affirming the political on a higher, creative plane means affirming the
excellence of those who correct human deficiencies by establishing dominion. But
Strauss’s affirmation of the power that forms States is tied to his view that philosophy
precedes and transcends the political. Philosophy looks beyond existing political
formations to the creative sources and processes that form political entities and because
for Strauss the unity necessary to establish dominion is imposed on groups against other
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groups, his greatest concern is with the education and development of leaders who
establish unity, create groups, and found new orders.
That Strauss defines his approach to political philosophy in opposition to
Schmitt’s political theology should not conceal his kinship with the German
reactionaries, who Strauss explicitly and publicly rejected after settling in America. 14 His
critique even reveals aspects of not that kinship. Strauss chastised the “German nihilists”
for their lack of imagination: the movement failed to recruit young thinkers as
successfully as the communist movement it took aim against because the reactionaries
lacked a vision of their own that could excite youthful passions. The reactionaries only
countered the revolutionary’s vision. They lacked their own inspiring theory of the future.
The vision that appeared “to the communists as the fulfillment of the dream of mankind,”
was seen by “very intelligent and decent, if very young, Germans” as the “greatest
debasement of humanity.” 15 Implicit in Strauss’s critique is the belief that liberals are to
blame alongside communists for modern dehumanization. “The prospect,” he explains,
“of a pacified planet, without rulers and ruled, of a planetary society devoted to
production and consumption only” was horrifying to young reactionaries. 16 What
accounts for their horror? “What they hated,” he says, “was the very prospect of a world
in which everyone would be happy and satisfied, in which everyone would have his little
pleasure by day and his little pleasure by night, a world without real, unmetaphoric,
sacrifice, i.e. a world without blood, sweat, and tears.” 17
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In Strauss’s telling, young thinkers, both intelligent and morally serious, sensed
deeply that without struggle and sacrifice human greatness will be no more. But the
partisans of greatness had no positive vision of their own. Their lack of imagination left
them without guidance in their rebellion against modern ideals. Strauss explains that they
“did not really know and thus they were unable to express in a tolerably clear language,
what they desired to put in the place of the present world.” 18 They were only certain of
one thing: “that the present world and all the potentialities of the present world as such,
must be destroyed.” 19 Without a guiding vision, the movement descended into nihilistic
destruction. For the reactionaries, anything was better than modernity: “literally anything,
the nothing, the chaos, the jungle, the Wild West, the Hobbian (sic) state of nature,
seemed to them infinitely better.” 20 Strauss says that “their Yes was inarticulate – they
were unable to say more than: No! This No proved however sufficient as the preface to
action, to the action of destruction.” 21 Though their “yes” was yet to be articulated, their
“no” was fertile for Strauss: “a new reality is in the making; it is transforming the whole
world; in the meantime there is: nothing, but – a fertile nothing.” 22
In the way he responds to Schmitt and the German reactionaries Strauss reveals
traces of a likeness he conceals incompletely, especially when he imagines a hypothetical
teacher who feels that “not everything was bad in that nihilism.”23 The likeness appears
stronger when, speaking in his own voice, he says that the rebellion against modern
Western values in the name of pre-modern warrior virtues is deserving of “lasting
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honors.” 24 After settling in the U.S., Strauss developed a concept of philosophy that
could articulate alternatives to the modern world, which the young German reactionaries
had rebelled against. The nothingness of the German nihilists had been fertile ground for
Strauss’s redefinition of philosophy.
Redefining the Quest
Strauss’s uncontroversial starting point when defining philosophy is the quest for truth. 25
He emphasizes that “philosophy is essentially not possession of the truth, but quest for
the truth” because the “distinctive trait of the philosopher is that ‘he knows that he knows
nothing.’” 26 The philosopher, relentless in his quest despite knowing that there are limits
to human understanding, refuses to disregard questions that cannot be answered and
problems that cannot be solved. “It is impossible,” Strauss says, “to think about these
problems without becoming inclined toward a solution.” 27 Then a contradiction seems to
appear. On one hand Strauss argues that the philosopher ceases to be a philosopher and
transforms into an ideologue or sectarian when the commitment to a solution becomes
stronger than the awareness of the problematic character of that solution, while on the
other hand the “danger of succumbing to the attraction of solutions is essential to
philosophy which, without incurring this danger, would degenerate into playing with
problems.” 28 Strauss’s way out of this contradiction is the key to his rethinking of the
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philosophical enterprise.
In pursuing its aims, philosophy must know how and when to give way to
ideological thinking even as it seeks to transcend political life. Socrates, held up by
Strauss as the model philosopher, accepts the danger but is not overcome by the
temptation to sectarianism. Strauss explains that “the philosopher does not necessarily
succumb to this danger, as is shown by Socrates, who never belonged to a sect and never
founded one.” 29 The word necessarily is the key to making sense of what Strauss means.
The philosopher may succumb to the temptation of providing answers, he may become a
sectarian or a sophist, but to be consistent with what Strauss has said, the philosopher
ceases being a philosopher only in those moments when it is necessary to do so. For
Strauss, the thinker can be a philosopher while exploring the fundamental questions
privately, and then play the part of sophist or sectarian when political life demands it or
when threats to the philosopher’s way of life make it necessary. Strauss says nothing that
prohibits the same individual from being in one instance a philosopher and in another a
sectarian just like Maimondes can be seen as a theologian publicly and yet be understood
as an atheist philosopher to students of Strauss who interpret a philosopher’s public
proclamations of faith and the corresponding public teachings as expressions of “highminded citizenship.” 30
When Strauss asserts that the philosopher must first be a political philosopher, he
is emphasizing the need for the philosopher to defend himself while on his quest. The
philosopher encounters threats on both philosophical and the political levels and must
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respond to each kind of threat in a different way. One threat comes from other
philosophers whose own pursuit of truth is seen as threatening. The other danger comes
from society itself, which is suspicious of the philosopher for good reason. Philosophy is
inherently threatening to society because philosophy “is the attempt to dissolve the
element in which society breathes, and thus it endangers society." 31 The philosopher
must be aware of these dangers, which is why his quest leads to political engagement.
The philosopher’s quest thus leads to political activity, but his intention is not to
seize political power or otherwise take control of political affairs. “Since the philosopher
is the man who devotes his whole life to the quest for wisdom, he has no time for
political activity of any kind” Strauss insists, “the philosopher cannot possibly desire to
rule.” 32 And yet the philosopher is compelled to engage in political activity, according to
Strauss, because his quest leads him to seek out friends who will support him on his
mission. “The philosopher needs friends,” Strauss says, “who in order to be of service to
the philosopher in his philosophizing must themselves be actual or potential
philosophers. 33 The philosopher must go out to the marketplace and recruit friends, which
arouses the hostility of the “political men” and forces the philosopher to speak and act
politically. “The conflict,” he stresses, “with the political men cannot be avoided” and
responding to this conflict is “a form of the philosopher’s required political action.” 34
This action expresses itself in different ways, which must be kept in mind when Strauss
goes about defining and defending his concept of philosophy. The philosopher is political
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in the way he teaches and writes, but also in the way he thinks about the world and his
place in it. The philosopher is made aware from the start of a world divided into the
friends and enemies of philosophy. He must recruit friends. And he must combat his
enemies.
The greatest enemies of philosophy are those who prevent philosophers from
actualizing the highest truths, which for Strauss involves questions of value, meaning and
purpose. And the most threatening of those enemies are those that take the form of
philosophy itself. Among the enemies of philosophy Strauss is most concerned with are
positivism and historicism. For Strauss, positivism is rooted in the claim that modern
scientific approaches reveal objective truth about the natural world but have nothing to
say about human values and historicism is the view that social values are historically
contingent. 35 Positivism and historicism are said to undermine the quest for the highest
truth and wisdom because they are unable to explain the “why” of human existence.
Since the quest for truth and wisdom demands an account of the good and the right, the
values Strauss claims are mankind’s deepest concern, scientific and historical methods
are treated as threats to the philosophical endeavor. The philosopher’s quest therefore
becomes combative because if philosophers are to justify their way of life, they must in
principle be able to provide an account of why what they do is good and right, but
scientific and historical thinkers employ methods that prevent such an account and
therefore threaten the philosopher’s life purpose.
Philosophical combat is called for against enemy thinkers who stand in the way of
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the philosophers’ movement toward truth and wisdom, but when confronted by the
challenge of dealing with ordinary people a different kind of political action is necessary
because philosophy is threatened by the masses in a different way. When Strauss says
that philosophy must be politically responsible philosophy, he means it must be able to
justify itself to the public. Philosophers need to answer the question “‘Why philosophy?’
Why does human life need philosophy, why is it good, why is it right?”36 This question
immediately transforms into another. “Since human life,” he says, “is living together or,
more exactly, is political life, the question “Why philosophy?” means “Why does
political life need philosophy?” This question calls philosophy before the tribunal of the
political community: it makes philosophy politically responsible and it “forbids the
philosophers any longer to disregard political life altogether.” 37 Seeking to “justify
philosophy before the tribunal of the political community,” Strauss believes philosophy
must make arguments which appeal to all citizens. 38 But not to lure ordinary people into
philosophy. In fact, philosophy’s public defense is meant to keep people at a safe
distance, to protect people from philosophy’s dangerous truths and protect philosophy
from people’s suspicions and their diluting effect. Philosophers keep the people away
from philosophy by steering them toward their own civic and religious traditions, which
are reinforced and given philosophical grounding. At the same time philosophy is used
rhetorically to justify social traditions, it is used as a recruiting tool to seek out thinkers of
a certain kind who see through the rhetoric, reject the traditions common people embrace,
and see themselves as morally and intellectually superior. The philosopher’s political
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action is expressed through philosophical lies that are supposed to help ordinary people
even as they ennoble the philosopher’s quest. This is what Strauss means by noble lies.
Noble lies provide more than opium to the masses: they give meaning and
purpose and thus humanize mankind because, for Strauss, people need goals to move
toward in order to be truly and fully human. 39 Creative thinking of the sort Strauss
promotes offers philosophers something more than ordinary people can acheive: their
aims transcend the merely human. Not only do they provide ordinary people with truth
and meaning, noble lies also serve to recruit potential philosophers and give them a
means to express their superiority by creating truth and order. Strauss acknowledges that
the “adjective ‘political’ in the expression ‘political philosophy’ designates not so much a
subject matter as a manner of treatment: ‘political philosophy’ means primarily not
philosophic treatment of politics, but the political, or popular, treatment of philosophy, or
the political introduction to philosophy which seeks to lead qualified individuals to the
philosophic life.” 40 The quest involves a double movement through double speak:
philosophers point ordinary people one way and potential recruits another. Strauss’s
political philosophy is thus defined as much by recruiting friends for an exalted mission
as by combating the threats that stand in their way. But the reconceived quest can only be
fully understood after reflecting on two other aspects of Strauss’s political philosophy:
the awareness it provides and the ascent it makes possible.
The Depths of Awareness
In search of wisdom, the philosopher comes to understand that “[p]hilosophy as
such, is nothing but genuine awareness of the problems, i.e., of the fundamental and
39
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comprehensive problems.” 41 Philosophy, Strauss argues, provides a special sort of
awareness and knowledge: “philosophy is knowledge that one does not know; that is to
say, it is knowledge of what one does not know, or awareness of the fundamental
problems and, therewith, of the fundamental alternatives regarding their solution that are
coeval with human thought.” 42 Awareness of the fundamental problems involves a
recognition that fundamental problems have no solutions, which derives from “the
fundamental phenomenon,” or “the fundamental experience,” the experience of the
objective groundlessness of all principles of thought and action, the experience of
nothingness.” 43 Strauss picks up after Nietzsche here. “If we may make a somewhat free
use of an expression occurring in Nietzsche’s Second Meditation Out of Season, the truth
is not attractive, lovable, life-giving, but deadly…The world in itself, the “thing-initself,” “nature” is wholly chaotic and meaningless. Hence all meaning, all order
originates in man, in man’s creative acts, in his will to power.” 44 Seeming to depart from
Nietzsche, he also claims that there are “simple experiences of right and wrong” which
undergird the philosophic contention that there is a natural right. 45 How to reconcile these
seemingly contradictory points of view? What is by nature right is for Strauss based on
the assumption that people are intrinsically unequal, that there is a hierarchy of human
beings, and that philosophers are the supreme beings. Only philosophers can escape the
abyss of nothingness unaided and thus it is by nature right that they lead humanity in its
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struggle against nihilism, in its effort to establish and interpret notions of right and wrong
in the face of the fundamental experience of nothingness. Strauss begins with the
assertion that ordinary people cannot handle the dark truth of nothingness and thus
require illusions to protect them. The people need what only the philosophers can
provide. What is left unstated but gestured at is that in providing the people what they
need, philosophers not only perform their civic duty by providing people with useful truth
and meaning, but in creating myths, inventing ennobling lies, sustaining or fabricating
traditions, philosophers replace the role long played by God. 46
The philosopher’s experience of nothingness combined with his understanding of
human frailty and belief in his own superiority leads him to embrace the role of lawgiver
and truth-creator. His political activity involves producing or reinventing moral and
intellectual frameworks that undergird all regimes: these constructions are good for the
people, who are guided away from the abyss, and for the philosophers, who are protected
from a potentially dangerous public and provided with recruits and the space to
demonstrate what makes them suprahuman. The truth does not set ordinary men free, but
creating that truth does make philosophers free. Truth understood as the abyss of
meaninglessness makes life unlivable for most people, who must be constrained and
guided by a higher truth embedded in moral law. Philosophers give people that truth and
law. Strauss rejects the view that equates moral law with positive law, instead treating
moral law as a supreme unwritten law rooted in nature itself. 47 And for Strauss, there is
something higher than natural law: it’s the source of the law in the mind of the law-giving
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philosopher. Natural right, based in what Strauss sees as a human predisposition to belief
that there is right and wrong, is equated with the power of the philosopher to satisfy that
belief by imposing order on nature’s chaos and creating the supreme law of right and
wrong. By gifting this law to the people, philosophers create the conditions for
establishing collective meaning and purpose which is necessary for people to become
fully formed human beings. But for the creators of men and worlds to cultivate their
lawgiving powers, they must surpass the efforts of past philosophers.
Strauss’s redefinition of philosophy based on the classical model is rooted in a
critique of the way philosophy has evolved under modern conditions. It has become
impotent: under the influence of natural science philosophy cannot make value
judgements, it is unable to “go beyond the stage of discussion” and “reach the stage of
decision” especially regarding values questions, which are those that give people
meaning. 48 Still, he emphasizes, philosophy as it now exists, is not futile because it
provides awareness, a thorough understanding of the fundamental questions. This
heightened awareness is not provided by positivism or historicism, which are seen as
faulty paths philosophy has taken and which only lead to nihilism.
Nihilism also results from the existentialist reaction to modernity, which Strauss
believes was unleashed by Nietzsche and reformulated by Heidegger. In a critique of
“Heideggerian existentialism” aimed at distinguishing his own response to the crisis of
modernity from Heidegger’s, Strauss says, still in agreement with Heidegger at this point
in the text, “All truth, all meaning, is seen in the last analysis to have no support except
man’s freedom. Objectively there is in the last analysis only meaninglessness,
48
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nothingness.” 49 What Strauss called the “abyss of freedom” in his 1962 seminar on
Natural Right 50 can be experienced in anguish, but it also can open up new possibilities:
“Man freely originates meaning; he originates the horizon, the absolute presupposition,
the ideal, the project within which understanding and life are possible.” 51 Existentialism
opens the door to a different kind of freedom, an escape from the abyss available to those
philosophers who seek to actualize wisdom by producing truth, meaning and purpose.
This is the noble freedom discussed in Chapter One that turns philosophical truth-seekers
into truth-creators.
But to fully realize their potential, according to Strauss, philosophers must
recognize the centrality of politics. As Steven Smith explains, the reason Strauss rejects
Heidegger’s ontological approach, which seeks a way beyond Nietzsche by returning to
ancient greek thought and to questions about being, is because of Heidegger’s blindness
to the primacy of politics, which Strauss recovers by also returning to greek philosophy
but with a focusing on other fundamental questions. 52 This criticism is explicitly leveled
against Nietzsche as well, who Strauss sees as the source of Heidegger’s thinking.
Heinrich Meier sums up this criticism well: “What Strauss has in view when he accuses
Nietzsche of regarding politics as belonging from the outset to a lower plane than
philosophy and religion is the requirement that one start more radically with politics, with
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the commonwealth, with the foundations of its existence, with its vital element, the
opinions and valuations of its citizens.” 53 Neither Nietzsche nor Heidegger were
sufficiently attuned to this political element, which is why, Strauss claims, their teachings
were so easily exploited for vulgar political purposes.
For Strauss, a greater appreciation for the differences between the truths that
ordinary people need to believe and the truths that philosophers seek will protect
philosophers on their path toward a transcendent wisdom. Strauss’s emphasis on political
moderation is presented as a warning to philosophers to lower their expectations about
what is achievable through politics in recognition of human limitedness. 54 But his
teaching about political moderation conceals a philosophical radicalism. The warning is
not meant to dissuade the philosopher from attaining the highest wisdom and
transforming himself into a perfect “wise man,” the warning is “about how the wise man
has to proceed in his undertaking.” 55 Strauss’s emphasis on the beliefs and opinions of
citizens derives from his view that there are necessary limits on what is politically
achievable because there are limits on what truths ordinary people can accept. The
philosopher’s awareness of nothingness leads to an awareness of those limits, but it also
frees the philosopher to transcend those limits.
Ascent from the Abyss
Strauss gives an overtly political twist to a notion of philosophic ascent taken from
Nietzsche, which already contained political resonances. Speaking about the purpose of
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society, Nietzsche says that the “fundamental belief must simply be that society cannot
exist for its own sake, but rather only as a foundation and scaffolding to enable a select
kind of creature to ascend to its higher task and in general to its higher existence.” 56
Strauss reframes this ascent as philosophical liberation from Plato’s cave of false opinion.
In Strauss’s reimagining of the metaphor, emancipation takes place through a twofold
process whereby philosophy is used to authoritatively order people’s variable opinions
while at the same time to ascend from those opinions:
Philosophizing means to ascend from the cave to the light of the sun, that is, to the truth.
The cave is the world of opinion as opposed to knowledge. Opinion is essentially variable.
Men cannot live, that is, they cannot live together, if opinions are not stabilized by social
fiat. Opinion thus becomes authoritative opinion or public dogma or Weltanschauung.
Philosophizing means, then, to ascend from public dogma to essentially private
knowledge. 57

The ascent is made possible because people need to believe in public truths and because
philosophers create those truths. The ascent is from awareness to creation, a movement
from the recognition of existential meaninglessness to the production of meaning. In
recognition of the social need to have public opinions cohere around something
meaningful, the philosopher provides an authoritative truth. For people to live together,
they must embrace shared values and meanings, which can only happen if public opinion
is stabilized and made authoritative. The creative act of producing authoritative truth
transforms philosophers into superhuman lawgivers.
The philosophic ascent entails keeping the many down in the cave while
liberating the chosen few to pursue their own perfection. Strauss’s philosophers return to
the cave after becoming aware of the dark and deadly truth beyond it. They return not to
liberate the chained masses within, but to improve the puppet show displayed on the cave
56
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wall so the public remains content with the truths given them and even consents to the
security of their chains. The better the show, the more secure the chains, and the greater
the individual who escapes them. In search of supreme beings, the philosophers beautify
and reinforce social truths which serves to keep the people down and create the
conditions for the superior few to rise up.
How does the philosopher achieve his task when the quest for truth reveals only
nothingness? Strauss says that “one might realize the insoluble character of the
fundamental riddles and still continue to see in the understanding of these riddles the task
of philosophy,” which only here he reveals should be understood “in the full and original
sense of the term” as “the attempt to replace opinions about the whole by knowledge of
the whole.” 58 If the whole truth is unknowable then philosophy “is not only incapable of
reaching its goal,” it is absurd. His foundational premise is that philosophy, far from
being absurd, is the highest human activity. The most influential attempts to escape from
the existentialist trap of absurdity, he says, begin with the assumption that the whole is in
fact knowable. 59 From the awareness of ignorance, he moves to the creation of the whole.
In that creation, philosophy can move beyond the absurd and reach its goal which is
transcendent without being otherworldly.
Strauss’s version of the philosophic ascent blurs into his discussion contrasting
the “perishable things” and the “eternal order.” He says that the “philosopher’s attempt
to grasp the eternal order is necessarily an ascent from the perishable things which as
such reflect the eternal order.” 60 The ascent involves moving beyond the perishable
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toward the timeless things, but the eternal order the philosopher attempts to grasp turns
out to be the philosopher’s eternal act of order-creation in response to the dark truth of
existential nothingness. In reaction to that darkness, the philosopher creates order out of
nothingness and gifts that creation to a humanity in need of a meaningful world to
inhabit. But this gift-giving and receiving takes place in a social context permeated by
various institutions, groups and individuals with varying degrees of power. The
philosopher’s political task involves navigating this social complex and properly
discriminating between the people, the ruling authorities, and other philosophers.
The ascent to wisdom is not a solitary affair, it turns out. The philosopher needs
friends to aid him in his mission. The philosopher must remain “particularly sensitive to
the difference among human souls” and remember that “he alone knows what a healthy
or well-ordered soul is.” 61 The fact that he is “intensely pleased by the aspect of a healthy
or well-ordered soul” and “intensely pained by the aspect of a diseased or chaotic soul”
leads him to desire “to be together” with and educate those healthy and noble souls. 62 His
conclusion is that the philosopher “cannot help desiring, without any regard to his own
needs or benefits, that those among the young whose souls are by nature fitted for it,
acquire good order of their souls. But the good order of the soul is philosophizing. The
philosopher therefore has the urge to educate potential philosophers simply because he
cannot help loving well-ordered souls.” 63 The next chapter will further explore how
Strauss views the purpose of philosophical education, but the starting point is to separate
healthy from diseased souls, to recruit a new nobility, and to ascend beyond the
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perishable things.
Shadia Drury makes the interesting claim in comparing Strauss to Dostoyevsky's
Grand Inquisitor that “the Straussian position surpasses the Grand Inquisitor in its
delusional elitism as well as in its misanthropy.” 64 She recounts how the Inquisitor
explains that ordinary people can only be happy if they surrender their freedom and bow
to mystery and authority. Drawing parallels to Strauss’s views on the abyss of
nothingness, Drury underscores the Inquisitor’s faithless position: “Beyond the grave,
they will find nothing but death.” 65 What follows is key. “But we shall keep the secret,”
the Inquisitor explains, “deception will be our suffering, for we shall be forced to lie.” 66
And in the end, “they will marvel at us and look on us as gods.” 67 Drury argues that
Strauss’s position is even more extreme:
The Grand Inquisitor presents his ruling elite as suffering under the burden of
truth for the sake of humanity. So, despite his rejection of Christ, the Grand
Inquisitor is modeled on the Christian conception of a suffering God who bears
the burden of humanity. In contrast, Strauss represents his ruling elite as pagan
gods who are full of laughter. Instead of being grim and mournful like the Grand
Inquisitor, they are intoxicated, erotic and gay. 68

Drury underscores the Nietzschean influence: “Nietzsche thought that only when
suffering is witnessed by gods did it become meaningful and heroic. Soaring high,
Strauss discovered that there are no gods to witness human suffering; and finding the job
vacant, he recruited his acolytes.”
But it is important to see where Strauss departs from Nietzsche. Section 294 of
the “What is Noble?” chapter in Beyond Good and Evil begins with the phrase “The
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Olympian vice” and goes on to highlight the importance to Nietzsche of laughter:
I would actually go so far as to rank philosophers according to the level of their laughter right up to the ones who are capable of golden laughter. And assuming that gods, too, are
able to philosophize, as various of my conclusions force me to believe, then I do not
doubt that when they do so, they know how to laugh in a new and superhuman fashion and at the expense of everything serious! 69

Strauss makes no reference to such Olympian laughter, though he does discuss the
“Olympian freedom” that allows philosophers to study all ideologies without bias, that is,
to see that none is inherent “superior in truth and justice to any other among the
innumerable ideologies.” 70 The philosophical ascent from public dogma to private
knowledge leads to this relativistic awareness. But just as the philosopher cannot stop at
the abyss of nihilism, so too, for Strauss, must he transcend his own relativism in search
of “the eternal order,” which can only be found in noble souls. The activity of
discovering and perfecting those souls is serious business: it is the highest task of
philosophy which must never descend into “playing with problems.” 71 Play and laughter
are not part of Strauss’s lexicon. If there is any laughter in Strauss’s worldview, it is
hidden, muted, repressed. In this sense Drury is wrong to see Strauss through the lens of
Nietzsche’s Olympian laughter. A healthy well-ordered soul, Strauss seems to suggest, is
one that does not laugh, one that is focused intensely on all that is deadly serious.
The philosopher’s ascent involves responding politically to the awareness of
existential nothingness by realizing that the deadly truth is unbearable for ordinary
beings. The ascent entails concealing dangerous knowledge and producing counterknowledge, life-giving knowledge, moral-political knowledge. The concealment and
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creation of knowledge concerning what Strauss refers to as the “true issues” separates
ordinary people from his political philosophers and makes possible their transformation
in a new noble class of “wise men.” Strauss begins with the premise that philosophers are
a noble class and that they take great pleasure in being with their own kind, but he does
not attempt to explain why. This is particularly puzzling considering his critique of
modern philosophy for being unable to deal with questions of why. Silently declaring that
you can only know why we are nobles and why we cherish our own if you are one of us,
he says, “We must leave it open why philosophers experience such profound pleasure
when we observe signs of human nobility.” 72 With that left open he abruptly shifts to a
discussion about the passion for wisdom which is the basis of an approach to
philosophical education that transforms potential philosophers into “perfect gentlemen.”
How philosophical education completes Strauss’s redefinition of philosophy is the
subject of the next chapter.
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Ch.3 The Education of Wise Men
Strauss’s conception of philosophical education aims high, so high that the goals
of potential philosophers are presented as beyond reach, or nearly so. And yet Strauss
describes his approach to education as a “training in the highest form of modesty.” 1
While embracing the pre-modern view “that education in the highest sense is
philosophy,” Strauss’s approach to philosophical education is premised on his belief that
philosophers of the past invariably failed in their quest for wisdom: the philosopher who
remains only a philosopher is by definition, “not simply wise.” 2 The claim that “God
alone is simply wise” 3 serves as a temptation to future philosophers to become something
more than the philosophers of the past.
A training in modesty begins with the self-evident truth that human beings are not
gods, but Strauss’s work points to this truism in such a manner that it conceals how his
approach to education also points beyond it. This chapter describes the culmination of
Strauss’s reconception of philosophy in the education of political philosophers who are
taught to look beyond modernity toward the “best regime” as they work toward their own
perfection as the “highest human type.” 4 Supra-human perfection ostensibly modeled on
the questing philosophers of old is actually guided by Strauss’s reimagined Socratic
model such that future philosophers can succeed where past philosophers failed in
actualizing philosophy’s wisdom through prophets and wise men.
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Philosophical education involves training in modesty or moderation, but Strauss
admits that it is “at the same time a training in boldness.” 5 Strauss boldly looks beyond
Plato’s conception of the philosopher’s mission and teaches would be philosophers that
they can build on the work of their philosophical teachers to accomplish “something
which the greatest minds were unable to do.” 6 The aim for Strauss of philosophical
education is the cultivation of an intellectual class of political teachers and advisors who
work toward what “moderate” political improvement while striving for their own suprapolitical “perfection.” The explicit goal of improving political rule by applying the
wisdom of moderation veils the more radical goal of transforming ruling regimes by
reorienting philosophy toward a reimagined notion of transcendence tied to the
embodiment of the highest wisdom in suprahuman form. “I am almost solely concerned,”
Strauss says, “with the goal or end of education at its best or highest – of the education of
the perfect prince” which is an “education to perfect gentlemanship.” 7 Strauss imagines
himself at the top of a chain of thinkers and teachers engaged in a common enterprise to
transform potential philosophers into future wise men. But the pedagogical enterprise
aims to create a class of intellectual gentlemen by revitalizing pre-modern notions of
eternal glory and redirecting philosophy’s purpose by heroizing founders and tempting
students with serpentine wisdom.
The previous chapter demonstrated how philosophy must become properly
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political so as to reassure people and rulers that the political community is not threatened
by philosophers and to point potential philosophers toward higher ideals. This chapter
builds on the notion that philosophical thought, speech and action follow this double
movement of defending philosophy before the tribunal of the city by upholding civic
truths and at the same time recruiting potential philosophers away from the city’s public
truths to pursue something greater. For Strauss, philosophy is a useful recruiting and
sorting tool because of the way it can “reveal the truth to some while leading others to
salutary opinions.” 8 This chapter focuses on the few to whom truth can be revealed, and
how they can be tempted to implement the wisdom received from their teachers in a
mult-generational act of lawgiving that begins in the imagined world and then comes to
life in the actions of real world demigods. Philosophical education is meant to “arouse to
thinking those who are by nature fit for it.” 9 This chapter explores the means of this
arousal, and the reconceived models meant to seduce certain types. Philosophical
education is a project to create a new intellectual class, which employs philosophical
ideas to reestablish the moral foundations of the regimes they engage with. Behind the
explicit concern with the erosion of moral authority under the conditions of modernity
and concealed within the explicit teaching of political moderation, Strauss teaches his
gentlemen to become teachers of and advisors to regime creators by tempting them with
godlike wisdom which they are inspired to embody and reflect.
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Against Modernity, then Beyond
Seeking to surpass a modern approach to philosophy that leads to nihilism,
Strauss sees in classical approaches a better justification for the use of philosophy as a
means to create and educate new political elites. That justification begins by asking “Why
does political life need philosophy?” 10 The classical philosophers were better able than
their modern counterparts to “supply a political justification for philosophy by showing
that the well-being of the political community depends decisively on the study of
philosophy.” 11 Philosophy justifies itself, according to Strauss, by the leaders it produces
and the regimes they rule. Strauss’s political philosophy justifies itself through the
formation through education of new intellectual elites concerned with the development of
new ideologies and new regimes that could correct the failings of modernity.
The source of modern problems, according to Strauss, is rooted in the failings of
modern philosophy, which is rooted in principles that prevent the few who are fit to rule
from receiving a proper education. Modern philosophy abandoned classical assumptions
about the permanence of human inequality and the need for social hierarchy when it
turned to democratic and egalitarian principles, ultimately defending the ideal of
unlimited technological progress and universal diffusion of philosophical and scientific
knowledge. Philosophical education modeled on the classics begins by rejecting this
modern bias as unnatural and destructive of humanity. 12 Strauss’s argument against
modernity is framed in terms of the need for responsible moral authorities who can
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replace modern ruling elites driven above all by material self-interest. Throughout his
writings, Strauss remained principally opposed to a modern project that aims at universal
prosperity, perpetual peace, and the relief of man’s estate through technological
development because under such conditions “man loses his humanity.” 13 Under such
conditions, modern ruling elites have no sense of noble values and modern society
becomes corrupt. The prospect of a universal order in which science and technology are
emancipated from moral and political supervision “would lead to disastrous
consequences: the fusion of science and the arts together with the unlimited or
uncontrolled progress of technology has made universal and perpetual tyranny a serious
possibility.” 14 Strauss’s view that modernity points toward such a tyranny is presented as
a full blown crisis after he settles in America. 15 The crisis is upon us because of improper
supervision. Our moral and political authorities have lost control of science, art and
technology. The ultimate reason for their failings? Modern elites fail because of the
modern principles that inform their thinking and corrupts their values.
Strauss wrote against a modern project that, whether through liberalism or
socialism, was converging on a universal and classless society. 16 The source of the
problem is a modern regime that
starts from the natural equality of all men, and it leads therefore to the assertion that
sovereignty belongs to the people; yet it understands that sovereignty in such a way as to
guarantee the natural rights of each; it achieves this result by distinguishing between the
sovereign and the government and by demanding that the fundamental governmental
powers be separated from one another. The spring of this regime was held to be the desire
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of each to improve his material conditions. 17

Strauss’s embraces Nietzsche’s vision of a “new nobility” to counteract the modern
movement toward a universal society. 18 The result of a modern regime that begins with
the principle of human equality and aims at universal happiness is that commercial and
industrial elites concerned above all with material prosperity predominate rather than
intellectual elites inspired by higher political and philosophical values. 19 The modernity
founded by a Machiavelli who, according to Strauss, was ultimately concerned with the
“intellectual liberation of an elite from a bad tradition” 20 produces unworthy elites and an
analogously bad tradition. 21
To liberate a new nobility from a bad modern regime, Strauss counters the
teaching of natural equality and the concern for material happiness, which conspire to
produce an “effete” and “unmanly” culture, by elevating pre-modern notions of social
hierarchy based on the natural superiority of thinkers. Framing the problem as the “crisis
of modernity” means that addressing the challenge entails going beyond normal courses
of action and beyond the existing moral and political order. And because the regime
concept means different things in different contexts, Strauss’s crisis narrative can be used
to focus corrective energies on “the way of life of a society” understood as the “form of
government,” as in the American constitutional regime, or the focus can be on regimes
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understood as distinct cultures and civilizations, as in Western democratic culture or
modern civilization. 22
Strauss’s Machiavelli counsels future princes to look back to the classics to see
passed an “effeminate” Christian tradition, which parallels the way Strauss teaches his
future gentlemen to see in the classics a path beyond an effeminate modernity to a regime
of “excellence.” 23 The two kinds of excellence Strauss is concerned with are described in
terms of two types of individuals: the “philosophical man” and the “political man.” 24
These types of individuals are driven to different expressions of excellence by
corresponding ambitions. The political types are driven by the desire to rule, which
according to Strauss can improve certain individuals: “While some men are corrupted by
wielding power, others are improved by it.” 25 Framed this way, the desire for power is a
noble ambition whereas the hunger for wealth is an inferior, animalistic urge that must be
controlled because “[m]an is so built that he cannot achieve the perfection of his
humanity except by keeping down his lower impulses.” 26 Whereas political men seek an
excellence associated with political power, the excellence associated with wisdom as
pursued by philosophical types, makes possible the highest perfection. 27 Moving toward
a regime of excellence means moving beyond modernity.
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According to Strauss’s classical approach, a regime that reflects the highest values
is constituted by the highest types of individuals. A regime of excellence requires that
individuals capable of philosophical and political excellence are dominant in society. 28
Not economic elites, but political and philosophical elites must be regarded as
authoritative if the regime is to be oriented to excellence. Such authoritative human
beings “must have the decisive say within the community in broad daylight: they must
form the regime” 29 Strauss teaches both his political and philosophical men to become
regime creators.
Strauss’s first lesson in philosophical education is that not all people desire and
deserve the same things. Modern philosophy comes into being when the end of
philosophy is identified with the end which is capable of being actually pursued by all
men.” 30 Strauss rejects the modern conception of philosophy for its inability to
distinguish and rank the desires that define and differentiate people, a deficiency he
attributes to modern philosophy’s fundamentally democratic character. 31 “Democracy is
rejected” by those who pursue wisdom “because it is as such the rule of the
uneducated.” 32 The problem is not new to the modern world. Even ancient Athens, held
up by Strauss as a model in other regards, was confronted by the problem of democracy
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and an educational system that leads to effeminacy. 33 But modernity makes matters
worse.
To see how philosophic education for a new ruling class is Strauss’s response to
the crisis of modernity, we must understand his critique of the modern ideal of
enlightenment, which was “destined to become universal enlightenment.” 34 Modernity is
premised on the belief that the widespread diffusion of knowledge benefits all. Modern
progress is measured based on the belief that scientific discoveries and technological
developments would ultimately bring happiness to all mankind. Even though the
knowledge that produced these wonders comes from the minds of the few, the benefits
are to be shared universally: “While invention or discovery continued to remain the
preserve of the few, the results could be transmitted to all.” 35 Invention and discovery are
the results of contemplation, the highest expressions of which can be experienced only by
superior minds. And therein lies a twofold problem for Strauss. Transmitting these results
to people who could not have thought them alone is dangerous to the people themselves,
and the philosopher’s sublime experience of free contemplation is diminished and
degraded.
As if the philosopher’s full potential could only be actualized when people are
kept away from the philosopher’s activities, Strauss sees double danger in the
philosopher’s ascent to wisdom. “Unfolded at large,” Perry Anderson says of Strauss’s
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perspective, the truths of philosophy “would destroy the protective atmosphere of any
civilization and with it all stable conditions for the pursuit of philosophy itself.” 36
Philosophy’s posture toward the people must be keep away for your own good. Strauss
treats modern philosophy as unnatural because it gives to common people a kind of
knowledge that invalidates the sacred beliefs that sustain their basic humanity. One
aspect of those sacred beliefs especially important to Strauss is that they impose restraints
on most people: if philosophic attitudes and knowledge became widespread, the masses
would behave as if everything were permitted. 37 “The deepest reason why philosophy is
so enormously dangerous,” is that it reveals the groundlessness of natural morality, it
shows that “natural morality is, strictly speaking, no morality at all.” 38 And yet
philosophy also teaches that social order requires morality. Political laws ultimately have
their foundation and derive their legitimacy from morality, which ultimately has its
source in a higher power that people believe is authoritative. Only laws coming from an
“omnipotent and omniscient God can make possible genuine morality.” 39 This points to
the “ultimate reason why political life and philosophic life, even if compatible for almost
all practical purposes, are incompatible in the last analysis: political life, if taken
seriously, means belief in the gods of the city, and philosophy is the denial of the gods of
the city.” 40 The ancients understood better than the moderns that the philosopher’s social
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duty was to remain silent or otherwise conceal such dangerous knowledge: “The
philosopher who knows the truth, must be prepared to refrain from expressing it, not so
much for reasons of convenience as for reasons of duty.” 41 The open dissemination of
knowledge as a philosophical ideal entails abandoning the philosopher’s social duty to
protect people by upholding the moral order. But this conceals the higher reason why
Strauss treats the diffusion of philosophical knowledge as destructive of humanity, 42
which has to do with protecting the philosopher’s own exclusive experience of
contemplation, which brings him closer to the omnipotence and omniscience required to
make possible genuine morality.
The problem goes beyond the challenges of maintaining moral and political order
when people’s sacred beliefs are undermined by the modern diffusion of philosophical
knowledge. The deeper problem concerns the status of the philosopher’s knowledge, the
exclusivity of the philosopher’s sacred experience of contemplation, and the prospects of
actualizing the wisdom received in contemplation. Wisdom is unlike other kinds of
knowledge in that it has the character of superiority; it is the highest type of knowledge
and it is obtained only by the highest types of men. For Strauss, wisdom loses its exalted
status when it is handed over to people unable to acquire or understand it alone because
he equates the diffusion of knowledge with its dilution: “The diffusion among the unwise
of genuine knowledge that was acquired by the wise would be of no help, for through its
diffusion or dilution, knowledge inevitably transforms itself into opinion, prejudice, or
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mere belief.” 43 The nature of knowledge is determined by the quality of mind. Only
superior minds can truly experience knowledge that has the character of wisdom, which
is qualitatively different from the opinions, prejudices, and beliefs that permeate the
minds of all people. Knowledge transmitted to inferior minds is diminished in status and
takes on the character of opinion; it is degraded and becomes nothing more than belief,
accepted but not understood, passively consumed but never actively and fully
comprehended. For ideas to rise to the level of genuine knowledge in Strauss’s sense, for
them to acquire the status of wisdom, they must spring from and be shared only with
superior individuals, who alone are capable of understanding the highest knowledge and
putting it to work in the pursuit of the highest perfection.
Wisdom as the source of the ultimate human perfection is only available to the
“rare few who possess the best natural endowments and who are also fortunate to live
under conditions in which the requisite virtues can be developed and noble activities
performed.” 44 Philosophers alone can possess “knowledge of man’s ultimate perfection”
whereas the “rest of men can only attain some degree of this perfection” through the gifts
the philosopher makes possible. 45 Philosophical education teaches that only philosophers
are fit to know the highest truth, to reach the peak of wisdom. But how should the thinker
respond to the voice of wisdom, which he alone hears only after he summits the peak and
stands atop the mountain as a perfected philosopher? For Strauss, the highest wisdom
calls for the philosopher to transcend his own limitations and become “more than a

43

Ibid., p. 193.
Leo Strauss, “Alfarabi,” in History of Political Philosophy, Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey eds.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 210.
45
Ibid.
44

103

perfect philosopher.” 46
The Philosopher’s Mountain
The model for Strauss’s philosopher is a special kind of mountain climber. It may
at first appear in pyramidal form. Strauss gestures with fragmented references at a
pyramidal mountain whose missing peak shines brighter than the foundation it rests upon:
his is a mountainous “structure which from a broad base of drabness rises to a narrow
plateau of distinction and grace.” 47 Because only a philosopher can stand atop this
mountain, and because Socrates represents for Strauss the model philosopher, it may be
Socrates that Strauss wants us to imagine guiding the philosopher’s ascent to wisdom.
Just like the philosopher who can attain “knowledge of ultimate perfection” but can only
give “some degree of that perfection” to those below, Socrates can be seen as the
illuminating peak that “gives some grace and some distinction” to the “broad base of
drabness” represented by the masses of people who live in darkness and long for the
philosopher’s light. But in gesturing at this vision, Strauss points beyond it as well.
Speaking of how Strauss’s followers view him and his teaching about natural
right, Mark Lilla says “[t]hey treat him less like Socrates than like Moses, and Natural
Right and History as tablets brought down from the mountain.” 48 The philosopher who
reaches the peak of human potential becomes more than a philosopher: he becomes a
prophet and lawgiver. By ascending the Sinaic mountain a higher wisdom is revealed,
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but only to the philosopher-prophet who returns to the base to give that wisdom in the
form of a new law to a distinct group chosen for a special mission. But in the lawgiving
moment, the prophet can only give “some distinction” to his followers. Much work
remains to be done if their mission is to succeed.
Strauss writes of Moses and his teachings to tempt future seekers of wisdom to
become “more than perfect philosophers,” to go beyond the model of Socrates the perfect
philosopher. “Moses taught,” Strauss says, “that uncreated “chaos” precedes in time the
ordered universe which is the work of God.” 49 God is the supreme wisdom that creates
moral order out of nature’s chaos, and this wisdom is communicated to human beings
through prophets. When Strauss teaches that “the prophets were perfect philosophers and
more than perfect philosophers” 50 he tempts future philosophers to look beyond the
model of Socrates. Philosophers lack something artistic the prophets possess, which
disqualifies the philosopher who is only a philosopher from being seen as a supreme
being. 51 The philosopher cannot reach full perfection “without the power of imagination
of which the prophet is the most accomplished representative.” 52 In contemplation, the
philosopher who aspires to be something more engages with the prophet’s power of
imagination and becomes a creative artist able to give form to nature’s chaos through
lawgiving, or what Strauss calls giving an account of “the whole to which one belongs.” 53
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Employing the language of the prophets in order to teach future philosophers to see
themselves as worthy of supreme distinction, Strauss says that Moses was deserving of
the greatest admiration for being seen as worthy to speak with God. 54 That distinction is
evident in the wisdom embedded in his artwork, which gave a small group a new identity
and a mission that would transform the world.
In the pre-modern world, the creation of a comprehensive belief system that
undergirded moral and political laws was the work of religious thinkers, not philosophers,
who took for granted the need people have for a “true and final account of the whole” 55
and that a priestly class existed to provide it. “As long as the belief in the possibility and
necessity of a final account of the whole prevailed,” then the attempt to provide such an
account “did not form an integral part of the philosophic effort.” 56 Philosophers left this
work to theologians. Strauss teaches that under the conditions of modernity, philosophers
are forced to rethink this division of labor because the commitment to the diffusion of
scientific and philosophical knowledge undermines people’s beliefs in existing religious
accounts, which opens new space for the philosopher-artist to become the philosopherprophet.
Strauss sees in classical philosophy a way to revitalize religious ways of thinking
as a means to inform and guide the rebellion against modernity. Concepts like
transcendence serve this purpose, but only when stripped of theological underpinnings
and given philosophical grounding. Strauss’s approach parallels the efforts of the Platonic
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political philosophers of the Middle Ages who grounded philosophy in efforts to justify
religious laws philosophically. 57 Under modern conditions, Strauss teaches, it is left to
political philosophy to provide an authoritative justification for moral values embedded
in political laws. 58 For this reason Strauss says political philosophy has become almost
synonymous with ideology. 59 The philosophical ascent propelled by ceaseless questions
leads to a wisdom that Strauss calls “comprehensive knowledge of the whole.” 60
Mark Lilla explains that for Strauss “all societies require an authoritative account
of ultimate matters – morality and mortality, essentially – if they are to legitimate their
political institutions and educate citizens.” 61 While theology traditionally accomplished
this by convincing people to obey laws that are believed to have sacred origins, the
philosophical alternative epitomized by Socrates is a “life of perpetual questioning
beholden to no theological or political authority.” 62 Such philosophical questioning
necessarily undermines the authoritative elements that legitimize political institutions and
educate citizens. Without these authoritative accounts, “no society can hold itself
together.” 63 Philosophical freedom serves a double purpose: while continuing to question
existing theological and political accounts of morality, philosophers articulate their own
authoritative accounts of the traditions that hold regimes together, but they express those
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accounts in a manner that recruits future philosophers to create new regimes and become
lawgivers.
Strauss’s philosopher-lawgivers establish “the permanent framework within
which the right handling of changing situations by excellent politicians and statesmen can
take place.” 64 Judging the decisions of political leaders “depends ultimately on the value
of the cause in whose service” the politician or statesman acts “and that cause is not his
work but the work of him or those who made the laws and institutions of his
community.” 65 The cause that determines how to judge the value of a leader’s actions is
given by founding lawgivers, who establish moral-political order by justifying a set of
values or preferences philosophically, that is, through ideology. 66 Ideology is the basis
for the moral framework leaders need in order to demonstrate excellence in the handling
of ever-changing political situations. Creating ideology is the supreme expression of the
legislative art, which Strauss calls “architectonic,” and which he claims is a teachable
political skill.67 Strauss teaches that philosophical lawgiving is superior in dignity to the
decisions taken “here and now by a legislator acting on behalf of this or that political
community.” 68
The wisdom of the philosopher is the source of the higher law that he gives to

64

Leo Strauss, “On Classical Political Philosophy,” in An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays
by Leo Strauss, Hilail Gildin ed. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), p. 65.
65
Ibid.
66
Leo Strauss, “An Epilogue,” in An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays by Leo Strauss,
Hilail Gildin ed. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), p. 151.
67
Leo Strauss, “On Classical Political Philosophy,” in An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays
by Leo Strauss, Hilail Gildin ed. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), p. 65.
68
Leo Strauss, City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 28-29.

108

political leaders in the form of ideological principles that guide decision-making. The
political philosopher is both a philosopher-lawgiver and a teacher of legislators:
Every legislator is primarily concerned with the individual community for which he
legislates, but he has to raise certain questions which regard all legislation. These most
fundamental and most universal political questions are naturally fit to be made the
subject of the most “architectonic,” the truly “architectonic” political knowledge: of
that political science which is the goal of the political philosopher. This political
science is the knowledge which would enable a man to teach legislators. The political
philosopher who has reached his goal is the teacher of legislators. 69

The ideological principles that Strauss refers to as an “authoritative account of the whole”
and which his political philosophers teach to would be legislators, is not based on
philosophy understood as a body of doctrines but as a way of thinking about political
problems. Steven Smith claims that “[a]lthough he bequeathed no formal system or
doctrine, he did leave a very characteristic way of posing problems.” 70 Strauss instructs
students to begin with the most urgent question: what kind of laws and institutions would
be most favorable to “the rule of the best?” 71 “It is primarily by answering this question,”
he says, “by thus elaborating a “blueprint” of the best polity, that the political philosopher
becomes the teacher of legislators.” 72 Smith says that Strauss himself “did not write to
produce an ideology, that is, a body of doctrine intended to serve as a blueprint for
political action.” 73 Strauss did not produce an ideology, but his way of posing problems
does inspire those influenced by him to seek alternative ways of thinking that can
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transform modern regimes. Daniel Tanguay agrees that Strauss’s overall objective “is not
to present a completed doctrine” but to “arouse an awareness of the fundamentally
problematic character” of modernity. 74 His teaching arouses the desire and provides the
tools to create alternative ideologies. What Smith refers to as Strauss’s way of posing
problems, Tanguay explains is an aspect of Strauss’s “desire to present alternatives rather
than solutions.” 75 By presenting alternatives to the established way of thinking, “Strauss
also wishes to transmit politically healthy opinions.” 76 Strauss does not himself present a
completed doctrine, but his teaching is meant to arouse in students a desire to improve the
health of ailing regimes or to take more drastic action to address the failures of a corrupt
regime. Strauss did not leave behind a blueprint, but he did indicate that future legislators
need a blueprint. “Strauss was not a legislator,” Smith explains, because “[h]e did not
propose any wholesale vision” for reform. 77 Not himself a legislator, but something
more, he was the teacher of future legislators and a teacher of their teachers. He provides
the prophetic vision that guides future founders who provide their own blueprints that
guide the intellectuals who provide the advice that guides political leaders.
The philosopher-founder provids a kind of comprehensive knowledge that
recognizes certain philosophical limits. The philosopher-founder develops an
“understanding of the whole” based on, according to Strauss, “the political art in the
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highest sense” which “is not knowledge of the whole.” 78 Comprehensive philosophical
knowledge is impossible to possess because “of the mysterious character of the whole.” 79
But for Strauss comprehensive political knowledge of a particular community is possible:
“the city is the only whole within the whole or the only part of the whole whose essence
can be wholly known.” 80 Such total knowledge is akin to what Daniel Bell referred to as
total ideology, “an all-inclusive system of comprehensive reality, a set of beliefs, infused
with passion and seeks to transform the whole of a way of life. This commitment to
ideology—the yearning for a ‘cause,’ or the satisfaction of deep moral feelings—is not
necessarily the reflection of interests in the shape of ideas. Ideology, in this sense, and in
the sense that we use it here, is a secular religion.” 81 Strauss teaches that thinkers need, as
all humans do, a cause or mission that gives life a higher moral purpose. As
representatives of the highest human type, their cause is so deeply tied to moral feelings
he explicitly stresses the importance of selecting for and cultivating an intellectual class
with a “passionate interest in genuine morality.” 82 He also seeks to transform the
philosopher’s way of life. The distinct way of posing political problems, a variation on
the idea of the philosopher’s ceaseless questioning, is part of the reconception of
philosophy described earlier. And his efforts to revitalize religious ways of thinking
serves the purpose of a secular religion with political philosophers as a priestly class. In
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spirit if not in form, Strauss provides an ideology or a meta-ideology to future legislators
and their teachers: the mission is not for intellectuals to implement a final ideology or
regime, but to ensure that intellectuals have the freedom to create and recreate the truths
embodied in ideologies and regimes.
Scholars who see Strauss’s political philosophy as an ideology for indirect rule by
intellectual elites overlook the way Strauss’s teaching is oriented to the creation and
transformation of regimes. Perry Anderson argues that Strauss’s work takes the “form of
an oracular retrospect of the history of philosophy from Socrates to Nietzsche,” which is
“in effect a systematic political doctrine.” 83 Anderson correctly says that for Strauss the
best political order will be hierarchical to mirror nature’s inherent inequality and so the
“best regime will therefore reflect differences in human excellence, and be led by an
appropriate elite. But although the highest virtue is philosophical contemplation of the
truth, this does not mean – contrary to a superficial reading of the Republic – that the just
city will be ruled by philosophers.” 84 Anderson captures the image of an intellectual class
of gentlemen rulers who are not themselves philosophers, but are the product of
philosophers. But this picture does not reveal the transformational spirit of Strauss’s
gentlemen who, according to Anderson, are “instructed in rule – but not raised to truth –
by philosophers” who teach them to “uphold a rational order of political stability against
leveling temptations.” 85 Anderson is right to call Strauss’s work is “oracular” because it
inspires through enigmatic writings a “passionate interest in genuine morality” while
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invoking the idea that only an “omnipotent and omniscient God can make possible
genuine morality.” 86 But Anderson is not right to interpret the passion of Strauss’s
gentlemen in terms of guarding against leveling temptations by aiming at hierarchical
stability. Their passion is not to stabilize but to create and recreate hierarchical regimes.
The passion for creation is what brings the philosopher-founder as close as humanly
possible to God. Strauss’s apparent concern for social stability expressed in arguments
against licentiousness are only the surface explanation for why a “passion for genuide
morality” must be “an integral part of the philosophic effort.” 87 More important is the
aspiration to godliness through contemplation, which gets reflected in the philosopherfounder’s aspirations: philosophizing begins “for us” by seeking understanding through
wisdom but then leads beyond mere understanding to a higher “awareness of our
understanding” and culminates in the need to “exert our understanding,” an experience
regarded as “so high, so pure, so noble” that a classical philosopher “could ascribe it to
God.” 88
With Strauss’s “classical philosopher” describing contemplation as “assimilation
to God,” we again are forced to reconsider the manner in which Socrates is presented by
Strauss as his model philosopher. If the prophet Moses received the highest wisdom
from God before giving a new moral law to his chosen people, then future philosophers
who see themselves as prophetic lawgivers will interpret the messages they receive from
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the highest sources of wisdom as divine truth, which will be interpreted politically and
made the basis of new laws. Strauss’s gentlemen-founder is not actually a philosopher,
but he is a teacher of legislators who “presents himself as an interpreter of, or as a
messenger from, the philosophers rather than as a philosopher.” 89 Especially relevant in
this regard is Strauss’s sole admission, given in a lecture about education to an audience
of educators, that “we cannot be philosophers” which he repeats, but which is not meant
to diminish how his non-philosophers should see themselves. After announcing twice that
the future gentlemen he has in mind cannot be philosophers, he claims that “we” can do
what even the “greatest minds were unable to.” 90
Strauss’s explicit call to greatness is preceded by a depiction of the “Socratic”
model that his gentlemen are to follow. “We do well to take as our model,” he says, “that
one among the greatest minds who because of his common sense is the mediator between
us and the greatest minds. Socrates never wrote a book, but he read books. Let me quote a
statement of Socrates which says almost everything that has to be said on our subject.” 91
Without citation or attribution, Strauss quotes directly an unnamed man who reports:
“Just as others are pleased by a good horse or dog or bird, I myself am pleased to an even
higher degree by good friends.” 92 Strauss continues, “And the treasures of the wise men
of old which they left behind by writing them in books, I unfold and go through them
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together with my friends, and if we see something good, we pick it out and regard it as a
great gain if we thus become useful to one another.” 93 This is how Strauss depicts the
relationship between the philosopher-teacher and his gentlemen-friends and students. The
teacher is the messenger of a higher wisdom that transforms his gentlemen students into
perfect gentlemen. “The man who reports this utterance,” Strauss explains, “adds the
remark: “When I heard this, it seemed to me both that Socrates was blessed and that he
was leading those listening to him toward perfect gentlemanship.”” 94 The unnamed
reporter, we learn elsewhere, is Xenophon. “There is only one occasion on which
Xenophon calls Socrates “blessed”: when he speaks of how Socrates acquired his friends
or rather his good friends – he acquired them by studying with them the writings of the
wise men of old and by selecting together with them the good things they found in
them.” 95 He acquired friends through his teaching of philosophy and through that
teaching he and his perfect gentleman aimed to do what even the philosophers of old
were unable to.
Strauss’s teaching redirects the mission of the Socratic philosopher and the
students inspired by him. “The philosopher” Strauss teaches, “must assume the
perspective of the revolutionary founder.” 96 Strauss’s glorification of founders points
beyond “reverence for the single founder,” which is based on a “blindness to the fact that
in every flourishing society foundation is so to speak continuous.” 97 Robert Howse calls
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this Strauss’s effort to recover the “perspective of the founder” as part of a “spiritual
movement” and a multi-generational project. 98 Those living this project are guided by
the model of a Socrates who lived “like a god among human beings.” 99 This remodeled
Socrates is presented as “higher than Romulus in the case of Rome or Lycurgus in the
case of Sparta or Moses in the case of the Jews.” 100 He is the godlike source of the
highest wisdom and though he never founded a political society, he was the teacher of
future founders and a teacher of their teachers. 101
The Spirit of the Sect
In a key passage where Strauss sets out to complete his redefinition of philosophy
by describing the importance of education, he returns again to the theme of the
philosopher’s political activity. He defines what a philosopher is and does by first
warning against what he calls “Epicurian detachment,” a view of the philosopher as a
solitary, apolitical thinker. The argument begins with a depiction of an apolitical
philosopher but then proceeds by showing why the philosopher’s failures, weaknesses,
and uncertainties demand the creation of philosophical schools he calls sects. Strauss
presents the Epicurian view this way:
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Since the philosopher is the man who devotes his whole life to the quest for
wisdom, he has no time for political activity of any kind: the philosopher cannot
possibly desire to rule. His only demand on the political men is that
they leave him alone. He justifies his demand by honestly declaring that his
pursuit is purely theoretical and does not interfere in any way with the business
of the political men. This simple solution presents itself at first glance as the
strict consequence from the definition of the philosopher. 102

Referring to the definition of a philosopher as a solitary thinker who demands very little
of political men, Strauss says “it suffers from a fatal weakness.” 103
The weakness of the apolitical pursuit of wisdom is initially presented in terms of
the madman problem: the solitary thinker has no way to know whether his thoughts are a
sign of madness or genius unless he communicates his ideas to other thinkers. “The
philosopher cannot lead an absolutely solitary life,” Strauss says, “because the legitimate
desire for "subjective certainty" and the certainty of the lunatic are indistinguishable, and
so genuine certainty must be "inter-subjective." 104 The quest for truth, which has already
been redirected toward the creation of truth, is here pushed in another direction as a result
of the philosopher’s need for certainty and other limits exposed by a philosophy practiced
in solitude. Strauss claims that these limits were recognized by classical philosophers,
who addressed the challenge by pursuing their aims in schools, with philosophical friends
engaged in a common enterprise. “The classics were fully aware,” Strauss explains, “of
the essential weakness of the mind of the individual. Hence their teaching about the
philosophic life is a teaching about friendship: the philosopher is as philosopher in need
of friends.” 105 After asserting the centrality of friendship, Strauss shifts away from inter-
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subjectivity as a guard against the philosopher’s potential madness to inter-subjectivity as
group-oriented action in service to the philosopher’s mission:
To be of service to the philosopher in his philosophizing, the friends must be
competent men: they must themselves be actual or potential philosophers, i.e.,
members of the natural "elite." Friendship presupposes a measure of conscious
agreement. The things regarding which the philosophic friends must agree
cannot be known or evident truths. For philosophy is not wisdom but quest for
wisdom. The things regarding which the philosophic friends agree will then be
opinions or prejudices. But there is necessarily a variety of opinions or
prejudices. Hence there will be a variety of groups of philosophic friends:
philosophy, as distinguished from wisdom, necessarily appears in the form of
philosophic schools or of sects. 106

Strauss then concedes that “friendship as the classics understood it offers no solution to
the problem of "subjective certainty."” 107 Friends are not needed to test the philosopher’s
possible madness. The issue of subjective certainty is raised by Strauss to distract from
the real reason for turning to group-centric philosophizing.
The shift to group-oriented contemplation is really about pursuing and seeking to
actualize a kind of philosophical wisdom that is achievable only by transcending modern
modes of thought. A core lesson of Strauss’s philosophical education is that the highest
human wisdom is unattainable through modern, Western philosophy. As perpetual
seekers of wisdom, the philosophers of old never reached their goal, they never became
wise men in Strauss’s sense. Strauss’s debates with Alexander Kojeve reveal how both
philosophers, despite their ideologically opposed political orientations, believed that the
emergence of truly wise men demanded a rethinking of the Western approach to
philosophy. Mark Lilla explains that their public exchange proceeded “from their shared
conviction that Western philosophy had reached a terminus and had to be thoroughly
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reconceived.” 108 Strauss, like Kojeve, begins with the premise that past philosophers
have failed in their quest to actualize wisdom. They are in agreement that “at least up to
now there have been no wise men but at best men who strove for wisdom, i.e.,
philosophers.” 109
Strauss aims to correct the failures of past philosophers by reimagining how the
interplay between philosophy, politics and education can create a new class of wise men.
Howse explains that for Strauss the “failure of the ideal of the single thinker possessing
complete intellectual perfection, of the fantasy of the ruling mind, presages a new
beginning for philosophizing.” 110 Philosophy is recast as the dynamic relationship forged
through theoretical contemplation and political knowledge as expressed through the
greatest thinkers bound together across time and space in a conversation about the most
important human matters. This conversation is the source of the highest human wisdom
and can only be actualized by schools of thinkers themselves bound together by shared
ideals and commitments. This conception of philosophy entails bringing the views of past
philosophers into alignment on the most important issues by setting them in dialogue and
listening for the underlying wisdom hidden beneath the surface disagreements. It may
appear as if the “greatest philosophic minds of the past were in fundamental
disagreement” regarding the most important human matters, but their disagreements can
be presented as a conversation that conveys wisdom to those who know how to hear it. 111

108

Mark Lilla, The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics (New York: New York Review of Books,
2001), pp. 130-131.
109
Leo Strauss, On Tyranny: An Interpretation of Xenophon’s Hiero, Victor Gourevitch and Michael S.
Roth eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 208.
110
Robert Howse, Leo Strauss: Man of Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 17.
111
Ibid.

119

Strauss admits that under the conditions of modernity those devoted to actualizing
the wisdom of philosophy, cannot themselves be philosophers: “We cannot be
philosophers, but we can love philosophy; we can try to philosophize. This
philosophizing consists at any rate primarily and in a way chiefly in listening to the
conversation between the great philosophers.” 112 But Strauss does not view
philosophical contemplation as the passive reception of wisdom that comes from hearing
the conversation between the greatest minds. “But here,” he adds, “we are confronted
with the overwhelming difficulty that this conversation does not take place without our
help – that in fact we must bring about that conversation. The greatest minds utter
monologues. We must transform their monologues into a dialogue.” 113 The highest
wisdom can only be heard if the conversation between the greatest minds is produced by
philosopher-teachers who see themselves as prophetic messengers and lawgivers.
Strauss is vague about how philosophizing can produce actual wisdom by
engaging with and surpassing the greatest minds of the past, but Kojeve reveals a crucial
parallel in their respective notions of philosophical progress toward wisdom, which
Strauss does not refute or even qualify. Strauss’s silent acceptance of Kojeve’s approach
to wisdom speaks loudly. Kojeve explains that “if the Statesmen did not eventually
actualize the philosophically based “advice” by their day-to-day political action, there
would be no philosophical progress.” 114 The culmination of philosophical progress is the
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production of “the book of (“Bible”) Wisdom that could definitively replace the book by
that title which we have had for nearly two thousand years.” 115 Here Kojeve indicates a
division of labor between “philosophers” and “intellectuals” that could make such
progress possible. The philosopher is right, he says, “when he refrains from elaborating
his theories to the point where they speak directly to the questions raised by current
political affairs: if he did, he would have no time left for philosophy, we would cease to
be a philosopher and hence would cease to have any claim to giving the tyrant politicophilosophical advice.” 116 The philosopher needs friends to accomplish his goals, to
actualize the highest wisdom. “The philosopher is right,” he repeats before finally giving
a name to the friends he has in mind, “to leave the responsibility for bringing about a
convergence on the theoretical plane between his philosophical ideas and political reality
to a constellation of intellectuals.” 117 Whereas Kojeve speaks openly of replacing the
Bible with a philosophical book of wisdom, Strauss speaks elusively about creating a
philosophical dialogue that serves as a source of wisdom. Whereas Kojeve distinguishes
the philosopher from the intellectuals who work to actualize philosophical wisdom,
Strauss blurs that distinction and declares that the politicization of philosophy has made
“the essential difference between intellectuals and philosophers” difficult to discern. 118
Strauss explains that
the politicization of philosophy consists precisely in this, that the difference
between intellectuals and philosophers, a difference formerly known as the
difference between gentlemen and philosophers, on the one hand, and the
difference between sophists or rhetoricians and philosophers on the other,
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becomes blurred and finally disappears. 119

Elsewhere, further blurring these distinctions while removing the philosopher entirely
and substituting the wise man, Strauss insists that sophists can be mistaken for wise men
because “[b]oth the wise man and the sophist are in a sense possessors of wisdom. But
whereas the sophist prostitutes wisdom for base purposes, and especially for money, the
wise man makes the most noble or moral use of wisdom.” 120 The sophist, comparable to
modern elites, is called servile for his materialistic motivations. But the sophist is treated
as a gentleman and wise man when his words and deeds are put to moral-ideological use.
Highlighting further how his gentlemen are closer in spirit to Kojeve’s intellectuals than
to philosophers and suggesting how they can surpass the philosophers of the past by
actualizing wisdom, Strauss explains in a then-unpublished letter to Kojeve that, as a
corrective to the failures of past philosophers, the “philosopher-sophist-statesman” must
be treated as One. 121 As mentioned above, Strauss admits only once, in his singular essay
explicitly devoted to education, delivered to an audience of educators, that we cannot be
philosophers and yet he employs the term throughout his writings to describe the
gentlemen he endeavors to groom into wise men.
Strauss’s early work contain hints of irony, which speak to his lifelong effort to
rethink how philosophy can actualize the highest kinds of wisdom. In his early Hobbes
book he referred to The Book of the Courtier and recommended taking “Castiglione’s
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guide to the courtier’s life as an ironical guide to the philosopher’s.” 122 That irony can be
understood in a passage Strauss highlights where the companions of Plato and Aristotle
are depicted embracing the name “philosopher” despite their pursuit of political power.
Dionysius, pupil of Plato, and Callisthenes, pupil of Aristotle, failed to achieve wisdom,
in Castiglione’s telling, because of their tyrannical natures. 123 The irony Strauss alludes
to is not simply that tyrants called themselves philosophers despite being undeserving of
the label. Nor is the irony that Aristotle, according to Castiglione, is said to have
succeeded in transforming Alexander, another pupil, into a “true moral philosopher.” 124
The irony is that Strauss employs the same “methods of a good courtier” to pursue
wisdom and nobility by counteracting those deeds Castiglione calls wise and noble:
besides directing Alexander to the noble objective of wishing to make the
whole world into one single country, in which men would live as one people, in
friendship and peace among themselves under one government and one law
shining equally on all like the light of the sun, Aristotle educated him so well
in the natural sciences and in virtue the he became extremely wise. 125

Strauss’s wise men rebel against this vision, which is presented by Strauss as distinctly
modern even though he recognizes its origins in classical philosophy. Another irony.
Strauss’s teaching stresses the importance of sects because he aims to arouse a
passionate interest in a moral vision that counteracts the modern ideal. Kojeve is right to
critique Strauss’s anti-modern version of philosophy because it cultivates gentlemenfriends with a cloistered mind: “if he never leaves the intentionally narrow circle of a
deliberately recruited “elite” or of carefully chosen “friends,” he runs the risk of
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considering “worthy” those and only those who approve of him or admire him.” 126
Strauss concedes that philosophical “[f]riendship is bound to lead to, or to consist in, the
cultivation and perpetuation of common prejudices by a closely knit group of kindred
spirits. It is therefore incompatible with the idea of philosophy.” 127 The modern approach
to philosophy, Strauss admits “indeed lacks the narrowness of the sect: it embraces men
of all philosophic persuasions. But precisely for this reason,” he explains, it “stipulates
that no philosophic persuasion must be taken too seriously or that every philosophic
persuasion must be treated with as much respect as any other.” 128 Strauss is concerned
with inspiring passionate interest in the creation of moral truth, not agreement for its own
sake. He continues: “Whereas the sect is narrow because it is passionately concerned with
the true issues,” the modern substitute “is comprehensive because it is indifferent to the
true issues: it prefers agreement to truth or to the quest for truth.” 129 He concludes: “If
we have to choose between the sect” and the modern approach, “we must choose the
sect.” 130
Opting for the sect as a way to rebel against modernity is a corrective to the lack
of noble passion on the part of modern ruling elites. The problem stems from the fact
that modernity “embraces men of all philosophic persuasions” and thus infringes on the
philosopher’s ability to inspire full commitment to his ideas: the principles of modern
toleration and inclusiveness mean that “no philosophic persuasion must be taken too
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seriously.” 131 Unlike Strauss’s version of classical philosophy which is “passionately
concerned with the true issues,” the modern alternative is “indifferent to the true issues: it
prefers agreement” and the result is that “every philosophic persuasion must be treated
with as much respect as any other.” 132 Mutual respect and toleration aimed at fostering
universal agreement comes at the cost of dehumanization: “Agreement at all costs is
possible only as agreement at the cost of the meaning of human life: for agreement at all
costs is possible only if man has relinquished asking the question of what is right; and if
man relinquishes that question, he relinquishes being a man.” 133 To be fully human is to
pursue noble goals based on a moral framework. To be more than fully human is to create
that framework.
What is presented as the Socratic mission of classical philosophy is also framed in
religious terms. Straussian education seduces philosophers into playing the role of
prophets, a role Eugene Sheppard explains, “is appropriate only for a philosophic elite
who can properly respond to the challenge of knowing that providence does not guide the
unfolding of history.” 134 Straussian seduction is self-consciously serpentine. The
possession of moral knowledge is explicitly tied to godlike powers exemplified by the
setting and breaking of sacred prohibitions. “The serpent begins its seduction,” Strauss
explains, “by suggesting that God might have forbidden man and woman to eat of any
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tree in the garden.” 135 The focus is on the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and the
blame is the woman’s more than the serpent’s. In Strauss’s retelling, the woman “makes
the prohibition more stringent than it was: “we may eat of the fruit of the other trees of
the garden; it is only about the tree in the middle of the garden that God said: you shall
not eat of it or touch it, lest you die.”” 136 This more stringent prohibition, Strauss
suggests, is appropriate to the woman, not because of her gender per se but because here
she represents ordinary humanity in its lack of full understanding and its need for strict
moral prohibitions. The sentence immediately following the woman’s misunderstanding
of the serpent is directed to man qua representative of what is highest in humanity, the
man to whom the prohibition was not directed: “God did not forbid the man to touch the
fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.” 137 Strauss corrects the woman’s
misunderstanding of the serpent by explaining that actually the “serpent assures her that
they will not die, for God knows that when you eat of it, your eyes will be opened and
you will be like God, knowing good and evil.” 138 “The serpent,” Strauss continues,
“tacitly questions God’s veracity.” 139 The proper response to what Sheppard describes as
the problem of knowing that providence does not guide humanity, is to follow the man
who eats of the tree of knowledge and becomes the godlike creator of good and evil.
Strauss incorporates religious themes into his political philosophy not just to inspire the
creation of moral order based on suprahuman wisdom. When regimes are so corrupt that
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no moral teaching can improve them, then, according to Strauss’s reading of the Bible,
religious wisdom teaches wise men to prepare for a flood.
Strauss’s telling of the biblical story of Babel is meant to guide future wise men,
through “the purgation of the earth through Flood” and the ensuing “restoration of
mankind.” 140 Strauss’s chosen wise men are, contrary to accounts that focus on the
empire-building aspects, oriented to the cyclical movement of regime creation,
corruption, and destruction. The highest wisdom has taught them when regimes should be
founded, when regimes should expand and transform, and when corrupt empires deserve
to fall. Though Nimrod’s power was expressed in the expansiveness of his kingdom,
Strauss draws the reader’s attention to the fact that “his kingdom included Babel.” 141
Placing a corrupt Babel at the center of the kingdom, according to Strauss, justifies its
destruction and the scattering of humanity:
God scattered them by confounding their speech, by bringing about the
division of mankind into groups speaking different languages, groups that
cannot understand one another: into nations, i.e., groups united not only by
descent but by language as well. The division of mankind into nations may be
described as a milder alternative to the Flood. 142

In this context, Strauss restates that the division of mankind, a purgation that prepares the
way for a restoration, elevates one chosen group above all others. Not a nation of course,
but philosophers do represent, for Strauss, “a different species of human being,” and a
group which does and must speak in a different way than all other human groups.
According to Strauss’s reconception of the relationship between philosophy,
politics and education, which seeks to revitalize religious modes of thought, philosophers
140
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must see themselves as a chosen group on a special “Socratic” mission. As if guarding
against the notion that his political philosophy conceals a kinship with the nihilistic
reactionaries discussed in Chapter Two, Strauss alludes, in his last published book, to the
charge that his teaching is animated by a spirit of “destruction for its own sake,” a charge
he himself leveled against the German nihilists in his first public lecture after emigrating
to the U.S. Against this view, Strauss invokes the Jewish prophets and points to the
creative side of destruction: “I have this day set thee over the nations and over the
kingdoms, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy, and to throw down, to build, and
to plant.” 143 The next page opens the chapter on Nietzsche, the final essay Strauss ever
wrote, in which he describes a “super-Socrates” who is godlike. 144
The next and final chapter of this dissertation explores how Strauss’s ideas about
cyclical movement and regime transformation conceal an apocalyptic vision that serves
his reconceived Socratic mission.
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Ch.4 Toward the Missing King
“The highest subject of political philosophy is the philosophic life: philosophy - not as a teaching or as a
body of knowledge, but as a way of life - offers, as it were, the solution to the problem that keeps political
life in motion." 1

The quote above suggests that what Strauss calls “the philosophic life” offers a
way to deal with the problems that animate political life and keep it in permanent motion.
There is a sense in which Strauss sees philosophy aiming beyond political life, but the
higher goals of philosophy are not achieved by establishing a stable and permanent order
that puts an end to political motion because Strauss sees political movement as a
condition for the kind of excellence he promotes. The problem is that under the
conditions of modernity excellence understood as monarchical greatness is in danger.
This chapter argues that Strauss seeks to preserve the never-ending cycles of
political movement as a means to keep alive a monarchy-in-motion rather than establish a
permanent framework for a stable order. Accordingly, the quote above actually means
that political philosophers devote themselves to the study of philosophy, their highest
subject, to ensure that the never-ending cyclical movement of political life has a higher
purpose. The concern is not that politics is forever in flux. The concern is that without the
flux there is no space to pursue the highest excellence and without truth-creators the flux
is aimless. This final chapter explores how Strauss’s ideas about ancient utopianism,
regime cycles, and noble imperialism guide political and philosophical movement toward
a monarchical principle in a manner that opens space for future founders and lawgivers to
demonstrate their own monarchical greatness.
One aspect of the movement Strauss is concerned with has to do with the
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possibility that modern political regimes can move toward an expression of monarchy
through the coordinated actions of intellectual elites. A reason Strauss argues that
modernity is in crisis is that its core principles cultivate a ruling elite unable to properly
exercise its latent “regal power.” 2 Strauss’s monarchy-in-motion points to a kind of
kingship that is possible in all kinds of regimes, which do and should cycle through
political change in response to the corruption of the ruling class. The “late corruption” of
modernity presents an opportunity for movement toward a “postconstitutional” regime,
which in turns paves the way for a “preconstitutional situation,” the lawgiving moment
Strauss points to repeatedly in which philosophers and gentlemen come together as
founders. By guiding regimes through these political cycles, Strauss’s philosopherfounders make human life meaningful and demonstrate their kingly excellence.
Another aspect of the movement Strauss seeks to preserve is the supposedly
natural tendency of all political societies toward imperialism. All regimes, according to
Strauss, unless constrained by internal weakness or external force, tend toward
expansion, but not all kinds of imperialism are driven by worthy passions nor directed
toward noble goals. 3 Despite his consistent defense of expansionism, there is a kind of
imperialism Strauss rejects entirely: a modern imperialism animated by the search for
profits, the establishment of universal norms and “the fusion of science and the arts
together with the unlimited or uncontrolled progress of technology.” 4 That imperialism
“has made universal and perpetual tyranny a serious possibility.” 5 His engagement with
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Schmitt revealed his early concerns over modern depoliticization and the coming of a
pacified world populated by the last man. 6 Those concerns find mature voice in his
rejection of a modern universalism that points to a “world state,” 7 which he believes
justifies “nihilistic negation” because of its dehumanizing effect on mankind. 8 But
“nihilistic revolution” is not the only way to counter the political universalism that
Strauss projects onto an Athenian imperialism that betrayed its noble origins. 9 He sees in
Spartan “moderation” both a rebellion against Athenian universalism and an imperial
ethos that would preserve the political motion vital for the cultivation of monarchical
excellence. But even as he imagines a fusion of Spartan and Athenian imperialism
animated by the pursuit of “great and noble deeds,” he admits that such a project may be
“doomed to failure.” 10 And therein lies the apocalyptic aspect of the movement toward
kingship.
Strauss’s ideas about regime cycles and noble imperialism are presented in his
readings and commentaries on actual civilizational conflicts. In the great wars of the past
Strauss sees meaningful parallels to present day issues. His most detailed analysis of the
Pelopenessian War, where he decribes the differences between the Athenian and Spartan
regimes, begins with an introduction that reveals the contemporary significance of his
ideas about imperialism. Speaking of the crisis of modernity as a Western crisis, he
admits that the West’s lack of purpose is a greater concern to him than the prospect of
defeat or destruction in the cold war: “the defeat, even the destruction of the West would
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not necessarily prove that the West is in a crisis: the West could go down in honor,
certain of its purpose.” 11 “The crisis of the West,” he explains, “consists in the West’s
having become uncertain of its purpose.” 12 Referring to the previous world wars as a time
when “the West was once certain of its purpose,” he frames the cold war as a battle
against Communism to determine whose vision will guide the “future of mankind.” 13 He
declares his opposition to the vision of a “universal state” and sees in the cold war an
opportunity for the West to embrace the “Olympian freedom” through which “it
overcomes the crisis of our time.” 14 Chapter 1 describes this as the freedom of
philosophers to create truth and meaning. Here freedom is tied to imperialism:
“mankind’s greatest objectives, freedom and empire” are pursued on the battlefield of
political thought, “the field on which human excellence can show itself in its full
growth.” 15 For the highest human excellence to flourish, for ruling elites to be seen as
wise kings, imperialism too must be driven by a noble purpose. A guiding theme of this
chapter is how Strauss’s critique of tyranny is the basis for a noble vision of imperial
rule. By exploring his views on regal power and noble imperialism, this chapter analyzes
what Strauss means when he argues that “genuine Caesarism is not tyranny,” 16 and how
the cyclical movement from constitutionalism to post- and then pre-constitutionalism
prepares the way for new forms of lawgiving guided by future philosophers and
gentlemen who together represent a monarchical expression of excellence.
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Strauss’s reading of Xenophon’s story of the queen bee shows how Strauss tempts
his gentlemen-in-training to seek kingship. Strauss’s version of the story begins with a
young Socrates depicted by Xenophon learning from and how to become a “perfect
gentleman.” 17 The young philosopher is taught by the gentleman Iscomachus how to
wisely rule one’s own household. In Strauss’s telling, the gentleman’s wife is at the
center of the story, which is presented theatrically as a performance where each character,
Xenophon included, plays the part Strauss assigns. Strauss emphasizes that Ischomachus
was “speaking like a teacher” to his wife, who Strauss claims Xenophon is using as a
stand in for Socrates himself. This episode reinforces Strauss’s premise, argued
throughout his book length commentary, that Xenophon uses his perfect gentleman to
teach young philosophers how to become kingly-rulers. Though Xenophon presents the
mature Socrates recounting the story of the queen bee to Kritobolus, a gentleman-student
of the mature philosopher, Strauss insists that Xenophon’s true intention is to depict the
young Socrates, the immature philosopher in training, as the true addressee, a mirror of
the wife who is taught to think of herself as a queen. “We might even think,” Strauss
says, “that Ischomachus is addressing Socrates, when comparing his wife to a queen
bee.” 18 In Strauss’s presentation, the student is shown as a potential queen, the teacher as
the queen’s kingly master, and the author of the story, he who determines what the
teacher teaches, is the ultimate authority. From that perspective, Strauss sees the story of
the queen bee paralleling the mission of Socrates and his gentleman-students: “the queen
bee controls the upbringing of the progeny, and when the young ones are fit to work, she
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sends them out under a leader to found a colony.” 19
There is one important problem with Xenophon’s queen bee metaphor that
Strauss seeks to correct. “Above all,” Strauss explains, “the comparison of the wife with
the queen bee suffers from the fact that it does not provide a proper place for the husband
and master.” 20 Nothing is said about a king. The story ends by drawing attention to an
absent king. Strauss corrects for this failing by gesturing back to the beginning of the
story where Xenophon’s “perfect gentleman” is depicted as the teacher of a young
Socrates, who is presented later in the story as mature, after having learned the ways of
kingly rule. This is what Strauss has in mind when, in a speech to an audience of teachers
“concerned with human excellence,” he declares that the Socratic philosopher is the “one
true king.” 21 But he also says that the perfect gentleman is “the closest approximation to
kingship that is compatible with citizenship in a republic.” 22 Strauss’s teaching aims at a
kingship exemplified by “Socratic philosophers” and “perfect gentlemen,” but that does
not mean he aims at a perfect kingly regime.
Utopian Kingship
There is an ever-present tension in Strauss’s writings about whether the actualization of
the best regime is the true aim of the “philosophic way of life.” 23 He says that “the best
regime, as the classics understand it, is not only most desirable; it is also meant to be
feasible or possible.” 24 But to say that the best regime is possible is not the same thing as
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saying explicitly that it should be actualized. “It is of its essence,” he says, “to exist in
speech as distinguished from deed.” 25 On that basis, he refers to the most thoughtful
articulations of the best regime as utopias. 26 The best regime is a creation in speech
based on what is humanly possible, a creation needed to inspire human thought and
action, but a creation that sets limits on what is achievable. Utopia inspires hope, but it
also set limits.
Among the utopian visions Strauss find instructive is Xenophon’s depiction of the
poet Simonides’s efforts to improve the tyrant Hiero, efforts that Strauss claims “the wise
man” knew could not succeed, and yet had to show being attempted. It is precisely
because the wise man “himself did not believe in the viability of his improved tyranny”
that Strauss regards the depiction as a utopia. 27 It is a vision that tempts future efforts by
those who believe they can succeed where Simonides fails, and at the same time it is a
vision that sets limits on what is actually possible: the best regime to aim at is an
improvement on tyranny through the advice of wise men. But, for Strauss, the modern
idea that tyranny can be abolished and that universal happiness established is an
unrealistic fantasy unworthy of the label utopia.
Strauss makes a distinction between classical and modern approaches to utopia:
classical thinkers were wiser in their imaginings and therefore never envisioned universal
happiness as a noble goal. Whereas the “modern solution is utopian in the sense that its
actualization is impossible” and thus not worthy of being pursued seriously, the “classical
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solution is utopian in the sense that its actualization is improbable,” 28 but possible. The
difference between what is impossible and what is improbable is one thing that makes the
classical approach so important for Strauss. “The classical solution supplies a stable
standard by which to judge of any actual order,” he explains, but the “modern solution
eventually destroys the very idea of a standard that is independent of actual situations.” 29
Utopias are about imagining a standard by which to judge existing regimes, and inspire
movement toward improvement. What Strauss calls classical utopianism is a vision that
inspires the few to achieve the highest possible happiness, and precisely because its
realization is difficult but possible, it animates movement by those who see themselves as
great and those who are prepared to demonstrate their superior worth and ability.
Superiority is the standard of judgment. Modern utopias destroy that standard by holding
up the prospect that all human beings can achieve the highest happiness. This is
definitionally impossible for Strauss because the highest human happiness can only be
achieved by the highest humans beings, so any notion of happiness that can be achieved
by all is by definition not the highest kind because it does not distinguish the happiness of
higher and lower beings.
Strauss sees in classical utopianism a way to separate those who believe in and
accept the existing social order from those who believe they can distinguish themselves
by pursuing and becoming something better. Classical utopias understood as expressions
of the best social order are valuable in Strauss’s political philosophy because they
idealize existing political life in a way that gives people meaning and purpose while
setting limits on the expectations that ordinary people have from their existing rulers. At
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the same time these idealizations inspire heroic action on the part of the few driven by the
call to greatness. Utopia as the “perfect city in speech” is an idealization that exists only
in speech. 30 Strauss treats utopia as a speech-act that should be understood as a kind of
writing, and the “proper work of a writing is truly to talk, or to reveal the truth, to some
while leading others to salutary opinions; the proper work of a writing is to arouse to
thinking those who are by nature fit for it.” 31 Utopian idealizations reinforce the beliefs
of ordinary people in a way that keeps their hopes high even as it keeps their place low,
while inspiring the noble few to transform the existing order and realize their own higher
potential. 32
Philosophy’s concern, according to Strauss, with utopian idealizations begins with
the existing political order but then moves beyond it. The starting point is the political
sphere of public opinion. 33 On this level, the utopian idealization “appeals not to
philosophers as such, but to citizens as such” engaged in political life. 34 But utopias
contain a higher call to greatness that culminates in “the attempt to lead the qualified
citizens, or rather their qualified sons, from the political life to the philosophic life.” 35
Utopias appear to idealize the social order while recruiting those who seek to transcend it.
In this sense Strauss refers to utopias as disguised satires. 36 The initial idealization in
which citizens are described as belonging entirely to the city is an articulation based on
the philosopher’s professed commitment to political life, but that idealization contains a
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“ruthless philosophical attack” on the city and the beliefs of its citizens. 37 This higher
level attack is presented as an ascent from the beliefs of common men, whose allegiance
to the citys gods and civic traditions is required by political life but unworthy of the
philosopher, to the higher plane where philosophers become the godlike sources of those
beliefs and traditions. 38
Even as Strauss admits that the actualization of the best regime, understood as the
establishment of perfect happiness, is impossible, he insists that realizing the “highest
excellence” is possible in the form of the reimagined philosopher, an “imagined being”
who reflects humanity’s greatest excellence by elevating political life through and
towards philosophy. 39 Strauss’s own utopian vision is realized in and through the
philosophers and gentlemen who come together as philosopher-founders. While the “best
regime simply” is a kingship that is impossible under modern conditions, he tempts those
inspired by his call to greatness to change those conditions and pursue their aims under
modern constraints: “under certain conditions,” he insists, kingship “of its essence” is
possible in modern regimes through the coordinated efforts of philosophers and
gentlemen who understand how to exercise “regal power.” 40 A modern regime ruled by
perfect gentleman is “the closest approximation to kingship that is compatible with
citizenship in a republic.” 41
Strauss’s utopianis paves the way for an idealization of modernity that inspires
self-confidence in democratic citizens, while also imposing limits on their expectations
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by reinforcing the belief that the existing liberal-democratic order is the best political
order and there is no good reason to hope for anything else. At the same time, such an
idealization can be presented in a manner that contains a ruthless attack on the existing
democratic order, which is detectable by those who are dissatisfied with modern
“effeminacy” and tempted by the call to “excellence.” 42 This is the context in which
Strauss compares “the excellence of Spartan education” that “leads to virtue” with an
Athenian education “which leads to effeminacy.” The conclusion of this chapter will
explore how this distinction relates to their respective approaches to imperialism, but here
the issue is how Strauss idealizes the movement from democratic effeminacy toward
monarchical excellence.
Strauss looks beyond the Athenian regime and even beyond Greek civilization in
search of an alternative model of kingship. Strauss finds in Xenophon’s portrayal of
Cyrus a literary device for teaching another model of monarchical excellence. 43 Strauss
is less concerned with the historical Cyrus, and more concerned with an “imagined
being” 44 who represents kingship as lawgiving by a supreme individual who creates a
new regime. After introducing “Cyrus” in the context of exploring how to move from
Greek effeminacy to supreme lawgivers, Strauss returns to the Greeks and offers the idea
that founder-kings like Lycurgus claimed to be descendants of demigods. 45 But here too,
the historical Lycurgus is not Strauss’s focus. “We are then led to the conclusion that,”
Strauss says about the way philosophers recreate historical figures and vest them with
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godlike powers, “according to Xenophon, Lycurgus did not exist at all, or that ‘Lycurgus’
was a mere name covering something much less solemn than an almost divine
lawgiver.” 46 Strauss turns to Xenophon’s portrayal of Lycurgus as an “almost divine
lawgiver” to depict his own concept of kingship. 47 Strauss’s king need not be an
individual: “‘Lycurgus’ is, then, a name designating authority or the men in authority.” 48
“Lycurgus” and “Cyrus” are names that designate a concept of kingship realizable
by “men in authority” who articulate a vision that idealizes the status quo even as they
attack and seek to transform it. And that transformative movement can be achieved,
Strauss explains, by restoring classical political philosophy. Such a restoration is
presented as utopian in the twofold sense that it is meant to reassure ordinary people that
their own is the best regime and that no fundamental change should be hoped for, but also
to inspire hope among the few with noble dreams and a kingly imagination. 49 These are
the few who are instructed by classical teachers to see in utopian idealizations of freedom
and democracy a regime that is “so preposterous they turned their imagination in entirely
different directions.” 50 One direction they turn is to “Cyrus,” the founder of a new
empire, another is to “Caesar,” the godlike king who transformed an empire.
In his exchange with Kojeve, which was discussed in chapter three to highlight
Strauss’s ideas about the relationship between the philosopher and his perfect gentlemen,
Strauss distinguishes between difference kinds of Caesars: “there are tyrannical as well as
royal Caesars.” 51 “One has only to read,” he continues, “Coluccio Salutati’s defense of
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Caesar against the charge that he was a tyrant - a defense which in all essential points is
conceived in the spirit of the classics - in order to see that the distinction between
Caesarism and tyranny fits perfectly into the classical framework.” 52 Strauss adapts
Caesarism to a modern framework. Pointing to Salutati is revealing because he was the
chancellor of the Florentine signorie, who, like the ephors of Sparta who Strauss
approvingly describes as having tyrannical power, were elected lords who ruled as
despots. 53 Salutati was in effect the head of a small class of elites who exercised despotic
power under his intellectual guidance: his elites looked back to the classical past in order
to imagine a different future. “I have always believed,” Salutati explains, “I must imitate
antiquity not simply to reproduce it, but in order to produce something new.” 54 Strauss
too looked to antiquity to inspire future creation.
When Strauss declares that “wisdom requires unhesitating loyalty to a decent
constitution and even to the cause of constitutionalism,” 55 he is embedding pre-modern
ideals into a modern constitutional framework and steering it toward his own concept of
monarchical greatness embodied by philosophical elites. These new elites look beyond
constitutionalism to “Cyrus” and “Lycurgus” as supreme lawgivers and regime-creators,
and to “Caesar” as a regime-transformer and godlike savior. What Strauss says of
Machiavelli’s use of “princes” applies to Strauss’s own use of “philosophers”: “[w]e
suspect that Machiavelli sometimes uses “princes” in order to designate superhuman
powers.” 56 Strauss’s “utopian” defense of constitutionalism contains a philosophical
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attack meant to inspire those with superhuman powers to move beyond it.
Cycling Around Constitutionalism
Strauss’s explicit defense of constitutionalism and accompanying arguments for
aristocratic excellence are expressions of his vision of philosophical elites who see
themselves as superhuman beings overseeing the cyclical movement of regimes.
Hovering above Caesars, above constitutions, and above chaos itself, are thinkers who
create and recreate regimes that provide meaningful truth and order. Strauss’s whole
discussion of constitutionalism looks beyond it to “post-constitutional Caesarism” and
beyond that, to the “pre-constitutional situation.” In that sense, his is not an argument in
favor of tyrants, or even kings, because higher than the “royal Caesar” he defends, are the
godlike forces of wisdom that propel constitutional regimes toward Caesarism, and then
prepare the way for the post-Caesarian space he refers to as pre-constitutional, a space
that demands new truths, new laws, and new founders.
In the context of analyzing whether beneficent tyranny can live up to the highest
standard of excellence as presented in Socrates’ definition of the good ruler, Strauss
argues explicitly against tyranny. He says that “the aim of the good ruler is much more
likely to be achieved by means of laws than by means of absolute rule.” 57 But in terms of
philosophical principles, Strauss admits that good government does not require rule of
law: “as a matter of principle, rule of laws is not essential for good government.” 58 Rule
of law is crucial to Strauss as a matter of political expediency. Considerations of law and
legitimacy are dealt with through the prism of political usefulness and strategic necessity,
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but those arguments give way to philosophical justifications for “regal power” contrasted
to “criminal tyranny.” 59 Laws, as a practical matter, help the “good ruler” achieve his true
aims, but, on principled grounds, are not essential for “good government.” This draws the
reader’s attention to the idea that the highest aim of the good ruler is something other
than or higher than the law, and to the question of how laws are used to achieve those
higher aims, which here Strauss equates with justice. Strauss speaks through Alcibiades
to address the question “What is law?” and to distinguish the concept “justice” from its
identification with the law. Later, in the discussion of imperialism, Alcibiades is the
vehicle Strauss uses to question whether the Athenian empire could have been redirected
to serve a higher cause if the Sicilian expedition had not been betrayed by ignoble elites.
Strauss uses Alcibiades to point beyond the law, to noble concepts of justice. At one
level, the separation between law and justice is meant to distinguish between just and
unjust laws. “But,” Strauss explains, “apart from the consideration that the identification
of ‘just’ and ‘legal’ would make impossible the evidently necessary distinction between
just and unjust laws, there are elements of justice which necessarily transcend the
dimension of the legal.” 60 Strauss points to a higher realm beyond the law, where
wisdom serves as the source of justice. And from that higher perspective, he looks
beyond existing regimes as if to say that wisdom demands permanent movement beyond
the here and now.
The distinction between law and justice is presented as a complex tension, which
Strauss magnifies by contrasting constitutionalism with a “tyrannical teaching” that he
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introduces and initially defends. 61 He ultimately argues against tyranny not because it is
unconstitutional but because it, by definition, is unkingly: “being a tyrant, being called a
tyrant not a king, means having been unable to transform tyranny into kingship, or to
transform a title which is generally considered defective into a title which is generally
considered valid.” 62 Strauss ultimate defense of constitutionalism takes as its starting
point the standard of justice defined by kingship. It begins with an idealization of
“beneficent tyranny,” then seeks to improve and transform that tyranny according to a
higher source of justice. But unable to make tyranny appear as anything other than “rule
without laws,” unable to provide it with a “title which is generally considered valid,”
Strauss shifts to a defense of constitutionalism as opposition to “criminal tyranny.” His
defense of constitutionalism is subordinate to and made compatible with the aim of
monarchical rule by wise elites.
The case for a benevolent tyranny of wise men could never be accepted by a
“legitimist or constitutionalist,” Strauss explains, because that case is premised on the
idea “that there is only one sufficient title to rule: only knowledge, and not force or fraud
or election, or we may add, inheritance, makes a man a king or ruler.” 63 The case for wise
absolutism, which Strauss makes and then backs away from, states that constitutional rule
and “rule derived from elections in particular, is not essentially more legitimate than
tyrannical rule, rule derived from force or fraud.” 64 Wisdom is the source of justice and
legitimacy. He says that tyrannical rule as well as constitutional rule will be legitimate to
the extent to which the tyrant or the constitutional rulers will listen to the advice of wise
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men. 65 But Strauss backs away from the utopian case for wise absolutism and joins the
camp of the “legitimists and constitutionalists” because kingship expressed through wise
absolutism is not achievable. Speaking through Xenophon, Strauss says that “[w]hile
Xenophon seems to have believed that beneficent tyranny or the rule of a tyrant who
listens to the counsels of the wise is, as a matter of principle, preferable to the rule of
laws or to the rule of elected magistrates as such, he seems to have thought that tyranny at
its best could hardly, if ever, be realized.” 66 “Reasons such as these,” Strauss says about
his turn against the tyrannical teaching, “explain why Xenophon, or his Socrates,
preferred, for all practical purposes, at least as far as Greeks were concerned, the rules of
laws to tyranny, and why they identified, for all practical purposes, the just with the
legal.” 67 Following “his Socrates,” Strauss then offers a defense of constitutionalism,
from the perspective of a “good citizen” living under a constitutional regime.
Philosophers have a duty, Strauss says, to reassure political authorities that they
are neither “subversives” nor “irresponsible adventurers” but are “good citizens and even
the best of citizens.” 68 If philosophers must be seen as good citizens then those living
under a constitutional regime are forbidden from making the case for tyranny of the wise.
Strauss summarizes the reasoning for adopting the constitutionalist position by reminding
political philosophers of the importance of being seen as good citizens:
The “tyrannical” teaching -- the teaching which expounds the view that a case can be
made for beneficent tyranny, and even for a beneficent tyranny which was originally
established by force or fraud - has then a purely theoretical meaning. It is not more than a
most forceful expression of the problem of law and legitimacy. When Socrates was
charged with teaching pupils to be “tyrannical,” this doubtless was due to the popular
misunderstanding of a theoretical thesis as a practical proposal. Yet the theoretical thesis
by itself necessarily prevented its holders from being unqualifiedly loyal to Athenian
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democracy, e.g. for it prevented them from believing that democracy is simply the best
political order. It prevented them from being “good citizens” under a democracy. 69

Strauss returns to the tyrannical teaching in a later section, which, in light of the
preceding, acknowledges that his own teaching prevents his pupils from having
unqualified loyalty to democracy. “We have stated,” he says in language that draws
attention to his own interpretation of the tyrannical teaching, “that according to that
teaching beneficent tyranny is theoretically superior and practically inferior to the rule of
laws and legitimate government.” 70 This admission in the context of his shift toward
defending constitutionalism reminds readers that the “tyrannical teaching” is not meant as
a practical proposal for establishing the best regime but is a pedagogical device: it “serves
the purpose, not of solving the problem of the best political order, but of bringing to light
the nature of political things.” 71 A theoretical teaching is not meant as a practical
proposal, and should not be seen publicly that way: “It is one thing to accept the
theoretical thesis concerning tyranny; it is another thing to expound it publicly.” 72
Publicly, Strauss teaches that philosophers living under a constitutional regime must
defend the cause of constitutionalism. But the teaching is utopian in Strauss’s sense
because accompanying the practical defense there is a theoretically superior view that
attacks constitutionalism and seeks to transform and transcend it.
Strauss even articulates this attack openly when he discusses those situations
when it is publicly defensible and legitimate to subvert the constitutional order. 73 Only
when a constitutional regime is in a “state of decay” is it legitimate to subvert the regime.
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If decadence rises to the level that wise men declare the regime corrupt, then efforts to
transform it are necessary. Strauss refers to the kind of corruption that justifies the
movement toward Caesarism as “late rottenness” and contrasts it to the “initial
corruption” of a people without law or government. 74 A new form of rule is necessary
when people need to be made good. In the context of explaining that “it is only
government, laws and other institutions which make men good,” Strauss says that
“through the application of regal power for a considerable time” people in a corrupt
regime can “become good or incorrupt.” 75 Founders like Romulus, who confront a
situation of initial, lawless corruption, understand how to use “regal power” to establish
an order that, in Strauss’s words, will “make men good.” Caesars operate in the context
of late rottenness, which justifies their use of royal power to transform existing regimes.
Apart from lawlessness, Strauss describes
another kind of corruption, namely, late rottenness, the corruption of Rome at the time
not of Romulus but of Caesar. Initial corruption, we may say, is the state of mind which
necessarily follows from the absence of law and government; late corruption is the state
of mind which necessarily follows from gross inequality in respect to power and wealth
among members temporal and spiritual of a society. The former kind of corruption allows
of a republican future; the latter kind of corruption precludes a republican future. 76

His discussion of both initial and late corruption is based on a future-oriented concern
with the creation and transformation of corrupt regimes by wise men who understand
when and how to use regal power. These wise men know when the circumstances call for
the establishment of republican or constitutional regimes and when the situation demands
something else.
Both alternatives require wise elites able to guide the actions of transformational
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leaders and regime founders. Strauss explains that even the “founders of republics must
be princes” who can only achieve their highest aims if they are “guided by intelligence
and sustained by strength of will or temper, sufficient to make a prince a good prince.” 77
The wise men must, in the context of lawlessness or initial corruption, know how to
advice founders to establish a good regime. But in the context of late corruption, the wise
men must seek out and create a good Caesar. Speaking of the post-republican path,
Strauss explains that Caesarism emerges only in the context of late corruption in what he
elsewhere describes as the breakdown of constitutional order. 78 In this context, Strauss
claims that genuine Caesarism is not tyranny: it is a wise response to the condition of
corruption and seeks to reestablish a good regime. 79 Strauss’s justification for “royal
Caesars” in contradistinction to “criminal tyrants” is not rooted simply in political
necessity determined by the breakdown of political order and the need to establish
stability: he justifies Caesarism as an expression of excellence, which improves and heals
a decaying body politic. Caesarism makes something corrupt and sick into something
“noble and good.” 80 The highest expression of regal power is a wisdom that aims not to
preserve a corrupt and sickly social order, but to heal it, to make it good. Royal Caesars
are the antidote to a sickly, rotten regime.
Strauss sees corruption as a process of decay that is inevitable and therefore
regimes move in cycles. The movement within legal-constitutional orders from initial
rottenness through late corruption prepares the way for the movement to “post-

77

Ibid., p. 267-269.
Leo Strauss, On Tyranny: An Interpretation of Xenophon’s Hiero, Victor Gourevitch and Michael S.
Roth eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 178-180.
79
Ibid., p. 180.
80
Ibid., p. 179.
78

148

constitutional Caesarism,” which ultimately prepares the way for a movement back to the
“pre-constitutional situation.” 81 When Strauss says that Caesarism prepares the way for
the golden era he points at and then beyond the era of godlike emperors, but also says that
“eternal glory” is not for the rulers themselves, but for the invisible demigods whose
wisdom guides them. 82 And when Strauss argues that Caesarism points back to “early
Kingship,” he is referring to how Caesars prepare the way for a pre-constitutional
lawlessness that demands new foundations. Caesarism invites rebellion, which creates the
conditions where new laws are needed. Caesarism is thus both a response to corruption
and an expression of it. There is no golden age of Caesars in Strauss’s teaching, but there
are golden moments when societies transform and wise men become creators and
founders. The cyclical movement Strauss seeks to preserve aims at excellence through
the founding and refounding of regimes, and while this movement offers no certainty that
excellence will emerge, it does provide inspiration to future founders.
With the ancient idea of regime cycles as the backdrop, Strauss’s “survey of the
movement” takes Machiavelli’s reading of Polybius as a model, but Strauss’s version is
updated for modern readers. Strauss makes elusive reference to Hobbes, the liberal
critique of Hobbes, and Schmitt’s antiliberal rereading of Hobbes suggesting that the
regime Strauss is most concerned with cycling beyond is modernity itself. Transforming
that foundation transforms the modern regime. This distinctly Straussian presentation of
regime transformation points ultimately to the importance of movement itself, which
creates ongoing opportunities for wise men to found “the best regime.” Here, and only
here, Strauss acknowledges from the outset that the best regime can be any regime that
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“fulfills the natural function of political society.” 83 Though here the best regime is
presented as a republic, the key is that the founding moment creates space for the highest
kind of excellence: it provides freedom for those who can create something noble and
good. When regal power decays and becomes criminal tyranny, then wise men guide the
movement back to the beginnings in pursuit of new foundations:
The republic of the character exemplified by the early Roman republic is the best regime because
it fulfills the natural function of political society. Men who originally live like beasts establish
government in order to escape insecurity; the function of political society is to make men secure.
Security, equally desired by all potential members of a political society, can be achieved only by
the union of them all, it is a common good since it must be shared in order to be enjoyed. Political
society fulfills its function through political power, and political power is apt to threaten the very
security for the sake of which it was established. To avoid this danger, the majority must have a
share, commensurate with its capacity, in public power. But men cannot be sure of their security
without having acquired superiority to their potential enemies. Besides, they are necessarily
dissatisfied with security as soon as they possess it; they no longer appreciate it; they subordinate
it to superiority to others in wealth and honor. Constant vigilance and periodic return to the
beginnings, i.e. periodic terror, do not suffice. Society cannot be kept united if it is not threatened
by war, and this threat will soon lose its salutary character if it is not followed from time to time
by war itself. War at any rate leads to oppression of the vanquished, even if oppression should not
have occurred with the society on account of the desire of some of its members to lord it over their
fellows. Oppression, or injustice, is then coeval with political society. Criminal tyranny is the state
which is characterized by extreme oppression. There is then in the decisive respect only a
difference of degree between the best republic and the worst tyranny. 84

All regimes fall somewhere within this movement, somewhere between the best regime,
exemplified by the founding of a political society by superior beings who establish and
maintain the kind of security that can transform beast-like humans into good and even
noble men, and the worst tyranny, exemplified by extreme oppression resulting from the
assertion of superiority by those who exploit their power unguided by wisdom. The
assertion of superiority by wise men is the key to the movement Strauss aims to preserve.
When the political society that emerges from the lawgiving moment fails to establish
enduring institutions that make people and their leaders good, then wise men proclaim
those efforts illegitimate and tyrannical. But when the accumulation and discharge of
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power is guided by wisdom, then the assertion of superiority is synonymous with the
pursuit of noble freedom and monarchical excellence.
The freedom and excellence Strauss is concerned with can emerge out of any
regime. What he says of Machiavelli applies to Strauss himself: “he teaches citizens how
to seek glory and reputation” in all regimes. 85 Any political regime can present
opportunities for noble freedom and excellence because all regimes emerge from the
minds and actions of lawgivers who create truth and order by ruling over others. This
underlies Strauss’s view that “mankind’s greatest objectives, freedom and empire” are
pursued on a political field upon which “human excellence can show itself in its full
growth.” 86 Strauss believes that what begins as a general commitment by all regimes to
the common good entails the pursuit of “glory and empire.” 87 But he does not advocate
imperialism for its own sake nor does he treat all expressions of imperialism as equally
deserving of glory. He argues for an “intelligent imperialism” that can earn its leaders
“eternal glory befitting the gods.” 88

Imperial Aims
Imperialism remained a consistent theme throughout Strauss’s writings. From his early
years, when he claimed in personal letters that the Nazis could only be defeated through
the “principles of the Right: fascism, authoritarianism, imperialism,” 89 to his American
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writings, when he articulated an aristocratic concept of excellence tied to the pursuit of
“freedom and empire,” 90 he saw imperialism creating space for the expression of noble
values. But the idea of imperialism too has been corrupted, in Strauss’s view, by ruling
elites driven by material self-interest and modern ideals like universal peace rather than
pre-modern notions of honor and glory. Strauss promoted an alternative, noble approach
to imperialism that restores the monarchical ideal of greatness and counters the modern
movement toward universalism.
An indication of the kind of noble imperialism that Strauss believed could cure
late modern corruption is provided in his comparison of Sparta and Athens in the context
of their civilizational war. His analysis of the differences between Spartan and Athenian
imperialism highlights distinct elements of their respective regimes that demonstrate
Strauss’s own views about the restoration of the monarchical ideal. Strauss defends
Athenian imperialism for its “spirit of initiative, daring and inventiveness” which
produces “superior ideals and superior human beings.” 91 The key is the way Strauss links
adventurous creativity and superiority. But he also celebrates Spartan imperialism for its
“moderation” and “restraint,” by which he means the Spartan spirit of rebellion against
Athenian universal values. 92
All cities seek to expand, according to Strauss, but not all deserve the eternal
glory bestowed on great empires. The regimes who “deserve to rule an empire” are those
driven by “not merely fear and profit but also something noble, honor.” 93 The Athenian
regime that Strauss endorses as being “worthy of imperial rule,” is the Athens that was

90

Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 133.
Leo Strauss, City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 206.
92
Leo Strauss, “The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon.” Social Research 6 (1939), p. 513.
93
Leo Strauss, City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 211.
91

152

driven to empire not from a base concern for profit or the unmanly concern for peace:
“the ultimate justification of the Athenian empire is less compulsion, fear or profit than
everlasting glory - a goal to the pursuit of which the Athenians are not compelled, or with
which they are not obsessed, but to which they have freely and fully dedicated
themselves.” 94 The noblest expressions of imperialism, Strauss says, are animated by the
pursuit of eternal glory. Robert Howse correctly explains that, in Strauss’s usage, glory is
achieved when political action is guided by wisdom, and eternity is understood in thisworldly terms as the distant future. 95 Eternal glory is possible for Strauss when noble and
wise elites guide multi-generational political projects. That pursuit should be guided by
the noblest and wisest of men, by “philosopher-founders” whose unique knowledge gives
them “the true title to eternal glory.” 96 Howse explains that for Strauss, “one essential
part of this very knowledge is the awareness that the actual achievement of eternal glory
cannot be guaranteed simply by virtue of knowledge or understanding; the actual
achievement of eternal glory depends on the eventual real-world foundation of a new
political order.” 97 Imperialism provides space for the highest human types to demonstrate
the highest kind of excellence by creating new regimes.
In his defense of Athenian imperialism, Strauss draws the reader’s attention to a
noble kind of freedom that he links to generosity, which imbues the philosopherfounder’s mission with a gift-giving spirit. Noble imperialism is freely undertaken and
driven by a multitudinous generosity: “generosity without pettiness or calculation,
freedom, generous gaiety and ease, courage in war which stems not from compulsion,
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dictation and harsh discipline but from generosity, in brief, a well-tempered love of the
noble and the beautiful.” 98 The repetition of the term generosity here alludes to the premodern aristocratic notion of noblesse oblige, and freedom to courage in the pursuit of
something noble and beautiful. Aristocratic gift-giving is not the only thing noble in this
depiction, “freedom is also something noble.” 99 Noble freedom as the free-creation of
truth and meaning through philosophy comes to mean regime-creation when freedom is
aligned with the noble expression of imperialism.
When Strauss discusses noble freedom in the context of the imperial pursuit of
eternal glory, the philosopher-founder is said to be in possession of the highest truth,
which is akin to possession of the “true divine law.” 100 Imperialism allows for this divine
knowledge to be actualized in the here and now. Strauss equates this divine law with a
concept of natural right that treats the assertion of superiority as a universal truth: “The
Athenian assertion of what one may call the natural right of the stronger as a right which
the stronger exercises by natural necessity is not a doctrine of Athenian imperialism; it is
a universal doctrine.” 101 This universal doctrine of superiority applies in all times, to all
regimes and is referred to by Strauss as “the true divine law, the law of the interplay of
motion and rest, of compulsion and right, compulsion obtaining among unequals and
right obtaining among cities of more less equal power.” 102 Superior powers are
compelled by the logic of expansion: “unless it is kept back by weakness of one kind or
another, every city is itself compelled to expand.” 103 But political expansionism is only
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treated as a noble expression of imperialism when it is guided by the philosopher’s noble
and beautiful truths. Strauss explains that “the natural right of the stronger does not lead
in all cases to expansionism” because wise men know when to impose limits. 104 Here he
makes an important distinction between a wise and restrained pursuit of noble
imperialism and the unwise, ignoble pursuit of political universalism.
Strauss’s defense of noble Athenian imperialism, which represents a “special kind
of democracy” 105 and which reflects superior philosophical ideals and “produces superior
thinkers and leaders,” 106 is tempered by his rejection of an imperialism that aims at a
universal state and system of values. As it relates to the prospect of creating a universal
system that would end the struggle for superiority, Strauss turns against the Athenians
and sides with the Spartan approach to imperialism, which he calls moderate and
restrained. Howse sees Strauss arguing that a “strong power’s natural impulse to rule can
know some limits or bounds.” 107 But what is presented as a defense of moderation is at a
deeper level an attack on universal ideals and an argument for permanent power struggles
among groups who see their own wisdom as supreme.
Knowledge of the “divine law” vests the philosopher with authority that Strauss
sees transcending the political laws that determine the power-seeking behavior of states.
The philosopher who has become a wise man understands that he must provide an
authoritative account of the political laws that govern state behavior, but that account
must set limits on political expectations while preserving the freedom of the philosopher
to remain the highest authority on what is right and good. As it applies to the
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philosopher’s need to guide the pursuit of empire, Howse explains that Strauss treats the
philosopher’s wisdom as a supra-political law: “[a]cceptance of the compulsion to empire
or domination by the powerful as a universal rule of state behavior does not lead to the
conclusion that such behavior cannot or should not be held in check by law.” 108
Philosophers must hold in check the imperial drive by ensuring that it aims at noble
pursuits rather than limitless expansionism rooted in a universal ideal. Philosophers who
see themselves as the highest source wisdom and truth and who want to eternally remain
that source, will see the actualization of universal political laws as a threat to their
authority.
For the authority of wise men to forever transcend that of universal laws, any
efforts to create a universal empire or political system must be countered. One way to
counter that movement is to defend what Strauss calls moderate or restrained
imperialism, that is, imperialism that aims at domination by superior powers without
seeking to foreclose future displays of superiority by ending the struggle for power itself,
which makes possible “great and noble deeds.” 109 Howse claims that Strauss sides with
“Spartan moderation” because it was held in check by “fear of the gods and reverence for
law.” 110 Accordingly, Howse sees Strauss rejecting the radical turn the Athenian empire
took. “The radical nature of the Athenian imperial ideology,” Howse explains, “lies not
so much in the principle of imperial expansion as a natural compulsion of the strong
(which, as Strauss notes, applies to Sparta as much as to Athens) but rather in the
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commitment to the Athenian ideology to insatiable, limitless expansionism.” 111 But
Strauss’s turn here to Spartan imperialism against Athenian universalism is not really
about restraint and moderation. Spartan imperialism represents a land-based approach to
establishing dominion that demands and fosters the “warrior virtues” Strauss praised the
German militarists for demonstrating in their rebellion against English imperialism. 112
His praise for Spartan imperialism is silent about this warrior ethos, but this silence
speaks loudly. The martial spirit of the Spartan regime is reframed as moderate and
restrained because it is not oriented toward universal expansion and makes no effort to
create a universal system. This is what Strauss means when he teaches the wisdom of
moderation and the importance of recognizing the limits of politics.
Strauss only turns against Athenian imperialism when it “points towards universal
rule.” 113 That critique does not take away from his praise for the way Athenian leaders
like Pericles demonstrated their own superiority and that of their regime by justifying
imperial policies using philosophical principles. 114 Athens stands for two kinds of
universalisms that Strauss wants to disentangle. Philosophical or “true universalism” as
represented by wisdom is “beautiful” and must be separated from “radical political
universalism” represented by efforts to establish universal rules that can be enforced
equally on all. 115 Modernity, Strauss argues, is on such a path and it ends in what he
alternately calls the “world state” 116 or the “universal and homogeneous state.” 117
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Proponents of aristocratic excellence should rebel against such a universal state because
universal values treat all people equally: by not recognizing the fundamental difference
between those who are capable of great and noble deeds and all others, universal political
laws diminish human potential. Strauss’s writings speak to those who see the movement
toward a universal state threatening human excellence and thus diminishing or even
destroying humanity’s potential. “There will always be men,” he says, “who will revolt
against a state which is destructive of humanity or in which there is no longer a
possibility of noble action and of great deeds.” 118 The Spartan rebellion against Athens
provides one model for how to deal with the problem of an emerging universal system.
Another answer Strauss provides to aristocratic rebels is both nihilistic and
apocalyptic. “They may be forced,” he says about the philosophers who will lead the
rebellion, “into a mere negation of the universal and homogeneous state, into a negation
not enlightened by any positive goal, into a nihilistic negation.” 119 The fact that such a
counter-movement may lead to ruin does not deter Strauss from inspiring this kind of
heroic rebellion. “While perhaps doomed to failure,” Strauss says, “that nihilistic
revolution may be the only action on behalf of man’s humanity, the only great and noble
deed that is possible once the universal and homogeneous state has become
inevitable.” 120 Strauss anticipates and reframes the argument of those who see such great
and noble deeds leading to ruin. He justifies the nihilistic revolution this way:
Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and
homogeneous process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state
will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process - a new lease of life
for man’s humanity - not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the
inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of
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seasons, although we know that winter will come again? 121

This spirit of revolt based on a cyclical vision of winter’s end and spring’s renewal
should be understood as apocalyptic. Advocating the nihilistic negation of an emerging
universal system embraces catastrophic destruction in the name of an imagined renewal.
Strauss’s defense of Spartan imperialism against Athenian universalism in the context of
a civilizational conflict was, in his view, a noble expression of rebellion, which in the end
destroyed an empire which had been corrupted by decadent elites. The death of Athenian
radical universalism also made possible the eternal glory of Greek philosophy, and its
rebirth in ever-new guises in ever-new regimes.
The rebellion against Athens should also be seen, in Strauss’s teaching, as part of
a never-ending movement toward kingship. Strauss turns against the Athenians when, at a
key historical moment, they embraced a “version of imperialism not ennobled by any
thought of everlasting glory.” 122 Whereas Alcibiades represents political greatness
ennobled by philosophical wisdom, those who turned against him abandoned “any
thought of generous compassion or any pleasure deriving from speeches” and embraced a
war policy Strauss derides as “sobriety itself,” a policy whereby “the war serves no other
purpose than to preserve the empire.” 123 The Athenians who cautioned against following
Alcibiades betrayed a leader who, in Strauss’s estimation, reflects the greatest human
potential. In turning against Alcibiades, Athens betrayed a noble cause and thus deserved
its fate. Strauss stands most stridently with Athens at the crucial moment when
Alcibiades convinces the empire to set sail for Sicily. Though history views that
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expedition as a disaster that led the empire to ruin, Strauss insists that the expedition
represents a worthy cause, which “would have succeeded if the Athenian demos had
trusted Alcibiades.” 124 He reiterates this belief several times and implies that if an
analogous historical moment presents itself, a future Alcibiades should be ready to set
sail again, even if it would lead his empire to ruin. Strauss recognizes that in the long
run, imperialism destroys freedom and ultimately destroys itself. 125 And yet he promotes
a ruinous imperialism in the name of something higher: the “grandest imperial enterprise
ever undertaken by any Greek city” could have made Alcibiades “the arbiter of all
powers and which might have made him the monarch of Athens and not only Athens.” 126
Imperialism is not an end in itself. Imperialism is but a means to keep alive the unending
movement toward kingship.
Strauss’s concept of monarchical greatness is kept in motion by three overlapping
themes: a utopianism that presents improbable but possible goals and which sets limits on
ordinary people as it tempts “philosopher-founders” to prove their superiority, a defense
of constitutionalism premised on permanent regime cycles which looks beyond legal
frameworks toward a higher notion of justice created by wise lawgivers, and a form of
noble imperialism which rebels against political universalism and sees destruction as a
path to renewal. By combining these elements with those discussed in previous chapters
- a concept of noble freedom that sees the creation of truth and meaning as the highest
philosophical task, a theoretical framework that redefines the fusion of politics and
philosophy while seeking to revitalize religious modes of thought, and an approach to
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philosophical education that reimagines how teachers, thinkers and leaders create and
rule regimes - Strauss presents himself as something “more than a philosopher,” he turns
himself into a prophet who points toward the arrival of a missing king.
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Conclusion
This dissertation has argued that Leo Strauss’s understanding of the relationship
between freedom and nihilism is a crucial but neglected theme at the center of his
political philosophy. Although renewed attention was drawn to Strauss’s work in the
debates surrounding US post-9/11 foreign policy, scholars who researched Strauss’s
influence on neoconservative thought by exploring his defense of imperialism and his
writings about regime transformation did not connect these themes to his theory of
freedom. And the scholars who have rightly argued that Strauss’s political philosophy
conceals its Nietzschean elements, have misunderstood how Nietzsche’s ideas shaped
Strauss’s thinking about freedom and philosophy. This dissertation has argued that the
scholarly literature, which has long focused on Strauss’s Platonic and Machiavellian
sides, has paid insufficient attention to how Nietzsche influenced Strauss’s redefinition of
the philosopher as a prophetic lawgiver, regime changer, and truth-creator.
The dissertation began as an investigation into how Strauss thought about
freedom, and how his ideas could have influenced neoconservative intellectuals who
promoted an American imperial agenda. The results of that investigation made clear that
Strauss’s teaching about freedom looks beyond America and beyond empire. This
dissertation has argued that his political philosophy does not point to democracypromotion through imperial expansion, but does aim to transform democratic regimes by
combining aristocratic and authoritarian principles with an apocalyptic vision. The
argument I have made is that Strauss’s teaching is Nietzschean at its core, and that his
worldview is utopian in the sense that it is based on a vision in which the cyclical
movement of regime creation, corruption and renewal is overseen by a new class of
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intellectual elites that see themselves as founders and lawgivers. This dissertation has
explored how Strauss’s ideas about freedom and imperialism are tied to a rebellion
against modernity itself, which Strauss sees evolving toward a universal state. 1 Freedom
and imperialism come together in Strauss’s work not to propel the movement toward a
universal empire, but as a countermovement to prevent the emergence of an intellectual
or political system not conducive to Strauss’s notion of monarchical greatness.
There is an unexpected story that emerges from Strauss’s response to modern
nihilism. In that story, Strauss picks up where Nietzsche’s left off by connecting the
failures of modernity to the void left by God’s death, but whereas Nietzsche publicly
proclaims the death of God and celebrates the space it opens for future creators, Strauss
responds by concealing from public view the allegedly dark truths that endanger ordinary
people and free philosophers to become “more than perfect philosophers.” 2 True
freedom, for Strauss, begins intellectually with an awareness of the absence of God and
moves to conceal the consequent meaninglessness of human existence. The highest
expression of this philosophical freedom is the achievement of wisdom, which transcends
the existential abyss of nothingness by moving from concealment of dark truth to the
production of meaningful truth.
Strauss thematizes the irreconcilable tension between reason and revelation, the
two alternative approaches in the Western tradition that thinkers can pursue and must
choose between when confronting the question of how to actualize wisdom. But I have
argued that Strauss blurs the differences and teaches his philosophers a fusion of the two

1

Leo Strauss, On Tyranny: An Interpretation of Xenophon’s Hiero, Victor Gourevitch and Michael S.
Roth eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 208.
2
Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 199.

163

approaches. Strauss uses “Athens” and “Jerusalem” as symbols that refer to the two poles
around which the greatest human minds sought answers to the greatest human questions,
but the argument I have been making is that while Strauss claims that truth seekers must
choose one or the other path, his teaching actually combines elements from both paths in
an effort to overcome the failures of modernity by having philosophers play a godlike
role. This dissertation has argued that for Strauss “Athens” and “Jerusalem” represent the
two poles of ancient wisdom that together should guide political leaders and the
intellectuals who guide them. “Athens” represents ancient wisdom as expressed by
philosophers capable of a noble freedom that transforms them into higher beings.
“Jerusalem” represents the source of sacred texts that inspire a chosen few to keep alive
belief in the higher power of creators. In response to the way modern nihilism threatens
the noble freedom of regime founers and the wise men who instruct them, Strauss turns to
“Athens” to teach future philosophers to see themselves as the chosen few and he turns to
“Jerusalem” to teach those chosen few to restore mankind’s highest potential by setting in
motion the conditions for future creation. But as in the biblical story of Babel, new
creation follows after cataclysm: “the purgation of the earth through Flood,” Strauss says,
prepares the world for new creation. 3 This dissertation tells the story of how Athens and
Jerusalem come together in Strauss’s mind to prepare the ground for future creators.
Each chapter of this dissertation presented different aspects of Strauss’s vision,
which points to the possibility of “systemic renewal” within a modern democratic
regime. 4 The first three chapters explored Strauss’s critique of modernity through his
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understanding freedom, his redefinition of philosophy and his approach to education. By
focusing on the Nietzschean elements in Strauss’s work, the dissertation has built on the
work of scholars who see Strauss’s mature teaching as a reformulated extension of his
youthful, acknowledged commitment to “the principles of the Right: fascism,
authoritarianism, and imperialism.” 5 Looking at Strauss’s authoritarian and aristocratic
concept of excellence and his defense of noble imperialism, the dissertation has argued
that there is an atheistic religiosity animating Strauss’s idea of philosophers as prophetic
lawgivers. That religiosity has Nietzschean origins which are concealed in Strauss’s
treatment of Platonic and Machiavellian themes.
All the chapters explored how Strauss’s philosophical and political commitments
grow out of an elitism that not only opposes the principle of modern egalitarianism but
rejects the Enlightenment notion that the discovery and dissemination of truth is the path
to human freedom, justice and happiness. My starting point was Strauss’s distinct
elitism, which has been described by his students in terms of his attitude toward truth:
“[w]hat distinguishes Strauss’s elite is not wealth, status, political, military, or economic
power, but recognition of “the truth.” This truth is hard to face: there is no God, and there
is no divine or natural support for justice.” 6 The dissertation has argued that Strauss
followed Nietzsche in teaching that the truth leads to an abyss of nothingness from which
only creative minds can save humanity by filling the void left by God’s absence. But
Strauss does not follow Nietzsche in shouting this from rooftops. The dissertation started
off by exploring Strauss’s response to Nietzsche’s willingness to openly proclaim God’s
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death and how Strauss’s theory of philosophical freedom is shaped by an esotericism that
incorporates and conceals Nietzsche’s idea that truth-creation is the highest expression of
the will-to-power. The dissertation ends by arguing that Strauss’s Nietzschean
affirmation of the real world points to a vision of a monarch-in-motion, which is based on
a cyclical concept of regime transformation and a defense of noble imperialism in
rebellion against modern universalism. But this vision which inspires future philosophers
to see themselves as prophetic lawgivers with the power and duty to create meaningful
truth and order entails an unending cyclical movement that invites destruction as the
condition for future creation.
Chapter One presented a framework for understanding Strauss’s theory of
freedom, which included a concept of “noble freedom” that draws inspiration from
Nietzsche’s vision of philosopher-creators. I made the argument that Strauss transforms
the distinction between negative and positive freedom into a hierarchy of different kinds
of freedom corresponding to a rank order of human types. Strauss refers to the lowest
kind of freedom as “License,” which applies to people with no control over their base
urges. Strauss claims that license leads to anarchy and diminishes human potential, which
is why he rejects it completely. Strauss uses “Liberty” to refer to a higher kind of
freedom that applies to people who accept that human desires require restraint and human
lives require purpose. Liberty is meant for people who obey laws given to them by higher
moral authorities; for people who aspire to be dutiful citizens pursuing higher goals than
those determined by material self-interest. For Strauss, this notion of liberty undergirds
civilized political order and he defends it but with important qualifications. The highest
kind of freedom, in Strauss’s view, is “noble freedom,” which is the kind he is most
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concerned with conceptualizing and promoting. Noble freedom applies only to
philosophers who have the intellectual courage and creativity to overcome the
fundamental human experience of meaninglessness. 7 Chapter one argued that Strauss’s
concept of noble freedom as an antidote to modern nihilism is rooted in the Nietzschean
notion that the most meaningful truths are created by philosophers.
Chapter two argued that Strauss’s political philosophy fuses aspects of philosophy
and politics in a manner that redefines how philosophers seek to actualize wisdom. This
chapter expanded on the work of scholars who argue that Strauss’s thought contains
elements of Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political. My argument is that these scholars
have misunderstood how the Nietzschean elements in Strauss’s work shaped even the
political aspects of his concept of philosophy. This chapter argued that Strauss’s
redefinition of philosophy is animated by a doctrine of the primacy of politics that
emphasizes combat against “historicism” and “relativism,” which are treated as enemy
ideologies that threaten philosophers on their quest to become godlike creators of truth,
meaning, and purpose. Chapter Two also explored Strauss’s view that philosophers must
pursue their higher aims in a politically responsible manner. For Strauss that means
philosophers must conceal dangerous truths and outwardly uphold civic and religious
traditions so that ordinary people are protected from the deeper truths that only
philosophers can handle, and philosophers are protected from the people whose
resentment would endanger the philosopher’s quest if they knew that philosophers
believed it was their natural right to create and recreate human worlds.
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Chapter three argued that Strauss’s notion of philosophical education seeks to
cultivate a new class of aristocratic intellectuals whose devotion to philosophy can only
be understood through his oracular “call to greatness.” 8 Chapter three explored why
Strauss thinks that the pursuit of wisdom leads philosophers into schools he calls sects
and why the truths they are forced to keep secret endanger the public, invite persecution,
and compel them to engage in sophistry and sectarianism while seeking a philosophical
wisdom that transcends politics. I made the case that ultimately Strauss sees
philosophical education as the cultivation of philosophers and gentlemen who work
together as founders, lawgivers, and regime changers called to fill the void left by an
absent God. The search for wisdom which opens the possibility of superhuman perfection
is explicitly modeled on the questing philosophers of the ancient world, but is actually
guided by Strauss’s Nietzscheanized “Socratic” model of future philosophers who can
succeed where past philosophers failed in actualizing the higheset wisdom in this world
through “wise men.”
Chapter Four looked at the utopian and apocalyptic elements in Strauss’s teaching
as they emerge from his defense of noble imperialism and his critique of modern
universalism, which Strauss saw as a form of tyranny. The notion of temptation was
explored in the context of Strauss’s concern with regime transformation animated by a
rebellion against modern regimes. Chapter four argued that Strauss’s teaching is a
temptation to move from constitutionalism to “post-constitutional Caesarism,” but not
because he sees a benevolent or wise tyranny as the best regime. 9 For Strauss, the
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tyrannical temptation is about inspiring thinkers to create the conditions for a “preconstitutional situation” and energize the movement toward aristocratic excellence and
monarchical greatness. The final chapter argued that Strauss’s ideas about utopianism,
regime cycles, and imperialism seek to preserve the never-ending cycles of political and
philosophical movement that keep alive a monarchy-in-motion. The aim is not to
establish a permanent framework for a stable, final or best social order. The aim is to
inspire permanent movement toward the missing king.
My dissertation presents several interesting possibilities for future research into
the meaning and impact of Strauss’s ideas. My interpretation of the core themes in
Strauss’s work will allow scholars to better understand the words and actions of
Straussian intellectuals and the political leaders who follow their advice. Even though
Straussian thought has often been associated with neoconservatism, some Straussian
intellectuals have embraced a Trump-led conservative-populist movement seemingly at
odds with the neoconservative commitment to American greatness via an imperialistic
freedom agenda. 10 Other Straussians continue to advocate neoconservative ideals and
steadfastly oppose populism. 11 My discussion of how Strauss’s approach to education
focuses on the cultivation of schools can help explain how different Straussian “sects”
can support different policies and different leaders even as they remain devoted to the
same overarching theory. Moreover, my reading of Strauss’s views about cyclical
movement and regime transformation offer insight into how, policy differences to the
contrary, neoconservatism and conservative populism both serve as vehicles for
Straussians to lead an ideological movement that ties visions of future greatness to the
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recreation of a mythical past. Despite Strauss’s promotion of intellectual elitism, it is
perfectly consistent with Straussianism to support an anti-intellectual leader like Donald
Trump, and not just because he can be seen as an empty ideological vessel for Straussians
to fill with their own ideas about greatness. Trumpism offers Straussians a way to rebel
against existing elites and existing ideologies: it prepares the ground, in the manner I
have discussed, for future creation by rejecting the elites, policies, institutions and norms,
which have led to the kind of corruption that, according to Strauss, justifies postconstitutional Caesarism and paves the way for the “pre-constitutional situation” that
opens space for future founders and lawgivers.
Donald Trump’s appointment of Michael Anton to the National Security Council
is an interesting case because Anton demonstrates how a self-described Straussian can
embrace an anti-elitist, populist movement while remaining committed to a Straussinspired elitist vision of greatness. 12 Anton’s critique of neoconservative imperialism
dovetails with ideas associated with the populist-nationalist movement and epitomizes the
work of a new generation of West Coast Straussians. “I think Michael is one of the most
significant intellects in this nationalist movement,” Steve Bannon said when he was still
Trump’s chief strategist. 13 Two essays penned by Anton are especially instructive in
terms of how Straussian aims can be pursued through Trumpism. The first essay, written
during the election, triggered much debate among conservative intellectuals for its
rebellious extremism. The second essay, written after Anton was appointed Deputy

12

Rosie Gray, “The Populist Nationalist on Trump’s National Security Council,” The Atlantic March 24,
2017. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/does-trumps-resident-intellectual-speak-for-his-boss/520683/.
13
Ibid.
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Assistant to the President for Strategic Communication, demonstrates how a moderate
sounding critique of existing institutions conceals a radical spirit of destructiveness.
“The Flight 93 Election” was written by Anton for the website American
Greatness, which was started by Straussian scholars and became a crucial intellectual
resource for Trumpism. 14 Anton’s essay demonstrated a rebellious attitude toward
American institutions, a condemnation of the existing ruling class, an apocalyptic
worldview, and a heroic call to sacrifice in the name of higher ideals, all of which are
consistent with my reading of Strauss. 15 He also framed the rise Trumpism in the context
of describing the American republic as a corrupt and dying regime, which parallels how
Strauss justifies the rise of Caesarism. My discussion of the movement in Strauss’s
argument from “post-constitutional Caesarism” to the “pre-constitutional situation” can
help explain why some Straussian intellectuals have rallied to Trump’s call to greatness:
they see opportunities for future founders and lawgivers. Anton’s essay has little to say in
terms of policy proposals, but it does articulate the Straussian desire for “civic renewal,”
which for Anton requires that conservative intellectuals rethink how they pursue
“creative destruction.” Anton’s call to break away from “Conservatism, Inc.” and pursue
higher aims in the “political arena” parallels Strauss’s critique of modern elites and his
promotion of a new nobility.
Soon after joining the Trump administration, Anton wrote an essay that
demonstrated several themes I have argued are central to Strauss’s political philosophy.
In “America and the International Liberal Order,” Anton rejects neoconservative
democracy-promotion and defends a foreign policy of “moderation,” which captures the

14
15

See Sanneh.
Michael Anton, “The Flight 93 Election,” The Claremont Review of Books September 5, 2016
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way Strauss’s argument for restrained and moderate imperialism conceals his promotion
of noble imperialism. 16 Anton’s version of America-first nationalism combined with his
anti-liberal posture, his delegitimization of the existing international order, and his
condemnation of modern intellectual elites epitomize how Strauss’s teaching aims at the
renewal of the American regime, the transformation of the international order, and the
emergence of new kinds of “wise men” able to provide people with a purpose that is
“greater than themselves.” 17 These themes are present in the writings of Straussian
intellectuals who have broken with neoconservatism and seek to redefine the
conservative movement led by Trump through scholarly journals and publications like
the Claremont Review of Books, the Journal of American Greatness, and American
Affairs. A fruitful line of research would be to explore how this scholarship is influenced
by Strauss’s concept of “nihilist negation,” an effort to overcome nihilism by inverting it,
or combatting one expression of nihilism with another so as to negate and overcome
modernity itself.
Other Strauss scholars who once advocated neoconservative policies have found
in Trump’s populism a way to articulate Strauss’s defense-cum-transformation of
Western civilization.18 In my view, what Straussians like Peter Berkowitz see in
Trumpism is an opportunity to rethink how Western principles fit together to constitute
the American regime and the international order. Trump offers a way for Straussians to
reassemble the pieces and recreate the regime. According to Berkowitz, Trump reminds
us that there are “serious tensions within Western civilization. Freedom, limited
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Michael Anton, “American and the International Liberal Order,” American Affairs February 2017.
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government, faith, family, and nation are, as Trump asserted in Warsaw, pillars of the
West. How they fit together, however, has never been more of a puzzle - for conservatism
and for the West.” 19 Berkowitz sees in Trumpism a way to challenge the rule of existing
intellectual elites, who are treated as the central problem because they do not understand
the significance of the West’s roots in “Athens and Jerusalem.” The problem for
Berkowitz comes directly from Strauss’s teaching: modern intellectuals promote a
concept of freedom that is tied to equality and they fail to understand how family,
religion, and schools that “cultivate moral and intellectual virtues” can “prevent liberty
from deteriorating into license and equality from mutating into the demand that
everybody think alike.” New intellectual elites are needed because existing intellectuals
“foster an indiscriminate disdain for authority.”
My arguments about Strauss’s approach to education show how Straussian elites
seeks to rectify the problem of the loss of higher moral authority. But more work is
needed to show how Straussian support for populism in scholarly publications and news
outlets has less to do with defending authoritarianism and more to do with delegitimizing
and replacing existing intellectual authorities as part of a broader effort to transform the
modern understanding and form of democratic regimes along the lines I’ve discussed
throughout the dissertation. It would also be interesting to explore the arguments made by
Straussians in opposition to foreign authoritarian movements in order to distinguish the
conservative authoritarianism of perceived enemy regimes from the conservative
authoritarianism I have argued that Strauss teaches.

19
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Finally, it would be interesting to explore how freedom is conceptualized in the
Straussian critiques of leftists and liberals and how that critique differs from libertarian
conservatives. Based on my understanding of Strauss’s theory of freedom and my
argument about his efforts to revitalize religious modes of thought, I expect that
Straussians will continue to forge alliances with conservative populists and religious
conservatives, and move away from libertarians and market-oriented conservatives whose
liberal conception of freedom is dehumanizing according to Strauss.
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